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 Abstract 
Changes in the New Zealand public health sector in recent years, such as heightened political, 
economic and social pressures to manage and reduce costs while improving the quality of 
care in conjunction with stringent health care guidelines, have forced district health boards 
(DHB) nationwide to reassess their approach to health care provision. This has chiefly 
involved evaluating current practices or institutions; revising health care systems, including 
locality of treatment; and assessing established accounting systems and mechanisms (or lack 
thereof) to understand the source of costs and resource consumption. Acknowledging that 
patient welfare has always held pre-eminence in the New Zealand public health sector, 
balancing the dual pressures to enhance the utilisation of limited resources and adhere to 
social pressures to provide sustained high quality health services has been a difficult exercise 
for DHBs. In recognition of the potential benefits of activity-based costing (ABC), and the 
fact that the New Zealand public health sector is severely underrepresented in current 
literature, this multi-site case study examines how sophisticated costing systems (such as 
ABC), are being used by DHBs. Using an institutional theory framework, this study posits 
that DHBs will use sophisticated costing systems to (1) improve cost understanding with the 
goal of managing and reducing their costs; and (2) contribute to more informed National 
Prices for Inter-District Flows (IDF), the aim of which is to plan and provide services to meet 
the directives and outcomes outlined by the Ministry of Health. Overall, the findings are 
compelling and reveal that costing systems are used on three levels to plan and provide health 
services, including unsophisticated costing systems that are not formally recognised; 
moderately sophisticated costing systems (such as CostPro) that are formally recognised; and 
sophisticated costing systems (such as PPM) that are formally recognised. Furthermore, the 
findings reveal that DHBs with sophisticated costing systems generate event-level 
information, which directly influences the calculation of National Prices for IDFs. The 
findings of this exploratory study also indicate a need to examine the nexus between ABC 
and IDFs in a New Zealand public health sector context further. 
Key Words 
New Zealand Public Health Sector, District Health Board, Activity-Based Costing, 
Sophisticated Costing Systems, National Price, Inter-District Flow 
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 Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In 2001, the newly elected Labour-led coalition Government passed the 2000 New Zealand 
Public Health and Disability Act (Ashton et al., 2008; Tenbensel et al., 2011; Ettelt et al., 
2012). Under the auspices of this Act, the Government reformed the New Zealand health and 
disability support sector by disestablishing existing hospital and health service providers and 
the Health Funding Authority, and replaced them with twenty-one partially elected district 
health boards (DHB).1 The DHBs were established as local agencies accountable to the 
Ministry of Health (MOH or “the Ministry”) for organising health care, and latterly, disability 
support services for the populations of their district (Tenbensel et al., 2011). In accordance 
with the 2001 reform, DHBs were set up specifically to “undertake periodic assessments of 
the needs of their populations, plan services for their districts, provide services through their 
provider arms (public hospitals and related services) and contract for services delivered by 
non-DHB providers” (Tenbensel et al., 2011, p. 243). 
One of the foremost issues with the reform of the New Zealand health and disability system 
(referred to as the New Zealand public health sector hereafter) concerned health service 
planning. Specifically, “planning at district level was considered to be insufficiently aligned 
with national objectives, and inter-district co-ordination too weak, leading to inefficiencies, 
duplication of services and concerns about future sustainability” (Ettelt et al., 2012, p. 55). 
Following a change in Government in 2008 and a ministerial review in early 2009, the 2010 
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act was revised in an attempt to mitigate the 
aforementioned concerns. As a result of the review, the Government was specifically advised 
to centralise some functions related to purchasing and planning of health services. “Other 
changes included the introduction of regional planning and co-ordination of services; changes 
to the distribution of operational and strategic plans, which made regions responsible for 
strategic and regional operational planning and districts responsible for operational planning” 
(Ettelt et al., 2012, p. 55). 
In late 2009 (and as a direct result of the ministerial review), the National Health Board 
(NHB) was established within the MOH with the explicit aim to improve the planning of 
services across district boundaries (for an overview of the NHB and its associated functions 
see Figure 1). “A key role of the NHB is to oversee and assist district and regional level 
1 On 1 May 2010, Otago DHB and Southland DHB merged to form Southern DHB, resulting in one less DHB 
operating under the MOH. There are currently twenty DHBs in the New Zealand public health sector. 
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 planning and to devise national strategies for services that are organised and/or planned at 
national level” (Ettelt et al., 2012, p. 55). Specifically, the NHB is responsible for developing 
a long-term view for service planning and reconfiguration, and planning and purchasing 
numerous national services – typically those services that are highly specialised or vulnerable 
to workforce shortages (Ettelt et al., 2012). The NHB is also expected to monitor 
development and implementation of DHB annual plans, which should align with the 
outcomes outlined by the MOH (Ashton et al., 2008). There are several outcomes for the 
MOH and health system that the Ministry considers to be main strategic emphases. The 
outcomes include New Zealanders living longer, healthier and more independent lives; a 
health system that is cost-effective and supports a productive economy; health services that 
are delivered better, sooner and more conveniently; and finally, assurance of the future 
sustainability of the health system.2 If a DHB is found to be failing against these outcomes, 
the NHB will advise the MOH when or if it needs to intervene (as the MOH holds all 
statutory powers) (Ettelt et al., 2012). 
Though there is strong evidence that the current New Zealand Government acknowledges it 
must do more to ensure the sustainability of its health sector (i.e. establishing the NHB and 
attempting to strengthen the MOH’s control over DHBs activities through emphasising 
central planning and oversight) there is inconclusive evidence of the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms (Ettelt et al., 2012). “Good planning requires good information, based on data 
that is complete, reliable, consistent and comparable” (OAG, 2013, p. 4). However, in a 2013 
review of regional services planning in the New Zealand public health sector, the Office of 
the Auditor-General (OAG) found a wide range of problems when they looked at how data is 
used in planning services. Specifically, the data the OAG reviewed was not always 
consistent, comparable, or complete – despite these conditions being important for planning 
and reporting purposes. “A lack of baseline information means that the contribution of 
regional services planning to reducing service vulnerability, reducing costs, and improving 
the quality of care is unproven” (OAG, 2013, p. 4). The OAG concluded that well-known and 
systematic problems need to be resolved to ensure that data can form a sound basis for 
planning and decision-making (OAG, 2013). As a result, there is a need to better understand 
how DHBs plan to provide services and how costing information influences this process. 
Consequently, this study has numerous motivations, which are discussed next. 
2 To achieve the outcomes outlined above, the MOH has separated the public health sector into several distinct 
business units, each with its own specific objectives (see Figure 1 for an overview of each Business Unit and its 
associated functions). 
2 
 
                                                          
  
Figure 1: Ministry of Health Organisation Chart 
(Source: www.health.govt.nz, 14/10/2013) 3 
 
 1.2 Motivation 
From 1950 until now, the amount of money the country has spent on health care has risen 
approximately three times the rate of increase of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Acknowledging the fact that the New Zealand public health sector has been predominantly 
funded through general taxation for the past 60 years, and continues to be funded through 
general taxation supplemented by statutory insurance for accidents and injuries, there are 
concerns that the current ongoing growth of spending on health care is not sustainable in the 
future (Tenbensel et al., 2011; Ettelt et al., 2012). These concerns are exacerbated by 
increasing demands on New Zealand’s health services, driven by causes such as a generally 
increasing population, an ageing population (with a lower proportion of people active in the 
workforce) and the rising prevalence of long-lasting health conditions (OAG, 2013). While 
the NHB has been established purposively to (1) improve service planning at the district and 
national level (including stronger alignment of service, capital and capacity planning); (2) 
improve inter-district co-ordination (with the aim of gaining efficiencies, reducing 
duplication of services, improving the quality of care and eradicating concerns about the 
sustainability of health care); and (3) achieve the overall outcomes outlined by the MOH, 
there is a need to assess the influence of the NHB and the twenty DHBs it monitors to fulfil 
their reformed roles (Ettelt et al., 2012; OAG, 2013). This is corroborated by the fact that 
eight DHBs did not meet their budgets in the 2012 financial year, and DHBs have historically 
faced difficulties meeting their annual budgets (OAG, 2013). 
As noted above, changes in the New Zealand public health sector in recent years, such as 
heightened political and economic pressures to manage and reduce costs while improving the 
quality of care in conjunction with stringent health care guidelines, have forced DHB’s 
nationwide to reassess their approach to health care provision. With the intention of 
preserving legitimacy, this has chiefly involved evaluating current practices or institutions; 
revising health care systems, including locality of treatment; and assessing established 
accounting systems and mechanisms (or lack thereof) to understand the source of costs and 
resource consumption (OAG, 2013). Acknowledging that patient welfare has always held 
pre-eminence in the New Zealand public health sector, balancing the dual pressures to 
enhance the utilisation of limited resources and adhere to social expectations to provide 
sustained high quality health services has been a difficult exercise for DHBs (OAG, 2013).  
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 As a result, this study will assess the influence of the NHB and the twenty DHBs it monitors, 
using a twofold consideration. The first consideration is adoption and use of costing systems 
by DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector. As current cost accounting 
literature indicates (Cooper & Kaplan, 1992; Drury & Tayles, 1995; Hussain & Gunasekaran, 
2001; Abdallah & Li, 2008), more sophisticated costing systems provide higher quality cost 
information compared to traditional costing systems, which leads to more informed and 
effective decision-making. Thus, bearing in mind the MOH’s directives and desired 
outcomes, and the recent issues observed by the OAG, it is expected that DHBs operating in 
the New Zealand public health sector will adopt and use more sophisticated costing systems, 
such as activity-based costing (ABC), to plan and provide health services. Based on this 
expectation, there is a need to ascertain whether or not DHBs adopt and use costing systems 
(including their level of sophistication), how well DHBs understand their costs and cost 
structures for effective service planning and provision, and how DHB’s contribute to 
effective regional and national service planning and provision using information provided by 
their respective costing systems. 
The second consideration is how service planning and provision is effectuated by inter-
district co-ordination and inter-district flows (IDF), and the impact costing systems adoption 
and use have on these processes. As Ashton et al. (2008) notes, most DHBs do not provide a 
full set of services within their districts; therefore around one in six admissions are for 
patients from other districts. Thus, there is a process of inter-district co-ordination that takes 
place to plan and provide services via IDFs. Ashton et al. (2008) expressed concerns about 
deficiencies in payments for IDFs. Specifically, there are concerns regarding poor quality 
data on the numbers and types of flows, inaccurate pricing and late payments. There is also a 
belief that mechanisms used to inform prices unfairly affect smaller secondary DHBs 
compared to larger tertiary DHBs due to the excessive influence tertiary DHB’s supposedly 
have over the price setting process, which is done at national level. As there is no published 
literature on IDFs in the New Zealand public health sector, this study will set out to 
determine how National Prices for IDFs are calculated, how costing systems information is 
used to inform these prices, how effective these prices are for inter-district trading, and to 
what extent DHBs are in collaboration with each other to plan and provide health services. 
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 1.3 Research Objective 
In recognition of the potential benefits of sophisticated costing systems, and the fact that the 
New Zealand public health sector is severely underrepresented in current cost accounting and 
transfer pricing literature, the objective of this study is as follows: 
To examine the costing systems used by DHBs to plan and provide health services, and to 
evaluate how the use of such costing systems influence service planning and provision (at the 
district, regional and national level) in accordance with the outcomes outlined by the MOH. 
In particular, the study will explore how more sophisticated costing techniques, such as ABC, 
are being used by DHBs to (1) enhance the utilisation of limited resources; and (2) adhere to 
social expectations to provide sustained high quality health services. The study also sets out 
to contribute to transfer pricing literature from a New Zealand public health sector context by 
exploring the processes that underpin IDFs, including (1) how National Prices for IDFs are 
calculated; and (2) to what extent the cost information produced by DHBs costing systems 
influences this calculation. 
1.4 Research Questions 
To achieve the overall research objective outlined above a series of research questions are 
posed. The specific research questions, which are based on the research objective, literature 
reviewed and theory considered are set out below: 
RQ 1: What determines and guides the costing systems used in New Zealand DHBs? 
RQ 2: How are costs calculated in DHB costing systems? 
RQ 3: How is cost information produced by cost systems used to plan and provide services? 
RQ 4: How and for what other purposes is cost information used in the public health sector? 
RQ 5: How are the transfer prices to be charged for inter-DHB trading determined? 
RQ 6: How and for what purposes do DHBs collaborate with each other? 
1.5 Research Framework  
The research framework, developed to achieve the research objective outlined at section 1.3 
and answer the research questions posed at section 1.4, is an organisational-field focused 
research framework based in the New Zealand public health sector (see Figure 7). According 
to DiMaggio & Powell (1983, p. 148) an organisational-field is defined as a set of 
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 “organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life; key 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that 
produce similar services or products”. The research framework for this study posits that 
institutionalisation is deeply embedded in the New Zealand public health sector, and will 
endeavour to contribute to literature and theory by identifying, with particular emphasis on 
costing and IDFs, (1) how institutional pressures impact on the organisational environment in 
which DHBs operate; and (2) the institutions New Zealand DHBs adopt. 
Based on the literature reviewed at Chapter 3, which relates to institutional theory in health 
care, hospitals face a unique challenge in balancing institutional pressures imposed on them 
by various constituents. With the intention of preserving organisational legitimacy, health 
care organisations potentially will use institutions as ceremonial processes to create and 
affirm conformity with regulatory, political and social agencies. Moreover, health care 
organisations will tend to conform to those pressures that are most influential. 
Acknowledging the fact that there are three agencies which institutional pressures can 
emanate from, the research framework for this study posits that the pressures placed on a 
health care organisation (i.e. a DHB) include (1) institutional pressures from authorities such 
as the MOH, the NHB and associated costing and pricing groups; (2) institutional pressures 
from other DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector; and (3) institutional 
pressures from the external organisational environment about how the organisation should 
behave (i.e. public expectations on DHBs to provide sustained high quality health services). 
While the research framework does not suggest the extent to which a DHB will implement 
any one institution, it does posit that these institutions (which are based on the twofold 
consideration documented at section 1.2) will include costing practices, costing systems, 
costing rules and procedures, the provision of cost and volume information for decision-
making, pricing mechanisms, and product/service mix. Moreover, the research framework 
suggests that a DHB which conforms to institutional pressures is likely to possess greater 
organisational legitimacy and be subjected to lower regulatory and behavioural scrutiny by 
internal and external constituents. This suggestion is justified by the fact that conformity to 
institutional pressures will lead to less public outcry that DHBs are reneging on their duty 
(i.e. their social contract) to the general public to provide sustained high quality health 
services. 
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 1.6 Research Methodology 
To achieve the research objective and answer the six research questions, this study employs a 
multi-site case study (MCS) approach. The case sites selected for this study are tertiary and 
secondary DHBs and the MOH. The resulting sample of six case sites comprises one main 
case site (DHB A), one supplementary case site (MOH) and several confirmatory sites (DHB 
B, DHB C, DHB D and DHB E). The two primary sources of data collected are interviews 
(with site visits and assisted access to organisational costing and information systems) and 
primary and archival documents (acquired during the interview process and from electronic 
sources recommended by interviewees). To add rigor to the study, demonstrate impartiality of 
the research process and gather findings that maximise validity, reliability and richness 
verification strategies were also used. The verification strategies, which include replication, 
reflection and triangulation, are used throughout the processes of sample selection, data 
collection and data analysis. 
To interpret and analyse the data collected this study makes use of qualitative procedures and 
techniques. Firstly, the data from each interview is transcribed and subsequently analysed to 
identify key terms and findings. The key terms and findings are then interpreted to discern the 
meanings and rationale that underlie the opinions, statements and explanations given by 
interviewees, and through which practical and theoretical explanations can be achieved 
(Silverman, 2006). To corroborate interview findings, the documentation acquired during 
data collection is also analysed to identify key terms and findings. Subsequent to data 
interpretation and analysis, the findings are presented as direct quotations, references to 
points made by interview participants or references to points made in relevant documentation. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, prior literature is reviewed to gain 
an understanding of previous studies’ findings regarding adoption and use of sophisticated 
costing systems, with a focus on ABC systems, and transfer pricing in health care settings. 
Chapter 3 justifies the institutional theory framework based on findings from prior literature 
and insights from the theory, namely organisational legitimacy and the three pillars of 
institutions. The use of a MCS approach and methods for data collection and analysis will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the New Zealand public health 
sector and in particular, how DHBs fund, purchase and cost health services to meet local, 
regional and national needs. Chapter 6 presents evidence of costing systems adoption and use 
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 in New Zealand DHBs. Chapter 7 discusses the costing and pricing group data submission 
requirements for DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector. Chapter 8 
discusses the calculation of National Price and presents evidence of how National Price 
influences IDFs. Chapter 9 discusses key findings, evaluates them in relation to the research 
objective, research questions and research framework, highlights this study’s contributions to 
the literature and provides a conclusion to the thesis. 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided a brief background on the New Zealand public health sector and 
outlined the main motivations for conducting the current study. This chapter has also 
provided the research objective, research questions and research framework that will be used 
to guide the study as well as the research methodology that will be employed to conduct the 
study. This chapter then provides a breakdown of the structure of the rest of this thesis. The 
next chapter will review the literature to gain an understanding of costing systems 
sophistication, transfer pricing, and previous studies’ findings on the nexus between adoption 
and use of sophisticated costing systems (as represented by ABC techniques) and 
organisational-field transfer pricing in a health care context.  
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 Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter prior literature is reviewed to gain an understanding of costing systems 
sophistication, transfer pricing, and previous studies’ findings on the nexus between adoption 
and use of sophisticated costing systems (as represented by ABC techniques) and 
organisational-field transfer pricing in a health care context. The gaps in literature identified 
during this review will (in conjunction with the theoretical framework) inform the research 
objective, research questions and research framework that will guide the study. The rest of 
the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the cost accounting literature on the 
various costing systems available, their respective approaches to overhead allocation and 
contextual factors that influence adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems (as 
represented by ABC). Section 2.3 reviews the cost accounting literature on adoption and use 
of ABC systems in the health sector during the 1990s, while section 2.4 reviews the cost 
accounting literature on adoption and use of ABC systems in the health sector during the 
2000s. Section 2.5 discusses several contributing factors which may help to explain why 
there are no published studies on adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems, such as 
ABC, in the New Zealand public health sector. Section 2.6 reviews the literature on the 
various approaches to transfer pricing (and their inherent limitations), while section 2.7 
reviews literature on transfer pricing in the health sector. Section 2.8 reviews literature on 
IDFs in the New Zealand public health sector, while section 2.9 evaluates the potential 
usefulness of transfer pricing to DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector. 
Section 2.10 reviews literature on the nexus between ABC and transfer pricing. Finally, 
section 2.11 discusses gaps in the literature identified through the review and proposes 
research areas that this study may explore to contribute to current cost accounting and 
transfer pricing literature. 
2.2 Costing Systems Sophistication: Traditional Costing versus Activity-Based Costing 
Garrison et al. (2012) define costing systems as information systems which collect financial 
information (such as department costs) and non-financial information (such as direct labour 
hours and units produced) that can then be used as the input data to determine product and/or 
service costs and other useful information on operations, performance and capacity. 
According to Geri & Ronen (2005), the information costing systems generate plays a major 
role in the decision-making process and has a crucial influence on organisational 
performance. Specifically, the information can be used to determine product and/or service 
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 mix, calculate prices, assess whether or not to outsource and evaluate investment alternatives. 
Moreover, the type of costing system institutionalised by an organisation will largely dictate 
the quality of cost and volume information that can be generated for decision-making. There 
are several types of cost system (with varying levels of sophistication) that can be 
institutionalised by an organisation, which include (but are not limited to) variable costing 
systems, absorption costing systems and ABC systems. 
The variable costing system focuses on direct costs (such as direct materials and direct 
labour), which can be attributed to a product and/or service through cost tracing. However, 
the variable costing system is flawed in its approach to allocating indirect costs to products 
and/or services (Geri & Ronen, 2005). Specifically, the variable costing system often only 
utilises a single overhead pool with a single arbitrary basis to allocate variable overhead and 
omits fixed costs from costing altogether, instead calculating “contribution per unit” to fixed 
costs. 
The absorption costing system attributes direct costs to a product and/or service through cost 
tracing (consistent with the variable costing system); however it is inherently flawed in that it 
allocates overhead using an arbitrary volume-related allocation basis. The added issue with 
the absorption costing system is that it allocates a proportional rate of fixed costs to the units 
produced but not necessarily sold. This approach to costing can distort cost information for 
decision-making because it does not consider fixed costs as periodic, meaning fixed costs 
from a previous period can be caught in the cost of inventory. The result of which can be an 
inaccurate understanding of actual costs incurred to manufacture a product and/or provide a 
service (Geri & Ronen, 2005). 
In recent years there has been considerable criticism of unsophisticated direct and absorption 
costing systems, which focus on physical volume-based cost allocations and short-term cost 
information usage in organisations (Geri & Ronen, 2005). This premise is intrinsically 
flawed, as many resources are also used for activities that are not directly related to physical 
volume (Hussain & Gunasekaran, 2001). Consequently, traditional volume-based cost 
allocation practices may report distorted product and service costs and add little value to 
short-term operational control (Cooper & Kaplan, 1992). Recognising the problematic nature 
of traditional costing, more recent cost accounting literature has proposed a shift to an 
alternative basis, which provides more sophisticated cost information (Cooper & Kaplan, 
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 1992; Drury & Tayles, 1995; Hussain & Gunasekaran, 2001; Abdallah & Li, 2008). This 
alternative is commonly referred to as ABC (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Comparison of Traditional Costing View to Activity-Based Costing View 
                  Traditional Costing View                         Activity-Based Costing View 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to traditional volume-based costing, which suggests that physical output of 
products and services drive costs, ABC rationale posits that organisational activities involved 
in the supply of products and provision of services drive costs (Cooper & Kaplan, 1992). This 
view is supported by Figure 2, which illustrates that products and services create demand for 
organisational activities; however it is actually those activities which induce resource 
consumption (and consequently drive costs). Though there is often a causal relationship 
between volume and incurrence of direct costs (such as direct materials and direct labour), as 
these costs tend to change as volume changes, the relationship between volume and indirect 
costs is not as explicit (Baker, 1994). Indirect costs are known as overheads and require an 
allocation basis to be apportioned to products and services.3 The next section will expand on 
the limitations of a traditional volume-based costing system (such as a variable costing 
system and an absorption costing system) and the benefits of a more sophisticated ABC 
system for the purposes of overhead allocation. 
 
3 Al-Omiri & Drury (2007) note that both simplistic and sophisticated costing systems can accurately assign 
direct costs to products and services. Cost assignment merely involves the implementation of data processing 
systems to identify and record the resources consumed by products and services. Therefore, the choice of 
costing system design generally only applies to the assignment of indirect costs. 
Products and Services 
 
Products and Services 
Consume Activities Consume Resources 
Activities 
Consume Resources 
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 2.2.1 Overhead Allocation 
Traditional costing systems have been criticised for their overly simplistic and arbitrary 
approach to overhead allocation. Traditional costing systems often only utilise a single 
overhead pool with a single allocation base related to direct labour or direct materials 
(Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994). This traditional approach was developed in an era when direct 
labour and direct materials were undoubtedly the most significant product costs, and 
overheads were as low as 15% of total product cost. However, as some organisations become 
increasingly complex and overheads continue to grow as a percentage of total costs, this 
approach to allocating overheads becomes less relevant (Brown et al., 2003). Relevance is 
lost because overhead costs are not typically caused by changes in volume. Therefore, 
assigning overhead costs using a single volume-based allocation approach can provide 
management with a distorted view of how costs are incurred (Hussain & Gunasekaran, 2001). 
Additionally, through a traditional costing system little attention is given to rapid increases in 
overhead costs, or where such increases originate. These deficiencies are a significant cause 
for concern, as poor cost understandings and inaccurate cost information can seriously inhibit 
managerial decision-making, particularly regarding product and/or service mix and price 
formulation (Hussain & Gunasekaran, 2001). 
Unlike the potentially arbitrary nature of overhead allocation through traditional costing 
systems, a well-designed ABC system reflects a careful understanding of the type of activities 
or processes that generate overhead costs (Colbert & Spicer, 1998). Through ABC “the costs 
that cannot be allocated directly to products or services are captured in overhead pools and 
allocated to products [and services] based on activities that have cause-effect relationships 
with cost incurrence” (Brown et al., 2003, p. 7). This allocation process requires an 
organisation to develop thorough understandings of how overhead costs are incurred, which 
can often lead to in-depth analysis to successfully identify activities or processes and the cost 
drivers associated with each activity or process (Baker, 1994). Ultimately, more thorough 
understandings of the cost drivers associated with overhead costs will enable more accurate 
overhead cost allocations (see Figure 3). This leads to more accurate product and service 
costs, which flows into more informed product and/or service mix and pricing decisions 
(Brown et al., 2003). Well-informed decisions, based on accurate cost information, can be 
vital to the success of an organisation, particularly in a competitive environment, as product 
and/or service mix must be profitable and prices need to be competitive with the market. 
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 Figure 3: Steps in the Activity-Based Costing Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is argued that continually using more traditional costing approaches may reflect 
management inertia and reluctance to abandon techniques that have become embedded in an 
organisation (Drury & Tayles, 1995). Management inertia and reluctance to abandon 
techniques can create a culture of resistance to change, which may severely impede the 
successfulness of strategy and constrain opportunities to improve efficiency within an 
organisation. In particular, maximising resource utilisation and improving cost control can be 
significantly limited if an organisation refuses to move away from more traditional costing 
approaches (Cobb et al., 1993). To assist organisations in determining whether or not they 
should move away from traditional costing approaches (i.e. unsophisticated costing systems) 
to more advanced costing approaches (i.e. sophisticated costing systems such as ABC), 
Cooper (1988) provides four factors to evaluate the suitability of ABC in different 
organisational settings. The factors are listed and discussed next. 
2.2.2 Organisational Factors and ABC Systems 
Cooper (1988) provides four contextual factors to assist organisations in evaluating whether 
or not their structure and the environment in which they operate warrants adoption and use of 
more sophisticated costing systems, such as ABC. The factors are: 
1) An organisation operates in a competitive environment 
2) An organisation provides numerous products/services 
3) Organisational operations are multi-faceted and complex 
4) The cost of measurement is lower than the likely benefits that will eventuate 
Organisational Activities 
Identify the cost driver for each major activity 
 
Cost Driver 
Establish a cost pool for each major activity 
Allocate the cost of activities to products according 
to their demand for (or consumption of) activities 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost Pool 
Cost of Activities 
Identify the organisation’s major activities 
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 A review paper by Drury & Tayles (1995) reaffirms the importance of the factors identified 
by Cooper (1988) when an organisation is evaluating the merits of sophisticated costing 
systems. Firstly (and more generally), Drury & Tayles (1995) suggest that organisations 
should theoretically implement more sophisticated costing systems, such as ABC, when they 
foster the factors identified by Cooper (1988) in any capacity. This suggestion is 
substantiated with numerous justifications, including (1) that organisations operating in a 
more competitive environment have a greater need for sophisticated costing systems that 
report more accurate product and service costs. This need arises because competitors are 
likely to take advantage of any errors arising from managerial decisions guided by distorted 
cost information; (2) organisations that provide numerous products and services should adopt 
ABC. This is largely because traditional costing systems only report costs that can be directly 
assigned to products and services, such as direct labour and direct materials; and (3) 
“Increased diversity arising from products [and services] consuming resources in different 
proportions also favours more sophisticated systems because, as diversity increases, so does 
the level of distortion reported by traditional systems that rely on simplistic costing systems” 
(Drury & Tayles, 1995, p. 272). 
Though there is cost accounting literature on adoption and use of more sophisticated costing 
systems, such as ABC, including Bjørnenak (1997); Gosselin (1997); Krumwiede (1998); 
Malmi (1999); Clarke et al. (1999); Hoque (2000); and Cagwin & Bouwman (2002), these 
previous research efforts have been criticised by Al-Omiri & Drury (2007, p. 400) for being 
“inconclusive and unable to establish strong links between the adoption of ABC and those 
contextual factors that have been identified in the literature that are conducive to the adoption 
of ABC systems”. Specifically, Al-Omiri & Drury (2007) have criticised this prior survey-
based research, for (1) use of weak measures for dependent and independent variables; (2) the 
terms ‘adoption of ABC’ and ‘non-adoption of ABC’ have been subject to different 
interpretations; (3) researchers have allowed respondents to self-specify whether their 
organisation operates an ABC system; and (4) previous research efforts have yielded 
inconsistent findings on the factors which influence adoption and use of ABC systems. 
Lee (2002) emphasises that pioneers of ABC theory development have worked tirelessly with 
client organisations on a worldwide basis to test and enhance ABC. Lee (2002, p. 75) also 
argues, “global homogenization in management accounting practices explains why there have 
been very little differences in the ABC theory development”. With reference to Cooper 
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 (1988), who believes that the optimum cost system is different for different organisations and 
that this is dependent on various contextual factors, the argument put forward by Lee (2002) 
appears to be a blatant oversimplification. Over the past two decades there has been very little 
conclusive research on the factors that influence the adoption of ABC systems, and whether 
or not these factors have evolved over time. There is an unequivocal need for further research 
to determine the factors that influence adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems; if 
the factors change based on different organisational environments; and if the factors outlined 
by Cooper (1988) still apply (and if so, whether or not they have become more or less 
important). Moreover, there is a significant lack of literature on the contextual factors that 
influence adoption and use of more sophisticated costing systems, such as ABC, from a 
health care perspective.  
To rectify the issues with previous survey-based research, and contribute to cost accounting 
literature on adoption and use of costing systems from a health care perspective, this study 
will apply the sophistication continuum developed by Al-Omiri & Drury (2007) to explore 
costing systems adoption and use in the New Zealand public health sector (see Figure 4). 
Specifically, this study will use the sophistication continuum to (1) determine the factors that 
influence adoption and use of costing systems (and their varying levels of sophistication) in 
the New Zealand public health sector; and (2) understand the dimensions of costing systems 
used in the New Zealand public health sector that makes them unsophisticated or 
sophisticated. According to Al-Omiri & Drury (2007), there are four dimensions that 
determine the sophistication of an organisation’s costing system. The dimensions include (1) 
the number of cost pools; (2) the extent to which costs are directly assigned to each cost pool 
during the first-stage allocation process, or the extent to which cause-and-effect first-stage 
drivers are used (first-stage allocation is the process by which overhead costs are assigned to 
activity cost pools (Garrison et al., 2012)); (3) the number of different types of second-stage 
cost drivers (second-stage allocation is the process by which overhead costs relate to cost 
objects (i.e. products, services and customer orders). In this stage activity rates are used to 
apply costs to products and services (Garrison et al., 2012)); and (4) the extent to which 
transaction drivers (which are less sophisticated) or duration drivers (which are more 
sophisticated) are used in the second-stage of the allocation process. 
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 Figure 4: Dimensions determining the varying levels of Cost System Sophistication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Al-Omiri & Drury, 2007, p. 401) 
The purpose of the next three sections is to review the cost accounting literature that has been 
written on adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems (with a focus on ABC systems) 
in the health sector over the past two decades. 
2.3 Activity-Based Costing and the Health Sector in the 1990s 
Despite overt acceptance that ABC was not developed for service organisations, several 
advocates considered its usefulness in the health sector during the 1990s (Chan, 1993; King 
et al., 1994; Lawson, 1994; Ramsey, 1994; Canby, 1995; Aird, 1996; Udpa, 1996; Baker, 
1998). One such advocate, Chan (1993, p. 73), contends “patients are unique products 
themselves [and] regardless of whether we are manufacturing one million units of a product, 
or treating one patient, the principle of cost application with ABC remains unchanged”. In 
addition, Aird (1996) and Baker (1998) recognise that hospitals typically have a high volume 
of broad and complex operations, with multiple services being offered to patients. These 
attributes are consistent with two of the four contextual factors outlined by Cooper (1988), 
which support adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems (discussed at section 2.1.2). 
Lowest level of sophistication Highest level of sophistication 
Direct costing system Simplistic traditional system 
Single plant-wide cost pool 
Single plant-wide cost driver 
Highly sophisticated ABC system 
Many first stage cost pools 
Many different types of second stage cost drivers 
Extensive reliance on first stage resource drivers 
or direct assignments 
Extensive use of duration drivers 
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 Specifically, factor 2) An organisation that provides numerous products/services, and factor 
3) Organisational operations are multi-faceted and complex (Cooper, 1988). 
Canby (1995) conducted a case study that investigated the applicability of ABC to four 
separate types of x-ray services (i.e. knee, hand, cervical and shoulder) provided at the x-ray 
department of a mid-sized outpatient clinic. After observing practices, interviewing 
clinicians, and reviewing archival records, Canby (1995) determined that each x-ray 
procedure functioned uniquely. Moreover, Canby (1995) deduced from his investigation that 
each x-ray procedure used activities in different quantities, creating procedure-specific costs 
(i.e. each x-ray series required a particular quantity of staff time, technology with varying 
levels of sophistication, and certain films with different costs and in different quantities). 
While it is indisputable that Canby’s (1995) findings are not exhaustive, they do provide 
evidence to support adoption and use of ABC (a more sophisticated costing system) in the 
health sector to improve cost information and cost understandings. Firstly, the findings 
highlight that ABC can assist the determination of costs associated with hospital processes (in 
this instance x-ray department processes). Secondly, the findings highlight that ABC can 
provide a more accurate measurement of financial performance compared to traditional 
costing approaches. Thirdly, as health care organisations often have limited resources to 
deliver services, ABC presents an accurate and meaningful cost-information system to 
develop operational control and potentially eliminate waste (Canby, 1995). According to 
Ramsey (1994), the ability of a hospital to develop stringent control over its operations and 
reduce waste is extremely important to its long-term viability. This is because hospitals must 
be able to provide low-cost, high-quality care for a large number of patients continuously. 
To corroborate suggestions that ABC systems can be used to gain operational control and 
eliminate waste, an article by Chan (1993) was reviewed, which considers adoption and use 
of ABC at a hospital laboratory (albeit hypothetically). According to Chan (1993, p. 77), for 
“health care organizations facing spiralling expenses, ABC can be a valuable tool… in 
controlling costs and making strategic decisions”. More specifically, Chan (1993) posits that 
ABC systems can promote operational control and reduce waste. This position is 
substantiated by Ramsey (1994), who conducted a case study to evaluate the applicability of 
an ABC system to a hospital radiology department. Findings from Ramsey (1994) indicate 
that an ABC system can be used to identify 1) key activities involved in radiological 
procedures; 2) where process improvements can be made; and 3) where non-value added 
    18 
 activities can be eliminated, while ensuring proper functionality of each radiology procedure. 
Overall, the ability of ABC to promote operational control and reduce waste is due to its 
emphasis on activity analysis, which results in superior cost measurement and cost 
management compared to traditional costing systems (Cooper & Kaplan, 1990; Schneider, 
1992; Chan, 1993; Ramsey, 1994).4 For example, activity analysis can allow departmental 
management to evaluate whether or not employee skills are being utilised appropriately; if it 
is feasible to cross-train staff to perform additional activities; and if the diagnostic yield of 
radiologists is being reduced due to administrative matters and/or other departmental 
inconveniences (Ramsey, 1994). 
King et al. (1994) conducted a MCS into adoption and use of ABC systems at four acute 
general United Kingdom National Health Service sites and while they acknowledged the 
applicability of ABC to the health sector in principle; they also accepted that there are major 
implications associated with the implementation of ABC systems in health care organisations. 
The major implications include “the high level of educational, communicative, data 
gathering, processing and interpretive work necessary to introduce ABC and the consequent 
need for resources and funding which its development will create” (King et al., 1994, p. 147). 
Regardless of its technical merits, these implications can act as a major deterrent to the 
adoption and use of ABC systems. As King et al. (1994, p. 159) revealed, operational and 
resourcing difficulties identified at the hospital sites investigated made it likely that ABC 
would only “be adopted in a piecemeal, fragmentary fashion in the National Health Service”. 
While there is evidence that the pragmatic potential of ABC to the health sector was 
considered during the 1990s, a very limited number of studies were identified in the cost 
accounting literature, and they tended to be introductory, partial and speculative in nature 
(Chan, 1993; King et al., 1994; Ramsey, 1994; Canby, 1995; Aird, 1996). As Udpa (1996, p. 
83) highlights, these “studies of ABC in health care settings focus on a narrow application of 
ABC to a department within the health care organization”. For instance, Chan (1993) merely 
examines the application of ABC systems to the costing of laboratory tests in a hypothetical 
hospital setting; King et al. (1994) to orthopaedics and radiography; Ramsey (1994) to a 
radiology department; and Canby (1995) to an x-ray department. Furthermore, these research 
4 As a caveat, though ABC can provide more accurate costing information to assist managers in identifying 
activities that are costly or non-value added, making changes in the mix of health services offered and 
instigating operating efficiency improvements, it is not a panacea to all problems within a hospital. ABC is only 
a decision support tool and ultimately it is at the discretion of management whether remedial action is taken and 
what that action should be (Chan, 1993). 
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 efforts only spanned over the mid-1990s and none of them relate to adoption and use of ABC 
systems in a New Zealand public health sector context. To determine if this changes in the 
2000s, the next section reviews the relevant cost accounting literature on adoption and use of 
ABC in the health sector written during the 21st century. 
2.4 Activity-Based Costing and the Health Sector in the 2000s 
Consistent with the 1990’s, there has been very few published studies on adoption and use of 
ABC systems in the health sector over the past decade or so. While scholars (such as Ross, 
2004; Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2005; Lawson, 2005; Yereli, 2009 and Shander et al., 2010) 
maintain that health care organisations need to manage their rapidly increasing costs more 
effectively and efficiently, and that ABC is viable tool to achieving this, there is a complete 
deficiency of evidence-based literature to support its use in the health sector. As Lawson 
(2005) states, prospective adopters have greater familiarity with ABC systems (including the 
benefits thereof) than they did when ABC was first developed, and it is well established as a 
sophisticated cost accounting approach compared with the more traditional cost accounting 
approaches. “However, contrary to expectations, use of these [ABC] systems has declined 
slightly over [the past decade], as has the percentage of health care organizations 
contemplating implementing such systems” (Lawson, 2005).5 
Despite the perceived benefits of ABC systems (i.e. superior cost information and cost 
understandings, improved organisational control, more accurate decisions on budgeting and 
strategy planning, and more efficient and effective use of resources), it is evident there are 
barriers to its use in the health sector. Findings made by Lawson (2005) indicate that health 
care organisations have several reservations about adopting and using ABC. These 
reservations include (but are not limited to) the cost of designing and implementing an ABC 
system; the need to create new systems for data capture and processing; failure to gain 
acceptance from managers; and lack of commitment by senior management. Lack of 
commitment by senior management is also noted by Ross (2004) and Arnaboldi & Lapsley 
(2005) as an overarching factor that can impede the success of ABC systems adoptions to 
health care. Specifically, Ross (2004) states, there is a clear division between medical and 
accounting personnel, which negatively affects each, as well as patients, the health delivery 
system, and society. Health care organisations need to comprehensively shift management 
5 Lawson (2005, p. 81) concludes, “this result is surprising given that in 1994 activity-based costing was a 
relatively new technique, only beginning to be utilized in service industries such as health care. Given the 
typical adoption pattern of management techniques, it would have been expected that the use of ABC would 
have increased over the last decade”. 
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 thinking from a functional departmental view to a more cross-functional view of hospital 
activities and processes, and to re-educate personnel organisation-wide on the benefits ABC 
systems can provide to all aspects of health care (namely low-cost high-quality service 
provision). “Health care can ill-afford managers who limit their duties to providing the best 
possible care or the most efficient use of resources” (Ross, 2004, p. 20). As a result, the 
initiative and impetus for change should come from them, as they have the power to influence 
how and for what purpose(s) health care organisations function. 
Though the previous paragraph has discussed the hurdles/reservations associated with 
adoption and use of ABC systems there are some success stories to demonstrate how ABC 
can be used effectively in health care settings. The first of these is a case study conducted by 
Yereli (2009) that explores the benefits of ABC systems over traditional accounting systems 
to cost gall bladder surgeries in the general surgery department of one university hospital in 
Turkey. The findings of Yereli’s (2009) study indicate that ABC is an effective cost 
management model that determines costs and evaluates financial performance across 
departments in a hospital. However, the main contribution of Yereli (2009) is his discussion 
of how ABC systems can be applied to health care (specifically, to cost gall bladder surgeries 
that are performed openly and laparoscopically), which is summarised below. 
Consistent with traditional costing, direct costs of the hospital are directly distributed to 
appropriate cost departments with an ABC system (Yereli, 2009). However, unlike traditional 
costing, which allocates indirect costs to services using the arbitrary criteria ‘number of 
patient days’, the ABC system allocates indirect costs to activities using a two-stage 
approach. “In the first stage, indirect costs are allotted to activity pools where certain activity 
groups are collected. Therefore, similar activities performed in accordance with the main 
services the hospital renders are collected in the same activity pools” (Yereli, 2009, p. 582). 
The activity pools are 1) procedure for admitting patients to the hospital; 2) laboratory 
procedures; 3) preoperational procedures; 4) surgeries; and 5) patient care. Once the activity 
pools are determined, indirect costs are allocated to them with first stage cost drivers, which 
forms the basis of cost pools (see Table 1). 
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 Table 1: Indirect Costs and First Stage Cost Drivers 
Indirect Costs Cost Drivers 
Indirect labour Number of employees 
Dining hall Number of meals 
Medical consumables Quantity of materials used 
Transportation and communication Number of patients 
Electricity and water Area (m2) 
Equipment depreciation Quantity of medical devices 
Maintenance and repair Quantity of medical devices 
Heating and fuel Area (m2) 
Cleaning work Area (m2) 
Laundry Amount of laundry washed (kg) 
Office stationery and materials Number of patients 
Accounting Number of patients 
Computer expenses Number of computers 
(Source: Yereli, 2009, p. 584) 
In the second stage, indirect costs are allocated to open or laparoscopic treatments from the 
cost pools. To carry out this distribution process, second stage cost drivers and data used for 
the designated activity pools is applied. For activity pool 1) procedure for admitting patients 
to the hospital, the cost driver is number of patients admitted; 2) laboratory procedures, the 
second stage cost driver is number of tests; 3) preoperational procedures, the second stage 
cost driver is number of patient days and preparation period of the patient (open surgery – 75 
minutes and laparoscopic surgery – 12 minutes); 4) surgeries, the second stage cost driver is 
number of patient days and surgery hours (open surgery – 90 minutes and laparoscopic 
surgery – 60 minutes); and 5) patient care, the second stage cost driver is number of patient 
days. Once both direct costs and indirect costs are allocated to open or laparoscopic 
treatments, the unit cost per surgical procedure can be calculated. As Yereli (2009) 
concludes, the ABC system (which has been described above) provides management with 
more accurate unit costs, which translates into more accurate decisions on budgeting and 
strategy planning. 
The second success story that demonstrates how ABC systems can be used effectively in 
health care settings is a case study conducted by Shander et al. (2010) that considers the 
applicability of ABC to the delivery of red blood cell transfusions at two hospitals in the 
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 United States and two hospitals in Europe. The study was motivated by the fact that health 
sector organisations have limited resources, and blood transfusions have long been suspected 
to consume more resources than previously reported. Furthermore, the nature of blood 
transfusions warrants use of more sophisticated costing systems, such as ABC, because “each 
process step involves diverse personnel, capital, and consumable resources that are then 
multiplied by their usage frequencies” (Shander et al. (2010, p. 754). The main findings of 
Shander et al. (2010) reveal that the cost estimates previously reported for all major process 
steps, staff, and consumables required to provide red blood cell transfusions have been 
underestimated (both in the United States and in Europe). Overall, Shander et al. (2010) 
conclude that ABC systems represents the most detailed and rigorous method available to 
account for the cost of blood transfusions (which require vast and complex activities), while 
facilitating cost-containment through improved cost information. 
The literature reviewed in this section provides evidence that authors have considered the 
usefulness of ABC systems to the health sector during the 21st century; however this evidence 
is very limited. Specifically, only two evidence-based studies were identified in the cost 
accounting literature and they focused on adoption and use of ABC systems to a single 
department within the health care organisation. Moreover, these studies only explored 
adoption and use of ABC systems in the United States and Europe. As a result, this section of 
the literature review indicates a greater need for research to explore adoption and use of ABC 
(and other forms of sophisticated costing systems) from a holistic organisational perspective 
(including how and for what purposes), and in a New Zealand public health sector context. 
In recognition of the fact that none of the studies identified and reviewed as part of the 
literature reviews performed at section 2.3 and section 2.4 relate to costing systems 
sophistication or the adoption and use of ABC (as a form of sophisticated costing system) in a 
New Zealand public health sector context, the next section will offer a brief potential 
explanation for this complete lack of cost accounting literature. 
2.5 Activity-Based Costing and the New Zealand Public Health Sector 
There are several contributing factors which may help to explain why there are no published 
studies on adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems, such as ABC, in the New 
Zealand public health sector. Firstly, public sector organisations tend not to operate within a 
general market like private sector organisations and they face far less competition. 
Furthermore, any competition faced tends to be less fierce (i.e. public health sector 
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 organisations are the primary providers of government funded health care services in New 
Zealand and are expected to provide a set range of services to the general public. If a public 
health sector organisation is not able to provide such services they will outsource to other 
providers such as private providers). Secondly, public sector organisations must consider 
more than just economic and technical matters. As providers of goods and services to the 
general public they are required to meet more rigorous political, ethical and social objectives. 
Thirdly, public sector organisations are not motivated by profit-maximisation, but a main 
objective of public satisfaction. Objectives such as cost reduction and resource efficiency are 
a secondary consideration (Guthrie and Parker, 1996). 
Irrespective of the factors outlined above, which may contribute to explaining why there are 
no published studies on adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems, such as ABC, in 
the New Zealand public health sector, it is evident (based on the review of prior literature) 
that this presents a significant gap in the cost accounting literature that needs to be filled. 
Consequently, the current study, which focuses on the nexus between adoption and use of 
sophisticated costing systems (as represented by ABC techniques) and IDFs in the New 
Zealand public health sector, will strive to contribute to cost accounting literature on adoption 
and use of sophisticated costing systems, such as ABC, from a New Zealand public health 
sector perspective. 
While this study is exploring IDFs in the New Zealand public health sector at an inter-
organisational-field level (i.e. between DHBs), the literature vastly focuses on transfer pricing 
at an intra-organisational-field level (i.e. between divisions of an organisation). As a result, 
the next section will review the literature on the various approaches to transfer pricing (and 
their inherent limitations), which has been written from a divisionalised perspective, but with 
the intention of applying it to the organisational environment within which IDFs take place. 
2.6 Transfer Pricing: Approaches and Issues 
A transfer pricing system facilitates cost determination and control together with performance 
accountability. According to Hoque (2003) and Baldenius & Reichelstein (2006), there are a 
number of strategic and practical issues associated with transfer pricing, which create what is 
commonly known as the “transfer pricing problem”. Such issues include (1) resolving pricing 
disputes between divisions via negotiation, arbitration or directives; (2) giving divisions the 
freedom to decide whether to buy and sell amongst themselves; (3) allowing divisions to 
source externally when resources are available internally; (4) deciding what type of transfer 
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 pricing method to use; and (5) determining the final price transfers will be made at. Wider 
organisational issues also have an influence on transfer pricing. Specifically, contextual 
factors such as size, managerial autonomy, market factors, product diversity and overall 
strategy (Desheh et al., 1997; Colbert & Spicer, 1998; Baldenius et al., 1999; Ghosh, 2000; 
Pfeiffer et al., 2011).  
The three most common transfer pricing methods applied by organisations are market-based, 
cost-based and negotiated transfer prices. In practice, each of these methods is used in 
conjunction with the opportunity cost approach when a transfer price is being set. “The 
opportunity cost approach identifies the minimum price that a selling division would be 
willing to accept and the maximum price that the buying division would be willing to pay” 
(Hoque, 2003, p. 151). If a fair compromise cannot be reached internally, buying and selling 
divisions will opt out of transfer pricing and choose to interact in the external market instead 
(if it exists). The purpose of the next three subsections is to define the main approaches to 
transfer pricing (from a divisionalised organisation perspective) and to outline their inherent 
flaws. Following this, section 2.7 will review literature on transfer pricing in health care 
settings from an inter-organisational perspective that has been written over the past two 
decades. Acknowledging the fact that the literature vastly focuses on transfer pricing at an 
intra-organisational-field level (i.e. between divisions of an organisation), section 2.8 will 
review literature on IDFs (an inter-organisational form of transfer pricing specific to the New 
Zealand public health sector) before section 2.9 evaluates the potential usefulness of transfer 
pricing (based on literature reviewed at section 2.6 and section 2.7) to DHBs operating in the 
New Zealand public health sector. 
2.6.1 Market-based Transfer Pricing  
If a perfectly competitive market for a product or service exists, the prevailing market price is 
recommended for transfer pricing. For a perfectly competitive market to exist, a homogenous 
product or service with equivalent buying and selling prices is typically required. Moreover, 
no individual buyer or seller should be able to affect those prices by their own actions 
(Hoque, 2003). Provided these conditions are present, market-based approach is deemed the 
most suitable approach to transfer pricing, as it will lead to efficient decentralisation of 
decision-making (Hirshleifer, 1956; Cook, 1955). However, as Baldenius & Reichelstein 
(2006) emphasise, the competitive market scenario can be debated as nothing more than a 
conceptual benchmark. “In many industries the very rationale for vertical integration appears 
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 to be that intermediate products and services are specialized or even proprietary” (Baldenius 
& Reichelstein, 2006, p. 2). See also Eccles & White (1988); Milgrom & Roberts (1992); 
Brickley et al. (1995); Kaplan & Atkinson (1998); Joskow (2004). 
2.6.2 Cost-based Transfer Pricing 
If a market price cannot be identified, does not exist, or is unsatisfactory to the parties 
involved, cost-based transfer prices should be used in its place (Colbert & Spicer, 1998). 
Though cost-based transfer pricing is a credible substitute to market-based pricing, there is an 
inherent expectation that organisations applying this approach can calculate accurate product 
or service costs (Atkinson et al., 2007). There are a range of different cost-based transfer 
pricing methods, including (1) the variable cost approach; (2) the full cost approach; and (3) 
the dual approach (Tebogo, 2011).  
(1) Variable cost-based transfer pricing is based on the total variable costs incurred by the 
selling unit, which include direct labour, direct materials and variable overhead (Hunt & 
Fowler, 2009). When the variable cost-based transfer pricing approach is applied, the selling 
division will always make a loss equal to its fixed costs of production (Tebogo, 2011). The 
major benefit of this approach is that it encourages prospective buying divisions to purchase 
goods and services internally, as the transfer price is lower than external market prices. 
(2) Full cost-based transfer pricing is based on the total cost of the provider’s product and is 
equivalent to the variable costs plus fixed costs per transfer unit (Colbert & Spicer, 1998). A 
full cost-based transfer price includes costs from other relevant business functions within the 
division (commonly referred to as overhead), such as research and development, design, 
marketing, distribution and customer service (Tebogo, 2011). The major benefits of this 
approach are simplicity of use (as the data is already available and easily understood) and it 
puts the selling division in a position to cover all production costs incurred (Colbert & Spicer, 
1998; Tebogo, 2011). 
Considering the definitions of variable and fixed cost transfer pricing provided above, it is 
evident that divisionalised organisations face a significant transfer pricing dilemma. While 
the use of variable cost transfer pricing may motivate buying divisions to purchase goods and 
services internally, transfer pricing without regard to fixed assets, overhead, and profit for the 
selling division leads to an unfair measure of its contribution to the company (Eccles, 1985). 
This may lead to short-term profit maximisation, as value is held in the firm, but from a long-
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 term perspective such a focus may remove any advantage that comes from treating divisions 
as independent profit centres (Sahay, 2003). However, if a transfer price is set at full cost this 
demotivates buying divisions to purchase internally, as they can acquire the same or similar 
goods and services cheaper in the external market. Kaplan (1982, p. 483) views this as “the 
essence of the transfer pricing conundrum”. 
(3) Dual transfer pricing involves the selling division charging the buying division the 
marginal cost for the goods and services transferred. The difference between the marginal 
cost and the market price is then settled by the parent company. As stated by Atkinson et al. 
(2007) and Tebogo (2011), this arrangement is designed to ensure transfer prices are set at 
efficient levels so as to motivate intra-organisational interaction between buying and selling 
divisions. The buying division is motivated to buy from the selling division, since the transfer 
price is at marginal cost and thus, below the external market price. Similarly, the selling 
division is motivated to produce and supply to the buying division, since any opportunity cost 
they forgo by not trading in the external market is reimbursed by the parent company. For the 
parent company, such transactions make economic sense. Not only do they alleviate “the 
transfer pricing conundrum”, but they also ensure value is retained within the group and not 
dissipated by external purchases. 
2.6.3 Negotiated Transfer Pricing 
When it is difficult to identify a market, imperfections exist in the market or interacting 
divisions cannot agree on a cost-based transfer pricing method, negotiated transfer pricing 
may be a more practical alternative. Negotiated transfer pricing is defined as a bargaining 
process between buying and selling divisions and dictates whether intra-company transfers 
take place, the quantity to be transferred, and the overall transfer payment (Vaysman, 1998). 
Though the negotiated transfer pricing approach is useful in particular situations, it has a 
number of  weaknesses, including (1) being a very time-consuming process that can make 
divisional measurement sensitive to the negotiating skills of management; (2) it can lead to 
inter-divisional conflict, and therefore requires time and effort of top management to oversee 
the negotiation process and mediate disputes; and (3) it can lead to sub-optimal output levels 
if the negotiated price is too high (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1989). Several scholars, including 
Spicer (1988), Holmström & Tirole (1991), Wagenhofer (1994) and Ghosh (2000), attest that 
to understand these weaknesses and manage them effectively involves a thorough 
consideration of the organisational setting in which transfers occur. 
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 “In general, a large hierarchical organization is described as a set of systems of simultaneous 
competition and co-operation which involve managers with diverse preferences” (Ghosh, 
2000, p. 664). That is, participants constitute a coalition and must cooperate in pursuit of 
common organisational goals. In addition, participants often have diverse mutually exclusive 
interests and objectives, as they have to compete for limited resources, status and career 
advancement (Kochan & Verma, 1983). For these reasons, organisational settings are highly 
important as they affect the behaviour of managers during the negotiation process and any 
subsequent outcomes (Graham, 1985; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Thus, to sufficiently 
understand and manage the weaknesses associated with negotiated transfer pricing, 
organisations should ensure their transfer pricing policies recognise the inherent mixed-
motive nature of separate interacting divisions (Kochan & Verma, 1983). This will involve 
developing transfer pricing policies that (1) focus on notions of fairness and how to mitigate 
inter-divisional conflict (Eccles, 1985; Emmanuel & Messaoud, 1994); (2) take into 
consideration the degree of inter-dependence between profit centres from sourcing (Eccles, 
1985; Spicer, 1988); and (3) positively affect the economic outcome measure of firm profit 
(Eccles, 1985; Chalos & Haka, 1990; Ghosh, 1994; Ghosh, 2000). 
The next section will review literature on transfer pricing in divisionalised health care 
settings (i.e. between divisions) that has been written over the past two decades. 
2.7 Transfer Pricing and the Health Sector in the 1990s and 2000s 
As stated by Young (1998), one of the key issues linked to health care delivery is the transfer 
price at which hospital divisions provide materials to patient care departments. Likewise, how 
the transfer price is determined requires hospital senior management to consider numerous 
factors. Primarily, they must choose whether or not to include the selling division’s variable 
costs for the materials being transferred or alternatively, the variable costs plus a share of the 
division’s fixed costs. If the latter, senior management also need to decide whether fixed 
costs should include direct fixed costs or direct fixed costs plus allocated overhead. While it 
may seem reasonable to supply materials at the actual cost incurred by the selling division 
(i.e. inclusive of variable costs, direct fixed costs and allocated fixed costs), this can create an 
issue with the efficiency of transfer prices. If both direct and allocated costs are included, it is 
highly probable that the transfer price will exceed the price at which the buying division 
could purchase the materials in the external market. This would not only create a disincentive 
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 for the buying division to purchase internally, but in effect, would impede the ability of the 
selling divisions to meet their financial goals and objectives. 
Beyond making a decision on the cost categories to include in the calculation of a transfer 
price, Young (1998) indicates that there are other potential issues associated with transfer 
pricing in health care organisations. More specifically, the choice of transfer pricing 
methodology and the chosen payment unit can create a set of dysfunctional incentives for 
hospital division managers that can result in excessive costs. For example, if senior 
management elects to use a per diem payment method, this creates an incentive for long 
inpatient stays. Two reasons for this include the reality that the per diem must cover both 
fixed and variable costs, and most hospitals have a sizeable base of fixed costs. “Similarly, a 
per discharge payment (whether diagnosis adjusted or not), encourages providers to increase 
the number of admissions, shorten inpatient stays, and/or seek a case mix with a high 
contribution margin” (Young, 1998, p. 58). Efforts to improve cost effectiveness and 
efficiency by reducing unnecessary admissions or accepting low-margin patients are 
negatively impacted, as such behaviours will likely result in selling divisions not being 
reimbursed for their fixed costs. 
While these “dysfunctional incentives” can invoke numerous ramifications in health care 
settings, Young (1998) states that the solution can be found in a two-part transfer price. “A 
two-part transfer price is based on the idea that fixed costs are time based and variable costs 
are volume based” (Young, 1998, p. 58). Essentially, this means that each hospital buying 
division pays its share of a selling division’s fixed costs on the basis of time (usually a flat 
amount paid constantly on a predetermined day) and pays for the selling division’s variable 
costs on the basis of the number and mix of purchased units. Theoretically, two-part transfer 
pricing occludes the selling division’s incentive to charge unnecessarily high prices to buying 
divisions or to produce superfluous volume. Moreover, two-part transfer pricing promotes 
greater clinical and administrative efficiency, which may lead to improved overall 
organisational performance (Young, 1998). 
A case study conducted by Kuntz & Vera (2005) explored the applicability of transfer pricing 
to health care in a German hospital. The purpose of this study was to investigate how the 
efficiency of physicians involved in anaesthesia and surgery services can be optimised by the 
introduction of transfer pricing for anaesthesia services. For the purpose of Kuntz & Vera’s 
(2005) study, “[t]he relevant transfer price is the one which is paid by the surgery department 
    29 
 to the anaesthesiology department for providing anaesthesia to the patient” (Kuntz & Vera, 
2005, p. 264). The transfer price is calculated using a relevant time span and the choice of 
time span (which is used as a reference unit) is extremely important. Not only does the time 
span have a strong impact on the incentive system of the physicians involved, but it can also 
influence overall hospital performance. Because the hospital operates as a decentralised 
organisation, whereby physicians want to maximise the financial performance of their own 
divisions, “the anaesthesiologist should try to maximize the relevant time span, whereas the 
surgeon should try to minimize it” (Kuntz & Vera, 2005, p. 264). To ensure the efficiency of 
anaesthesia services is optimised across the entire organisation, the most appropriate time 
span is one that minimises time consumption – the surgeon. Surgically controlled time (SCT) 
includes the pure surgical time, from incision to closing, plus positioning, preparation and 
dressing of the patient by the surgeon. 
After identifying the most appropriate transfer price and mechanism to calculate it, Kuntz & 
Vera (2005) set out to investigate their hypotheses. The first hypothesis proposed “the 
introduction of a transfer pricing system for anaesthesia services which uses the SCT as 
reference unit increases the efficiency of the surgeons” (Kuntz & Vera, 2005, p. 265). Since 
the transfer price reflects the efficiency of the surgeon (who wants to minimise time 
consumed), there is a strong incentive for them to keep the SCT as short as possible to 
improve the financial performance of the surgical department. As postulated, Kuntz & Vera 
(2005) observed a positive effect from the introduction of an SCT-based transfer pricing 
system – surgical time reduced and overall surgical efficiency improved. 
The second hypothesis proposed “the introduction of a transfer pricing system for anaesthesia 
services which uses the SCT as reference unit increases the efficiency of the 
anaesthesiologists” (Kuntz & Vera, 2005, p. 265). To test this supposition, Kuntz & Vera 
(2005) assumed that anaesthesiologists’ efficiency is reflected by their resource consumption. 
“Even though the anaesthesiologists were not able to influence the reference unit of the 
transfer price (the SCT), they reduced their material costs and consequently improved their 
efficiency too” (Kuntz & Vera, 2005, p. 267). To elaborate, the anaesthesiology department 
could not increase the transfer price they received from the surgical department; hence they 
could only improve their financial performance by making their own processes more 
efficient. 
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 Kuntz & Vera (2005) are cognisant that paying physicians a salary is not an overly input-
intensive mechanism, nor does it promote efficiency. Conversely, it fosters a bureaucratic 
mentality and often leads to poor physician productivity. With regard to anaesthesia services, 
neither the anaesthesiologist nor the surgeon is incentivised to minimise the time the 
anaesthesiologist spends with the patient. For these reasons, it is a major task of hospital 
management to ensure they implement a sophisticated accounting system that serves both as 
a management planning and a control tool to mitigate this unfavourable incentive 
characteristic, and improve the efficiency of physicians. Kuntz & Vera (2005) prescribe 
transfer pricing as an accounting instrument capable of achieving this aim. Based on the 
findings of their study, Kuntz & Vera (2005) state that introducing a transfer pricing system 
can improve the efficiency of physicians involved in the provision of anaesthesia services. 
One caveat is the need to ensure payments for anaesthesia treatments are linked to the 
behaviour of those persons that have a strong incentive to minimise these payments. Kuntz & 
Vera (2005) also highlight that decentralised organisations can use transfer pricing to make 
employees more aware of the financial consequences of their behaviour, particularly relating 
to costs and overall performance. 
Apart from the studies reviewed above, there is no other relevant published literature on 
transfer pricing in the health sector. Moreover, none of these studies consider transfer pricing 
from a New Zealand public health sector perspective. This is a cause for concern, as transfer 
pricing “is of particular importance in decentralized organizations, where top management 
delegates decision-making authority to the constituent areas or organizational units and where 
the financial performance of these units is calculated separately” (Kuntz & Vera, 2005). 
Furthermore, Ellwood (2009, p. 429) suggests that “further research on accounting 
technologies including interrelated accounting technologies such as transfer pricing and 
analysis of cost structure and behaviour could possibly aid public service reform”. As a 
result, this section of the literature review indicates a greater need for research to explore use 
of transfer pricing from a holistic organisational perspective (including how and for what 
purposes), and in a New Zealand public health sector context. 
As none of the studies reviewed above relate to transfer pricing in a New Zealand public 
health sector context, the next two sections (section 2.8 and section 2.9) will review literature 
on IDFs (an inter-organisational form of transfer pricing) and evaluate the potential 
usefulness of transfer pricing to DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector. 
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 2.8 Transfer Pricing and the New Zealand Public Health Sector 
As Ashton et al. (2008), Tenbensel et al. (2011) and Ettelt et al. (2012) note, the New 
Zealand public health sector was reformed in 2001, which resulted in the decentralisation of 
some decision-making authority for health service planning and provision. Specifically, 
DHBs were set up to “undertake periodic assessments of the needs of their populations, plan 
services for their districts, provide services through their provider arms (public hospitals and 
related services) and contract for services delivered by non-DHB providers” (Tenbensel et 
al., 2011, p. 243). One aspect of health service planning and provision that DHBs have 
delegated authority over is IDFs. There is a process of inter-district co-ordination that takes 
place between DHBs to plan and provide services via IDFs because most DHBs do not 
provide a full set of services within their districts. Therefore, patients from one district are 
often treated in another district. To achieve this, the two engaging DHBs will need to 
determine both the volume and price at which IDFs for different services occur (Ashton et 
al., 2008). While it is not clear from the literature reviewed how prices for IDFs are 
calculated, it is evident that there is an inter-organisational process of transfer pricing that is 
used to facilitate IDFs between DHBs. The purpose of the next section is to discuss the 
applicability of transfer pricing literature (which predominantly focuses on transfer pricing at 
an intra-organisational level) to the inter-organisational process for IDFs. 
2.9 Applicability of Transfer Pricing to the New Zealand Public Health Sector 
Typically, a transfer price is the amount one division of an organisation charges for a product 
or service transferred to another division of the same organisation (Kaplan & Atkinson, 
1989). While the transfer pricing literature reviewed at section 2.6 and 2.7 ascribes to this 
definition, and as such, has an intra-organisational emphasis, this study posits that the 
underlying foundations of transfer pricing are applicable in a New Zealand public health 
sector context. Specifically, this study posits that transfer pricing rationale is applied by 
DHBs for the purpose of IDFs.6 Based on the conventions of transfer pricing, buying and 
selling divisions of a decentralised organisation will tend to function separately for the 
purposes of decision-making and performance. However, they must act in accordance with 
common overarching organisational objectives, directives and accountability frameworks 
when making transfer pricing decisions. Similarly, DHBs will function separately for the 
purposes of decision-making and performance when making IDF decisions (as they have 
6 To clarify, as this study will be exploring the process of IDFs, it does not consider the applicability of transfer 
pricing at the intra-organisational level (i.e. between divisions), but rather, the inter-organisational level (i.e. 
between DHBs). 
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 delegated authority over service planning and provision), though they must also act in 
accordance with common overarching objectives, directives and accountability frameworks, 
as stipulated by the MOH (Ashton et al., 2008). Based on this logic, the definition of transfer 
pricing provided by Kaplan & Atkinson (1989) can be amended for the purpose of IDFs to 
state that a transfer price is the amount one DHB of the MOH charges for a product or service 
transferred to another DHB in the New Zealand public health sector (see Figure 5). Based on 
the literature reviewed, it is unclear precisely what prices would be used by DHBs for IDFs 
and how these prices would be calculated. However, it is probable that (1) the MOH will 
have some influence over the price setting process; and (2) DHBs will have some ability to 
negotiate transfer prices between themselves. 
Figure 5: Inter-Organisational Transfer Prices in the New Zealand Public Health Sector 
 
 
The next section will review literature on the nexus between adoption and use of 
sophisticated costing systems (as represented by ABC techniques) and intra-organisational-
field transfer pricing in a health care context. 
2.10 Activity-Based Costing and Transfer Pricing 
It is well established in the literature that the way transfer prices are set can seriously affect 
divisional performance, the success of competitive strategy and overall firm value (see 
Young, 1998; Baldenius et al., 1999; Ghosh, 2000; Kuntz & Vera, 2005; Göx & Schiller, 
2007; Dean et al., 2008; Pfeiffer et al., 2011). With globalisation, the challenge of developing 
effective pricing strategies becomes very complex (Stevenson & Cabell, 2002). These 
complexities are particularly salient in situations where the transfer of intangible services or 
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 component parts is involved because these transfers create internal revenues that impact on 
divisional performance (Carter et al., 1998). Therefore, management needs high-quality 
information, so well-informed transfer pricing decisions can be made. More precisely, 
management need high-quality information to set appropriate and efficient transfer prices that 
ensure value remains in the organisation. 
Colbert & Spicer (1998); Desheh et al. (1997) and Stevenson & Cabell (2002) recognise the 
importance that high-quality information has on transfer pricing and claim that ABC can be 
used to provide such information. The major benefit of ABC is its ability to provide an 
accurate and more complete picture of the costs and profitability of products and/or services. 
In particular, ABC has a focus on the level and basis of overhead allocation. Allocation of 
overheads is a highly important and often contentious issue, which can seriously distort 
information for decision-making and performance evaluation when done arbitrarily. By using 
ABC, organisations can identify systematic cause and effect linkages among products, 
markets, and costs before resorting to across-the-board allocations. “These linkages, called 
cost drivers, are activities that cause costs to be driven up or down. These costs occur when 
an activity is performed, so a cost driver is a way of allocating a cost to a particular activity” 
(Stevenson & Cabell, 2002, p. 81). 
Considering market-based transfer pricing, it is improbable that ABC could be used to inform 
these. A market-based transfer price is predetermined by prevailing economic conditions 
within the particular market for a good or services, thus, ABC cannot affect this price. With 
reference to cost-based transfer pricing, ABC is unlikely to improve direct variable cost 
information. Direct variable costs have clear cause and effect links and are not influenced by 
overhead allocation rates. However, cost-based transfer prices have an overhead component. 
To elaborate, variable cost transfer prices have a variable overhead component, while full 
cost-based transfer prices have a variable and fixed overhead component. ABC could be used 
to provide more accurate understandings of the cause and effect links of these costs, leading 
to more appropriate overhead allocations. Therefore, ABC could influence variable and full 
cost-based transfer prices. 
The usefulness of ABC when setting transfer prices is emphasised for an organisation that 
uses a full-cost transfer pricing system (Colbert & Spicer, 1998). This is mainly because a 
full-cost transfer price requires overhead costs to be included and allocated to each product 
and/or service. If an organisation is using a traditional costing system there are likely to be 
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 information deficiencies, as such systems typically only rely on one or two volume-related 
cost drivers. Other important cost drivers may be omitted, resulting in inaccurate overhead 
allocations and distorted individual product and/or service costs. Price distortions can 
adversely influence transfer prices, and create bias and resourcing inefficiencies (Colbert & 
Spicer, 1998). ABC can be deemed a panacea to overcome these issues and improve the 
transfer pricing process through improved cost understandings and more accurate product 
and/or service costs (Desheh et al., 1997). 
ABC can be invaluable to an organisation that uses a negotiated transfer pricing system too. 
As Colbert & Spicer (1998, p. 23) suggest, “ABC-based transfer prices can positively 
influence negotiations and serve as a basis for more constructive interdivisional working 
relationships”. Desheh et al. (1997) provides evidence to support this suggestion, finding that 
transfer prices influenced by ABC information led to a dramatic reduction in conflicts among 
managers in a pharmaceutical company. Desheh et al. (1997) also found that transfer pricing 
systems influenced by ABC not only reduce the strain on managerial relationships, but 
motivate divisional collaboration to reduce costs and better use organisational assets. Desheh 
et al. (1997) and Colbert & Spicer (1998) believe the improved environment for negotiations 
is predominantly due to enhanced confidence in product and/or service costs reported and 
greater acceptability of transfer pricing decisions, which flows directly from using ABC. 
Colbert & Spicer (1998) investigate the merits of using ABC as the basis for a transfer 
pricing system and argue that such a system has a number of desirable features beyond those 
described above. In addition, it can positively influence organisational decision-making and 
behaviour. The desirable features of ABC systems linked to transfer pricing include (1) a 
basis for improved inter-divisional relationships; (2) enlarging the information base between 
buying and selling divisions; (3) tool for lowering product costs at the supplier-buyer 
interface; and (4) cost management efforts within the supplier division. The presence of these 
features then feeds into improved internal decisions and behaviour. Specifically with relation 
to (1) component design/mix decisions; (2) end product design, mix, and pricing decisions; 
(3) sourcing decisions (make versus buy); and (4) cost management and asset utilisation. 
While there is some literature on the nexus between sophisticated costing systems (such as 
ABC) and transfer pricing, it is very scant. The studies above only span over the late 1990s to 
early 2000s and merely discuss the use of ABC and transfer pricing or provide anecdotal 
evidence. There are no practical examples in the literature, nor have there been any studies on 
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 ABC and transfer pricing in the New Zealand public health sector. Furthermore, the literature 
reviewed in this section only considers the applicability of sophisticated costing systems 
(based on ABC principles) to transfer pricing from an inter-organisational perspective. This 
study posits that sophisticated costing systems (such as ABC) can also be used to (1) 
influence decision-making associated with IDFs; and (2) inform prices for the intra-
organisational process of IDFs between DHBs. 
2.11 Research Gap 
Based on the review above, several gaps in the literature have been identified. Specifically, 
there is a substantial gap in the cost accounting literature on (1) adoption and use of costing 
systems from a New Zealand public health sector perspective; (2) contextual factors that 
influence adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems; and (3) the dimensions of 
costing systems used that makes them unsophisticated or sophisticated. Similarly, there is a 
substantial gap in the transfer pricing literature on (1) use of transfer pricing approaches in 
the health sector; and (2) transfer pricing in the New Zealand public health sector. Finally, 
there is a substantial gap in the literature on the nexus between costing systems and transfer 
pricing, particularly from a health sector perspective. 
In recognition of the potential benefits of sophisticated costing systems, and the fact that the 
New Zealand public health sector is severely underrepresented in the cost accounting 
literature, this study will explore what costing systems are being used by DHBs (i.e. 
unsophisticated or sophisticated) and how they are being used. This study will also contribute 
to cost accounting literature by studying the factors that influence adoption and use of 
sophisticated costing systems and the dimensions of costing systems used by DHBs in the 
New Zealand public health sector that makes them unsophisticated or sophisticated. This 
study sets out to contribute to transfer pricing literature from a New Zealand public health 
sector context by exploring the processes that underpin IDFs and how prices for IDFs are 
calculated. To contribute to literature on the nexus between costing systems and transfer 
pricing from a health sector perspective, this study will explore the extent to which cost 
information produced by DHBs costing systems influences IDFs (including service planning, 
provision and IDF prices). 
The next Chapter will develop a research objective, a set of research questions and a research 
framework, all of which are based on the gaps in current costing and transfer pricing 
literature identified and discussed above and the theory. 
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 Chapter 3 Theory and Research Framework  
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to develop a research objective, a set of research questions and a 
research framework, all of which are based on the gaps in current costing and transfer pricing 
literature identified and discussed at section 2.11, and the theory considered throughout 
Chapter 3. To fill the gap in current literature and contribute to theory, Chapter 3 will begin 
by considering the theoretical basis of institutional theory – namely organisational legitimacy 
and the three pillars of institutions (see section 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4). A generic theoretical 
framework will then be developed based on the main features that underpin organisational 
legitimacy and the three pillars of institutions at section 3.5. Following this, Chapter 3 will 
consider organisational legitimacy and the three pillars of institutions in the health sector (see 
section 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8). A research objective (see section 3.9) and a set of research questions 
(see section 3.10) will then be developed based on the literature reviewed at Chapter 2, the 
theory considered throughout Chapter 3, and the organisational environment being studied 
(the New Zealand public health sector). To facilitate achieving the research objective and 
answering the research questions, a research framework grounded in institutional theory will 
also be developed at section 3.11, which will be applied in this research. 
3.2 Institutions, Organisational Change and Institutionalisation 
Scott (2001) describes institutions as social structures that have attained a high degree of 
resilience; are composed of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life; 
are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational systems, 
routines and artefacts; operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to 
localised interpersonal relationships; and finally, although by definition institutions connote 
stability, they are subject to change processes prompted by constant shifts in internal and 
external organisational environments (institutional stability and change processes are 
discussed in greater detail in the next paragraph). While this is a relatively dense conception, 
it gives a clear overall depiction of institutions as “multifaceted, durable social structures, 
made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources” (Scott, 2001, p, 49). 
Institutions intrinsically function to provide stability and coherence in the social world but it 
is important to appreciate that they themselves undergo change. This is because institutions 
are possessed objectively yet created subjectively therefore they are socially constructed. 
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 Typically institutional change is incremental or revolutionary in nature and involves the 
reshaping of institutions or the taken-for-granted rules and shared norms that constitute 
institutions (Scott, 2001). According to Dacin et al. (2002), incremental change processes are 
piecemeal subtle changes that tend to unfold over time. The quintessence of incremental 
change is the gradual withering of an accepted norm or social convention, or the gradual 
adoption of a new norm or social convention, as the nature of political, social, and/or 
economic exchanges gradually change. In contrast, revolutionary change tends to be 
extensive, as it can present large discontinuities with former patterns, and it occurs rapidly. 
Oliver (1992) emphasises the discontinuous nature of revolutionary change, stating that it can 
be termed deinstitutionalisation, which refers to the erosion or discontinuity of an 
institutionalised organisational practice. There are numerous factors, both internal and 
external, that drive organisational change (Scott, 2001; Lounsbury, 2008). The most notable 
internal environmental factors include intra-organisational shifts in political ideologies and 
heterogeneous/discordant beliefs and practices. The imposition of change can also eventuate 
through external factors such as regulation; legislation; economic conditions; technological 
advancements; societal expectations and political emphases (Scott, 2001; Greenwood et al., 
2002; Dacin et al., 2002; Deegan 2006). 
When confronted with changing environmental demands, organisations can adopt or adapt a 
range of institutions to ensure survival (Scott, 2001; Kostova et al. 2008). This generally 
involves the weakening or occasionally even the disappearance of certain institutions or 
taken-for-granted rules and norms, and the strengthening or emergence of other institutions or 
taken-for-granted rules and norms (Scott, 2001; Lounsbury, 2008). This occurs through 
institutionalisation, the process “by which social processes, obligations or actualities come to 
take on a rule like status in thought and action” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341). That is, they 
become established as a convention or norm within an organisation. Often institutions can be 
in conflict during the process of institutionalisation and will compete with each other by 
prescribing “varying forms and activities for participants, with the winners and losers to be 
sorted out over time” (Scott, 2001, p. 189). This process can potentially be problematic as it 
may undermine the legitimacy of an organisation. To elaborate, institutions competing for 
ascendency will generate internal tensions and conflicts. These tensions and conflicts, if 
strong enough, can jeopardise “perceived consonance with relevant rules and laws, normative 
support, or alignment with cultural-cognitive frameworks” (Scott, 2001, p. 59). The result of 
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 which can be resistance to new ideas and ways of doing things, and an overall reduction in 
the success and legitimacy of an organisation. 
3.3 Organisational Legitimacy and Social Obligations 
Legitimacy is a theory that explicitly considers organisations as part of the broader social 
system and it seeks to describe or explain behaviour rather than prescribe how organisations 
should behave. According to Lindblom (1994), legitimacy is a condition or status that exists 
when an organisation’s value system is congruent with the value system of the larger social 
system of which it is a part. For congruence to exist, an organisation must give explicit 
consideration to the expectations of society, and comply with these relevant social 
expectations (Deegan, 2006). Since legitimacy is socially constructed, that is, it reflects 
congruence between the behaviours of the legitimated organisation and the shared beliefs of 
society; it can only be understood in the context of a particular setting at a particular time. As 
Suchman (1995, p. 574) states, “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. When a disparity, actual or potential, exists 
between the two value systems (the organisational system and the larger social system), there 
is a threat to the organisation’s legitimacy. 
According to Shocker & Sethi (1974) any organisation operates in society via a social 
contract, expressed or implied, whereby its survival and growth are based on two 
fundamental outcomes. The first being the delivery of socially desirable ends to society in 
general; the second being the distribution of economic, social, or political benefits to groups 
from which it delivers its power. As Deegan (2006, p. 170) explains “organizations are 
expected to comply with the terms (expectations) embodied within the social contract. The 
explicit terms of a social contract tend to be legal requirements, while other non-legislated 
societal expectations embody the implicit terms of the contract”. “By designing a formal 
structure that adheres to the norms and behaviour expectations in the extant environment, an 
organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued purposes in a proper and 
adequate manner” (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 509).  
If an organisation does not design a formal structure that adheres to norms and behaviour 
expectations the by-product will inevitably be a legitimacy gap. The impact of a legitimacy 
gap can vary and is largely dependent on the extent to which society deems an organisational 
form to deviate from what is considered normal or expected (Dillard et al., 2004). Typically a 
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 legitimacy gap will lead to the reduction of organisational legitimacy, with two potential 
outcomes/responses (Scott, 2001; Deegan 2006). If the reduction in legitimacy is gradual, in 
terms of timing and intensity, there will also be a gradual change in the organisation’s 
institutions and taken-for-granted norms as it attempts to parry the negative effects and 
maintain survival (Scott, 2001; Kostova et al. 2008; Lounsbury, 2008). If the reduction is 
sudden and sizable this will lead to the destruction of organisational legitimacy, as the 
damage will be irreparable (Deegan, 2006). 
As this section has emphasised, “Organizations require more than material resources and 
technical information if they are to survive and thrive in their social environments. They also 
need social acceptability and credibility” (Scott et al., 2000, p. 237). To gain and retain social 
acceptability and credibility organisations must observe and adhere to social expectations and 
applicable legal and political frameworks (Deegan, 2006; Dillard et al., 2008). Organisations 
must also consider their established conventions and norms, which form organisational 
institutions, to ensure their behaviour (perceived or actual) is in line with stakeholder’s 
expectations.7 Ultimately, these considerations form the basis of the organisational 
environment and through congruence/adherence organisational legitimacy is created. As the 
organisational environment changes over time organisations are required to constantly review 
and make ongoing amendments to their practices to maintain organisational legitimacy, with 
the aim of ensuring long-term survival. As Scott (2001, p. 59) states, organisational 
legitimacy is “not a commodity to be possessed or exchanged but a condition reflecting 
perceived consonance with relevant rules or laws, normative support, or alignment with 
cultural-cognitive frameworks” (Scott, 2001, p. 59). These rules or laws, normative support, 
and cultural-cognitive frameworks form the three pillars of institutions, which elicit three 
related but distinguishable bases of legitimacy (Scott, 2001). 
3.4 Organisational Legitimacy and the Three Pillars of Institutions 
The three pillars of institutions are regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive systems (see 
Table 2 for further details). According to Scott (2001, p. 51), each of the three pillars “has 
been identified by one or another social theorist as a vital ingredient of institutions”. This is 
7 As Deegan (2006, p. 169) states, “institutional theory provides an explanation of how mechanisms through 
which organisations may seek to align perceptions of their practices and characteristics with social and cultural 
values (in order to gain or retain legitimacy) become institutionalized in particular organisations. Such 
mechanisms could include those proposed by legitimacy theory, but could conceivably also encompass a 
broader range of legitimating mechanisms. This is why these theoretical perspectives should be seen as 
complementary rather than competing”. 
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 corroborated by Hoffman (1997, p. 36), who describes the pillars as three elements that form 
a continuum moving “from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the 
taken-for-granted”. Furthermore, D’Andrade (1984) argues that an integrated conception of 
the three pillars of institutions creates the appearance of institutions as overdetermined 
systems. “Overdetermined in the sense that social sanctions plus pressure for conformity, plus 
intrinsic direct reward, plus values, are all likely to act together to give a particular meaning 
system its directive force” (D’Andrade, 1984, p. 98). With these outlooks in mind, the 
theoretical framework for this study will consider the three pillars of institutions both 
independently and interdependently, the aim of which is to highlight important differences 
between each of the three pillars before amalgamating them into one research framework to 
apply to the New Zealand public health sector.8 
Table 2: The Three Pillars of Institutions 
 Pillar 
Theory Element Regulative Normative Cognitive 
Basis of 
compliance Expedience Social Obligation 
Taken-for-grantedness 
Shared understandings 
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding expectations Constitutive schema 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Indicators 
Rules 
Laws 
Sanctions 
Certification 
Accreditation 
Common beliefs 
Shared logics of action 
- Prevalence 
- Isomorphism 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed 
Comprehensible 
Recognisable 
Culturally supported 
(Source: Scott, 2001, p. 52) 
3.4.1 The Regulative Pillar 
The regulative pillar is concerned with the idea that institutions constrain and regularise 
behaviour. “In this conception, regulatory processes involve the capacity to establish rules, 
inspect others’ conformity to them, and as necessary, manipulate sanctions – rewards or 
punishments – in an attempt to influence future behavior” (Scott, 2001, p. 52). Typically 
“force, fear and expedience are central ingredients of the regulatory pillar, but they are often 
8 This approach is supported by Scott (2001, p. 51) who proposes that “[o]ne possible approach would be to 
view all of these facets as contributing, in interdependent and mutually reinforcing ways, to a powerful social 
framework, one that encapsulates and exhibits the celebrated strength and resilience of these structures”. 
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 tempered by the existence of rules, whether in the guise of informal mores or formal rules 
and laws” (Scott, 2001, p. 53). These informal mores or formal rules and laws are devised 
and espoused by the societies in which organisations exist or by those whom organisations 
depends on, and they create what several authors have referred to as coercive pressure 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Carruthers, 1995; Carpenter & 
Feroz, 2001; Scott, 2001; Delmas & Toffel, 2004). The regulative pillar as a stable system of 
rules (either formal or informal), which is backed by surveillance and sanctioning power, is 
one prevailing view of institutions. However as Scott (2001) reveals, the regulative pillar is 
by no means a perfect view. “[R]ules must be interpreted and disputes resolved; incentives 
and sanctions must be designed and will have unintended effects; surveillance mechanisms 
are required but will prove to be fallible, not fool proof; and conformity is only one of many 
possible responses by those subject to regulative institutions” (Scott, 2001, p. 54).9 
3.4.2 The Normative Pillar 
The normative pillar underscores systems comprising shared values and norms that are 
internalised by individuals and imposed on others (Scott, 2001).10 Normative systems are 
archetypically seen to impose constraints on social behaviour because they establish rules that 
introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life. Normative 
systems do however empower and enable social action. “They confer rights as well as 
responsibilities, privileges as well as duties, licenses as well as mandates” (Scott, 2001, p. 
55). The normative conception stresses a deeper moral base for assessing legitimacy and the 
successful imposition of values and norms as a normative system of social behaviour is 
supported by normative pressure to conform. Conformity can be roused by various carries 
including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines and artefacts (Scott, 2001). “In 
exchange for appearing to conform to such normative institutional pressures [the 
organisation] obtains rewards, such as increased legitimacy” (Krishnan & Yetman, 2011, p. 
1006). This increased legitimacy (typically observed through certification and accreditation) 
can benefit the organisation by allowing it to appeal to its stakeholders for more resources 
9 North (1990, p. 54) also calls attention to problems that can arise because “enforcement is undertaken by 
agents whose own utility functions influence outcomes”. Numerous institutional theorists stress this potential 
eventuality. One such theorist is Skocpol (1985), who argues that the state develops its own interest and operates 
somewhat autonomously from other societal actors. In this and other ways, attention to the regulative aspects of 
institutions creates renewed interest in the role of the state: as rule maker, referee and enforcer. 
10 Values are “conceptions of the preferred or the desirable, together with the construction of standards to which 
existing structures or behaviour can be compared and assessed. Norms specify how things should be done; they 
define legitimate means to pursue valued ends” (Scott, 2001, p. 55). 
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 and subjecting it to lower regulatory and behavioural scrutiny by internal and external 
constituents (Scott, 2001; Bansal & Clelland, 2004). 
3.4.3 The Cultural-Cognitive Pillar 
The cultural-cognitive pillar postulates that institutions are shared understandings and 
common beliefs that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which 
meaning is made. According to Scott (2001), as meanings emerge through social interactions 
they are attributed to objects and activities, and are subsequently maintained and transformed 
to make sense of the ongoing stream of happenings. Over time these meanings are deemed to 
be the orthodox structure in society and are adopted as either a common frame of reference or 
definition of a situation (a constitutive schema). This is because they are not simply treated 
“as subjective beliefs but also as symbolic systems perceived to be objective and external to 
individual actors” (Scott, 2001, p. 57). That is, they become prevalent isomorphic structures 
for shared logics of action. This leads to their becoming institutionalised as cognitive and 
preconscious taken-for-granted assumptions and shared understandings that form “templates 
for particular types of actors and scripts for action” (Scott, 2001, p. 58). Consequently, 
mimetic pressure results as organisations identify and imitate culturally supported structures 
or practices used by other entities that are perceived to be successful or legitimate. 
3.5 Theoretical Framework 
The previous three sections (including section 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4) have considered and 
discussed the theoretical underpinnings of institutional theory, which will be applied to this 
study – namely organisational legitimacy and the three pillars of institutions. Using the main 
features that underpin organisational legitimacy and the three pillars of institutions, a 
theoretical framework has been developed (see Figure 6), which forms the foundations of the 
research framework. As the theoretical framework is only a generic framework, it is 
necessary to consider and discuss institutional theory in the organisational-field being studied 
(the health sector). The purpose is to determine the applicability of institutional theory in the 
research context and to provide a substantive framework that will be used to assist the 
research process (specifically to achieve the research objective and answer the research 
questions). Thus, the next three sections (including section 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8) consider and 
discuss institutional theory in a health care setting.  
 
    43 
  
    44 
 3.6 Institutionalisation in Health Care 
Conventional wisdom asserts that use of case-mix accounting systems based on Diagnosis 
Related Groups (DRG) faithfully represent the economic or technical reality of health care 
organisations (Fetter et al., 1991). The foremost issue with this view is the fact that it 
establishes a general theory of organisational rationality. However, “one cannot understand 
such organizational and regulatory practices as the DRG framework and case-mix accounting 
merely with reference to the general rationality of their structural properties” (Covaleski et 
al., 1993, p. 76). “Organizations are inextricably embedded in a dynamic system of 
interrelated economic, institutional, and ecological processes” (Dacin, 1997, p. 47). Therefore 
a general theory of rationality is not sufficiently qualified to comprehend or explain the 
complexities of such a dynamic system and its multiple influences on organisational action 
(and the basis for such action). Organisational action is an indeterminate outcome of 
substantive struggles between different agencies with varying levels of influence, all of which 
serve a role in shaping action. Failure to give due consideration to these influences is to 
neglect “the actual complex and contingent conditions under which organizational action 
occurs” (Clegg, 1989, p. 105). Accordingly, “one can more accurately characterize such 
practices as the DRG framework and case-mix accounting as social in nature, practices 
whose principal purpose is at once to express and demonstrate conformity with 
institutionalized rules and expectations” (Covaleski et al., 1993, p. 76). 
Several institutional theorists, including Scott et al. (2000); Lounsbury (2001); Scott (2001); 
Dillard et al. (2004) and Lounsbury (2008) offer compelling insights to support the 
perception that institutional theory can be used to understand the various social and 
behavioural facets of health care practices, which would otherwise be ignored. These 
institutional theorists also concur with Covaleski et al. (1993, p. 66) “that an organization’s 
survival requires it as much to conform to societal norms of acceptable practice as to achieve 
high levels of production efficiency and effectiveness”. Many aspects of an organisation’s 
formal structure, policies and procedures are founded in this dual requirement, thus they not 
only serve to reaffirm organisational efficacy internally, but they also serve to demonstrate 
conformity with the institutionalised rules and expectations expressed by external 
constituents (Clegg, 1989; Covaleski et al., 1993; Scott et al., 2000; Scott, 2001; Dillard et 
al., 2004; Lounsbury, 2008). Based on this premise, the adoption and use of costing systems 
may be expected to play heightened, though ritualistic roles in the heavily institutionalised 
environment of health care, with the fundamental goal of adhering to institutional pressures. 
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 This essentially means “they may be treated as ceremonial systems for creating and affirming 
order and meaning, for executing procedures in sanctioned ways, and for providing accounts 
of activities in terms that make them seem reasonable and acceptable to external constituents” 
(Covaleski et al., 1993, p. 66). 
3.7 Institutional Pressures in Health Care 
As noted at section 3.3, there are three institutional pillars (regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive), which provide stability and meaning to social behaviour (Scott, 2001). 
The three pillars also elicit three separate bases of institutional pressure, which impose moral 
and cultural boundaries around appropriate organisational and managerial behaviour. The 
bases of institutional pressure that emanate from these pillars are regulatory, political and 
social agencies (Child & Tsai, 2005).11 Regulatory agency pressures are authorities, such as 
state and local bodies, which impose rules on organisations and monitor and sanction 
organisational behaviour; political agency pressures are the actions of other organisations 
within the same reference group; and social agency pressures are the general societal 
expectations of how an organisation should behave (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Scott, 
2001; Dacin et al., 2007). 
As argued by Covaleski et al. (1993); Ruef & Scott (1998); Scott (2001); Covaleski et al. 
(2003); Eldenburg & Krishnan (2003) and Krishnan & Yetman (2011), institutional pressures 
are particularly salient in hospitals, especially public and non-profit hospitals. “An additional 
complicating factor in hospitals is that one set of institutional pressures may conflict with 
other sets of pressures” (Krishnan & Yetman, 2011, p. 1006). Specifically, one set of 
institutional pressures can require hospitals to reduce costs by being economically and 
programmatically efficient (Dranove, 1998; Covaleski et al., 2003; Eldenburg & Krishnan, 
2003). These types of institutional pressures are typically imposed by government through 
fiscal policy because of poor economic conditions or changes to strategic emphases. 
Conversely, an alternative set of institutional pressures can constrain managers from pursuing 
opportunities to reduce costs and increase economic value, particularly if such opportunities 
diminish the range and/or quality of health services to sections of society (Krishnan & 
Yetman, 2011). These types of institutional pressures are typically imposed through societal 
expectations, legal obligations and regulatory oversight. 
11 Goodstein (1994); Goodrick & Salancik (1996) and Hitt et al. (2004) recognise that, in addition to economic 
factors, institutional pressures can affect organisational behaviour. 
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 3.8 Organisational Legitimacy and the Notion of Social Contract in Health Care 
Numerous authors in health care, such as Rodwin (1993); Morreim (1995); Spencer et al. 
(2000) and Dacin et al. (2002), have voiced concerns that changes to the organisational 
environment may prompt significant moral implications in health care settings. Specifically, 
these authors have “considered how these changes have influenced the character of 
professionals delivering health care services and their loyalties, commitments, and 
perceptions of their ethical obligations to patients” (Dacin et al., 2002, p. 52). At the core of 
many exploratory studies that have looked at the correlation between changing organisational 
environments and professional morality is a concept Toulmin (1990, p. 25) identified as “de-
moralisation”. The foundations of this concept bring forth the argument that changing 
institutional environments and heightened budgetary pressures can erode a particular way of 
defining the moral calling associated with physician roles. This is a particularly pertinent 
issue because physicians “must consider the social, political and economic framework within 
which human life takes place” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 47). To elaborate, physicians need to 
adhere to political and financial pressures (along with legal and regulatory structures that 
monitor and sanction organisational behaviour), but equally they must also consider their 
social and moral obligations to the general public.  
Society (which comprises patients, donors and other community members) will tend to hold a 
set of expectations about how a health care organisation should conduct its operations (Ruef 
& Scott, 1998). These expectations are central to organisational legitimacy and form the 
notion of a social contract between the organisation and the general public (Scott, 2001). In 
an organisational environment where patient welfare primacy is a prominent socially 
constructed expectation, the existence of de-moralisation (or the perceived existence thereof) 
can severely impact on the legitimacy of a health care organisation. This is largely because 
the presence of de-moralisation implies that physicians are defecting from their responsibility 
to deliver high quality health care services to the public (to some extent), instead focusing 
their attention on adhering to politically imposed directives and/or meeting budgetary 
constraints. As a result, confidence in the public health sector will reduce and a legitimacy 
gap will be created between society’s expectations and the actions (perceived or actual) of the 
organisation (Deegan, 2006). 
In summary, health care organisations face a unique challenge in balancing institutional 
pressures imposed on them by various constituents. According to Clegg (1989), in order for 
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 hospitals to survive they should conform to those interests that are the most influential. Based 
on the literature reviewed, relating to institutional theory in health care, this would involve 
hospitals reaffirming organisational efficacy internally while demonstrating conformity 
externally. With the intention of preserving organisational legitimacy, health care 
organisations will use institutions as ceremonial processes to create and affirm conformity 
with regulatory, political and social agencies. For example, the institutionalisation of costing 
systems “as ongoing processes appears to be profoundly political and potentially complicit in 
a shift in the balance of power from the practitioner to the administrative components of the 
hospitals” (Covaleski et al., 1993, p. 77). Power shifts from the physician to the hospital 
administrator in the sense that expertise becomes encoded within the organisational structure 
(with respect to those institutional pressures that are the most influential) rather than the 
individual providing the health services. 
3.9 Research Objective 
Changes in the New Zealand public health sector in recent years, such as heightened social, 
political and economic pressures to manage and reduce costs while improving the quality of 
care in conjunction with stringent health care guidelines, have forced DHB’s nationwide to 
reassess their approach to health care provision. With the intention of preserving legitimacy, 
this has chiefly involved evaluating current practices or institutions; revising health care 
systems, including locality of treatment; and assessing established accounting systems and 
mechanisms (or lack thereof) to understand the source of costs and resource consumption 
(OAG, 2013). Acknowledging that patient welfare has always held pre-eminence in the New 
Zealand public health sector, balancing the dual pressures to enhance the utilisation of limited 
resources and adhere to social expectations to provide sustained high quality health services 
has been a difficult exercise for DHBs (OAG, 2013).  
As a result, this study will assess the influence of the NHB and the twenty DHBs it monitors, 
using a twofold consideration. The first consideration is adoption and use of costing systems 
by DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector. As current cost accounting 
literature indicates (Cooper & Kaplan, 1992; Drury & Tayles, 1995; Hussain & Gunasekaran, 
2001; Abdallah & Li, 2008), more sophisticated costing systems provide higher quality cost 
information compared to traditional costing systems, which leads to more informed and 
effective decision-making. Thus, bearing in mind the MOH’s directives, desired outcomes 
and the recent issues observed by the OAG (discussed at section 1.1), it is expected that 
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 DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector will adopt and use more 
sophisticated costing systems, such as ABC, to plan and provide health services. Based on 
this expectation, there is a need to ascertain whether or not DHBs adopt and use costing 
systems (including their level of sophistication), how well DHBs understand their costs and 
cost structures for effective service planning and provision, and how DHB’s contribute to 
effective regional and national service planning and provision using information provided by 
their respective costing systems. 
The second consideration is how service planning and provision is effectuated by inter-
district co-ordination and IDFs, and the impact costing systems adoption and use have on 
these processes. As Ashton et al. (2008) notes, most DHBs do not provide a full set of 
services within their districts; therefore around one in six admissions are for patients from 
other districts. Thus, there is a process of inter-district co-ordination that takes place to plan 
and provide services via IDFs. Ashton et al. (2008) expressed concerns about deficiencies in 
payments for IDFs. Specifically, there are concerns regarding poor quality data on the 
numbers and types of flows, inaccurate pricing and late payments. There is also a belief that 
mechanisms used to inform prices unfairly affect smaller secondary DHBs compared to 
larger tertiary DHBs due to the excessive influence tertiary DHB’s supposedly have over the 
price setting process, which is done at national level. As there is no published literature on 
IDFs in the New Zealand public health sector, this study will set out to determine how 
National Prices for IDFs are calculated, how costing systems information is used to inform 
these prices, how effective these prices are for inter-district trading, and to what extent DHBs 
are in collaboration with each other to plan and provide health services. 
In recognition of the potential benefits of sophisticated costing systems, and the fact that the 
New Zealand public health sector is severely underrepresented in current cost accounting and 
transfer pricing literature, the objective of this study is as follows: 
To examine the costing systems used by DHBs to plan and provide health services, and to 
evaluate how the use of such costing systems influence service planning and provision (at the 
district, regional and national level) in accordance with the outcomes outlined by the MOH. 
In particular, the study will explore how more sophisticated costing techniques, such as ABC, 
are being used by DHBs to (1) enhance the utilisation of limited resources; and (2) adhere to 
social expectations to provide sustained high quality health services. The study also sets out 
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 to contribute to transfer pricing literature from a New Zealand public health sector context by 
exploring the processes that underpin IDFs, including (1) how National Prices for IDFs are 
calculated; and (2) to what extent the cost information produced by DHBs costing systems 
influences this calculation. 
3.10 Research Questions 
To achieve the overall research objective outlined at section 3.9 a series of research questions 
are posed. The specific research questions, which are based on the research objective, 
literature reviewed and theory considered are set out below: 
RQ 1: What determines and guides the costing systems used in New Zealand DHBs? 
RQ 2: How are costs calculated in DHB costing systems? 
RQ 3: How is cost information produced by cost systems used to plan and provide services? 
RQ 4: How and for what other purposes is cost information used in the public health sector? 
RQ 5: How are the transfer prices to be charged for inter-DHB trading determined? 
RQ 6: How and for what purposes do DHBs collaborate with each other? 
3.11 Research Framework 
The research framework, developed to achieve the research objective outlined at section 3.9 
and answer the research questions posed at section 3.10, is an organisational-field focused 
research framework based in the New Zealand public health sector (see Figure 7). According 
to DiMaggio & Powell (1983, p. 148) an organisational-field is defined as a set of 
“organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life; key 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that 
produce similar services or products”. The research framework for this study posits that 
institutionalisation is deeply embedded in the New Zealand public health sector, and will 
endeavour to contribute to literature and theory by identifying, with particular emphasis on 
costing and IDFs, (1) how institutional pressures impact on the organisational environment in 
which DHBs operate; and (2) the institutions New Zealand DHBs adopt. 
Based on the literature reviewed at section 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, which relates to institutional 
theory in health care, hospitals face a unique challenge in balancing institutional pressures 
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 imposed on them by various constituents. With the intention of preserving organisational 
legitimacy, health care organisations will use institutions as ceremonial processes to create 
and affirm conformity with regulatory, political and social agencies. Moreover, health care 
organisations will tend to conform to those pressures that are the most influential. 
Acknowledging the fact that there are three agencies which institutional pressures can 
emanate from, the research framework for this study posits that the pressures placed on a 
health care organisation (i.e. DHB A, the Main Case Site) include (1) regulatory and political 
agency pressures from authorities such as the MOH, the NHB and associated costing and 
pricing groups (i.e. the Supplementary Case Site); (2) political pressures from other DHBs 
operating in the New Zealand public health sector (i.e. the Confirmatory Case Sites); and (3) 
social agency pressures from the external organisational environment about how the 
organisation should behave (i.e. the general public expecting DHBs to provide sustained high 
quality health services). 
While the research framework does not suggest the extent to which a DHB will implement 
any one institution, it does posit that these institutions (which are based on the twofold 
consideration documented at section 3.9) will include costing practices, costing systems, 
costing rules and procedures, the provision of cost and volume information for decision-
making, pricing mechanisms, and product/service mix. Moreover, the research framework 
suggests that a DHB which conforms to institutional pressures is likely to possess greater 
organisational legitimacy and be subjected to lower regulatory and behavioural scrutiny by 
internal and external constituents. This suggestion is justified by the fact that conformity to 
institutional pressures will lead to less public outcry that DHBs are reneging on their duty 
(i.e. their social contract) to the general public to provide high quality health services. 
3.12 Chapter Summary 
To fill the gap in current literature and contribute to theory, Chapter 3 has considered the 
theoretical basis of institutional theory – namely organisational legitimacy and the three 
pillars of institutions. A generic theoretical framework was then developed based on the main 
features that underpin organisational legitimacy and the three pillars of institutions. 
Following this, Chapter 3 considered organisational legitimacy and the three pillars of 
institutions in the health sector. A research objective and a set of research questions were 
then developed based on the literature reviewed at Chapter 2, the theory considered 
throughout Chapter 3, and the organisational environment being studied (the New Zealand 
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 public health sector). To facilitate achieving the research objective and answering the 
research questions, a research framework grounded in institutional theory was also 
developed, which will be applied in this research. 
The purpose of the next chapter is to outline the main methodology that will be used to 
conduct this study. Chapter 4 will then identify the data types required to (1) make inferences 
with respect to the research objective; (2) respond to the resultant research questions; and (3) 
assess the research framework. Chapter 4 will also set out the tools and techniques that will 
be used to collect and analyse the data required to answer the research questions and achieve 
the overall objective of the study. 
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 Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This study explores the nexus between sophisticated costing systems use (as represented by 
ABC techniques) and IDFs in the New Zealand public health sector. In particular, the study 
considers adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems to disseminate cost information 
to inform transfer prices for inter-DHB trading. To guide the study, Chapter 3 developed a 
research objective (at section 3.9), six research questions (at section 3.10) and a research 
framework (at section 3.11). The purpose of Chapter 4 is to identify the data types required to 
(1) make inferences with respect to the research objective; (2) respond to the resultant 
research questions; and (3) assess the research framework. Chapter 4 also explains the tools 
and techniques that will be used to collect and analyse the data required to answer the 
research questions and achieve the overall objective of the study. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section outlines the main 
methodology used in the study, a MCS approach, and its applicability with respect to the 
research purpose stated above. Section 4.3 discusses the benefits of a MCS approach over 
alternative approaches. Section 4.4 outlines the potential limitations of case study research 
grounded in a qualitative paradigm and discusses the verification strategies employed to 
mitigate such limitations (specifically replication, reflection and triangulation). Section 4.5 
details the procedures for data collection, including methods of data collection and 
demographics of data collected. Section 4.6 details the procedures for interpretation and 
analysis of the data. And finally, section 4.7 summarises this chapter. 
4.2 A Multi-Site Case Study Approach 
To achieve the research objective stated at section 3.9, answer the six research questions 
posed at section 3.10 and assess the research framework developed at section 3.11, this study 
employs a MCS approach. A MCS approach is defined as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a defined, contemporary phenomenon that is common to two or more real-life or 
naturalistic settings (Bishop, 2010). A MCS “offers a means of understanding an individual, 
event, policy, program, or group via multiple representations of that phenomenon” (Bishop, 
2010, p. 587). To elaborate, a MCS enables wider understandings about a phenomenon by 
illuminating the experiences, implications, or effects of a phenomenon in more than one 
setting (Bishop, 2010). The research design through which MCS research is conducted is 
typically the same across all sites. Thus, the same phenomenon or unit(s) of analysis is 
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 studied with respect to the same key research questions (i.e. the research objective discussed 
at section 3.9 and research questions posed in section 3.10). “In addition, the same or similar 
data collection, analysis, and reporting approaches are employed across the sites” (Bishop, 
2010, p. 587). 
4.2.1 Applicability of the Multi-Site Case Study Approach 
The adoption of a MCS approach is appropriate for the purposes of this study for three 
reasons. Firstly, the study explores a contemporary phenomenon, the nexus between 
sophisticated costing systems (as represented by ABC techniques) and IDFs in the New 
Zealand public health sector. Secondly, the phenomenon is common to more than one setting, 
as the New Zealand public health sector comprises multiple DHBs. Thirdly, a single-site case 
study approach is not appropriate because DHBs which operate in the New Zealand public 
health sector come from varying backgrounds, have differing organisational structures and 
characteristics (i.e. tertiary and secondary DHBs vary in size and nature), and serve their 
respective communities with consideration for specific and often dissimilar objectives and 
needs. Therefore, a MCS research approach is more suitable for purposes of this study 
because it allows individual DHBs to be explored within the organisational environment in 
which they operate. 
4.3 Benefits of the Multi-Site Case Study Approach 
A MCS approach has a number of benefits over alternative research methods, such as a 
single-site case study and cross-sectional surveys. The benefits of a MCS approach, 
compared to a single-site case study approach, are discussed below at section 4.3.1. The 
benefits of a MCS approach, compared to a cross-sectional survey approach, are discussed 
below at section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Multi-Site Case Studies versus Single-Site Case Studies 
A single-site case study can yield in-depth findings about the structure and characteristics of 
an organisation (including the historical, cultural and situational nature of an organisation). 
However, it is unable to provide cross-site patterns that can potentially enhance the internal 
and external validity of the study (Lillis & Mundy, 2005). Moreover, a single-site case study 
has limited generalisability to other organisations and industries due to its single-site focus 
(Miller, 1998). As Bishop (2010) states, criticisms about single-site case studies tend to 
reflect concerns about the uniqueness or artifactual conditions surrounding the case. 
Conversely, a MCS approach has the capacity to elicit common findings from across different 
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 settings, but with respect to a single phenomenon. Hence, as well as eliciting site-specific 
findings that can be unique to an individual site, a MCS has the potential to enable valid 
cross-site syntheses and generalisable insights into a phenomenon. “As a result, richer and 
deeper understandings of a phenomenon are revealed” (Bishop, 2010, p. 578).  
4.3.2 Multi-Site Case Studies versus Cross-Sectional Surveys 
According to Lillis & Mundy (2005) a cross-sectional survey can provide a wide breadth of 
findings. In particular, a cross-sectional survey can provide patterns of relationships between 
investigated factors and insights into the impacts of external factors, such as industry; 
regulation; legislation; economic conditions; technological advancements; societal 
expectations and political emphases. Though a cross-sectional survey can provide breadth of 
findings, it is unable to provide contextual explanations for occurrences within an 
organisation due to multiple respondents (Lillis & Mundy, 2005). Moreover, survey 
instruments are inherently flawed because they often use weak measures for dependent and 
independent variables; leave fundamental terms to be interpreted in a subjective manner by 
respondents; allow respondents to self-specify; provide inconsistent findings; and finally, rely 
on a particular response rate (without which the survey becomes unusable) (Al-Omiri & 
Drury, 2007). In contrast, a MCS approach allows the researcher to define fundamental terms 
and ascertain what such terms mean to the participant; facilitate constructive in-depth 
discussions on relevant topic areas; interact face-to-face with key members of an organisation 
to gain clearer insights on a phenomenon; and provide consistent findings through 
verification strategies (which are discussed in the follow section) (Al-Omiri & Drury, 2007). 
In summary, though a MCS approach does not have the same depth as a single-site case 
study; it has more breadth due to its multi-site analysis. In addition, though a MCS approach 
has less breadth than a cross-sectional survey, it has more depth by investigating the structure 
and characteristics of individual organisations (Lillis & Mundy, 2005). The next section 
discusses the general limitations of qualitative research and outlines the specific mechanisms 
to be used in this research to mitigate such limitations. 
4.4 Mitigating Potential Limitations of Qualitative Research 
While the case study approach as a method to conduct qualitative research has numerous 
benefits (as per section 4.3), it is frequently criticised for having limited generalisability, 
validity and reliability. According to Zimmerman (2001) and Ahrens & Chapman (2006), the 
shortcomings of case study research are ascribed to a failure to follow research protocols 
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 originally designed within an economics-based quantitative paradigm. As a means to mitigate 
the shortcomings of case study research grounded in the qualitative paradigm, numerous 
scholars, including Ahrens & Dent (1998), Morse et al. (2002) and Lillis (2006), have 
suggested that case study researchers need to demonstrate that they are both rigorous and 
unbiased in their approach to research. This can be achieved by employing various 
verification strategies. 
Acknowledging the inherent shortcomings of qualitative research, the study mitigates these 
by employing a MCS study approach. Using a MCS approach improves the degree of 
generalisability, validity and reliability of findings by obtaining data from multiple sites 
(Lillis & Mundy, 2005; Bishop, 2010). Furthermore, several verification strategies are 
employed to add rigor and demonstrate impartiality to the research process and findings 
(Morse et al., 2002). The verification strategies employed in this study are replication logic 
(discussed at section 4.4.1), reflection (discussed at section 4.4.2) and triangulation 
(discussed at section 4.4.3). 
4.4.1 Choice of Case Sites and Replication 
According to case-focused literature, including Yin (1984); Eisenhardt (1989); Yin (2003); 
and Lillis & Mundy (2005), a MCS research approach should make use of replication logic, 
which involves a non-random and purposive choice of case sites. To gain a wider breadth of 
understandings about a phenomenon and strengthen analytical generalisations, the sites 
chosen should also vary in organisational structure and characteristics (Yin, 2003). This 
approach to site selection is supported by Pettigrew (1988), who notes that given the limited 
number of cases which can usually be studied; it makes sense to choose sites that are both 
antithetical and transparently observable, the aim of which is to gain insights from additional 
case sites that corroborate, qualify and/or extend the findings of the first site. As Yin (2003) 
notes, the underlying logic of replication is to treat a series of cases as a series of experiments 
with each case serving to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses. Case sites that confirm 
emergent findings enhance confidence in the validity of the findings. In contrast, case sites 
that disconfirm emergent findings can often provide an opportunity to refine and extend 
theory (so long as findings can be explained logically). 
This study employs replication logic by choosing case sites that operate within the same 
organisational-field environment but vary in their organisational structure and characteristics. 
The sites selected for the purposes of this study all operate in the New Zealand public health 
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 sector and include a combination of tertiary and secondary DHBs and the MOH (particularly 
representatives from costing and pricing groups). This combination of case sites was selected 
so as to maximise case diversity and to gain deeper insights on the use of costing systems and 
transfer prices for IDFs in the New Zealand public health sector from multiple perspectives. 
These sites were also chosen to demonstrate rigor; to mitigate the potential for selection bias; 
and to gather findings that are valid, reliable and potentially generalisable with respect to 
DHBs operating in a New Zealand public health sector context. 
To add further rigor to the research process, this study also makes use of reflection. 
Reflection as a form of verification strategy and its application in this study are discussed 
below at section 4.4.2. 
4.4.2 Reflection Methods 
According to Ahrens & Chapman (2006), reflection is a flexible and ongoing process in 
which different stages of the qualitative inquiry interact and influence each other, the aim of 
which is to ensure the research problem, theoretical framework and data collected are 
appropriately linked. The process of reflection is particularly important in conducting a 
research exploration (whether it is qualitative or quantitative in nature) because defining the 
research problem, choosing appropriate theoretical perspectives to underpin the study, and 
collecting and analysing relevant data to address the research problem are core to a study. In 
addition to linking the main components of a study together, reflection can be used to validate 
the research framework, provide additional insights on a phenomenon and add richness to the 
findings of a study. That is, reflection can be used to validate ideas and findings from earlier 
data collection/analysis by identifying like terms or similar findings or alternatively it can be 
used to identify dissimilarities or obscurities in findings that require further explanation 
(Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988). 
With consideration for the prospective uses of reflection aforementioned, this study makes 
use of an interactive pattern in its research process, whereby the preliminary findings inform 
decisions about future data collection (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Miller et al., 2004). To 
elaborate, reflection is employed during the process of data collection and analysis. It is also 
employed to establish and check links between the data collected, the data analysed and the 
research framework developed at section 3.11. 
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 The process of reflection associated with data collection that is used in this study is split into 
three phases to enable reflectivity and interaction between the research problem, theoretical 
framework and data collected and analysed (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988). The first phase is 
collection of data from one case site, so as to gain a general understanding of the research 
field and to develop the main research agenda. This phase is important as it serves to 
substantiate the research context and research purpose. The second phase of data reflection is 
initial analysis of data collected from the first case site, the aim of which is to discern key 
trends and patterns, and to evaluate their compatibility to the proposed theory and research 
framework (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). Phase two is also 
important as it provides insights into the most significant or interesting issues in the particular 
context, and can be used to revise the research purpose and/or research questions. The third 
phase involves using the findings from the first case site to inform the interview questions 
and choice of documents (which are relevant to the study’s finalised research purpose), which 
will be collected from supplementary case sites and analysed to form the study’s main results. 
The overall purpose of reflection is to provide validity, reliability and richness to the study’s 
results. Another verification strategy that is used for these purposes is triangulation. 
Triangulation as a form of verification strategy and its application in this study are discussed 
below at section 4.4.3. 
4.4.3 Triangulation 
Triangulation is defined by Flick et al. (2004, p. 178) as “observation of research from (at 
least) two different points”. There are four main points research can be observed from and 
they can be used separately or in conjunction with each other. The points include findings 
gathered from different methods, data, theories or investigators and they represent four 
distinct types of triangulation – methodological triangulation, data triangulation, theoretical 
triangulation and investigator triangulation (Flick, 1992; Flick et al., 2004; Hopper & Hoque, 
2006). The main benefits of triangulation are in its ability to reveal additional insights that 
may be neglected by a single method, data source, theory or researcher. Moreover, 
triangulation can enhance the credibility of explanations and capture richness and complexity 
of a phenomenon (Flick et al., 2004; Hopper & Hoque, 2006). 
Of the four types of triangulation outlined above, this study makes use of data triangulation. 
According to Flick (1992), the purpose of data triangulation is to determine patterns or 
reoccurring and consistent instances in the data collected. This process allows a researcher to 
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 confirm the validity and reliability of a particular explanation, theory or argument. In 
addition, Flick et al. (2004) note that data triangulation is used to provide richer more in-
depth understandings about a particular event, people, context or community. To achieve this 
data triangulation draws on data from several different sources (specifically people and 
places) at different times (Flick, 1992). 
For the purposes of this research, data triangulation is used by drawing insights from several 
data sources (case sites and documents) relevant to the New Zealand public health sector 
(particularly DHBs and the MOH). Data from each case site is analysed and compared 
through data triangulation to determine whether or not findings cohere. Data from case sites 
is also compared to documents acquired during the data collection process to determine 
whether or not findings from different sources cohere. The success of this process is crucial 
to the results of the study (and overall richness of results) as it dictates whether ideas and 
findings are valid and reliable. This is done by identifying like terms or similar findings. Data 
triangulation is also used to identify dissimilarities or obscurities in findings that require 
further explanation, which can add richness to the study’s overall results (Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1988). As Bishop (2010) notes, analysing data can be particularly challenging for 
multi-site case researchers. The sheer volume of data can be overwhelming and identifying 
patterns and themes among data can prove difficult. “However, when what a researcher hears, 
observes, and reads at a site is consistent, the triangulated data can be sturdy and helpful” 
(Bishop, 2010, p. 588). 
As section 4.4 has discussed, three verification strategies are used in the study, replication 
(discussed at section 4.4.1), reflection (discussed at section 4.4.2) and triangulation 
(discussed at section 4.4.3). These strategies are employed with the intention of adding rigor 
to the study, demonstrating impartiality of the research process and to gather findings that are 
valid, reliable and add richness. The data collected and analysed with consideration for the 
verification strategies is described in the next section. Specifically, the next section describes 
the data sources and methods employed to select and collect data. 
4.5 Data Collection 
The two primary sources of data collected in the study are interviews (with site visits and 
assisted access to organisational costing and information systems) and primary and archival 
documents (acquired during the interview process and from electronic sources recommended 
by interviewees). As noted above at section 4.1, the sources of data are selected and collected 
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 to make inferences with respected to the research objective stated at section 3.9, to respond to 
the resultant research questions posed at section 3.10 and to assess the research framework 
developed at section 3.11. According to Yin (2003), reliance on interview data supplemented 
by extensive analysis of documents is a popular and recommended practice in case study 
research. Specific methods employed to recruit interviewees and conduct interviews, as well 
as methods used to select and collect primary and archival documents are discussed below. 
4.5.1 Methods of Data Collection 
4.5.1.1 Interviews 
A semi-structured interview approach is adopted to conduct interviews and serves as the main 
method to collect data for the purposes of the study (Yin, 2003). A semi-structured interview 
approach typically comprises a set framework of themes that the researcher wants to explore 
with specified questions, however the interview process is open and flexible (Warren, 2002). 
To elaborate, the researcher will ask set questions that the interviewee is free to respond to in 
an unrestricted manner based on their own experiences and perceptions (Schram & Steen, 
2001). The researcher can then tailor follow-up questions to the interview context based on 
the interviewee and their previous responses. The benefits of a semi-structured interview 
approach are in its ability to yield a wider breadth and depth of responses compared to a 
structured interview process (which has a rigorous set of questions that yield standardised 
responses). In addition, a semi-structured interview approach allows the researcher to 
comprehend the interview context, which is particularly useful as it provides a means to 
understand the bases for statements made and views expressed by interviewees (Yin, 2003). 
The sites chosen to conduct semi-structured interviews are New Zealand public health sector 
organisations (i.e. tertiary and secondary DHBs and the MOH) and a desired sample size 
between 5-10 participants was anticipated and attained. For the purposes of the study, all 
participants were expected to have a detailed knowledge of their organisational environment, 
the costing systems used by DHBs and IDF processes. To guarantee validity of findings and 
ensure appropriate conclusions were made it was essential that participants meet these 
characteristics (Warren, 2002). The method of selection that was used to approach potential 
participants involved email and telephone correspondence with suitable personnel from 
chosen DHBs and the MOH. Contact details were obtained from applicable organisational 
websites, by email contact with organisational administrators and through the snow-balling 
technique. The snow-balling technique involves previous interview participants suggesting 
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 further contacts who may be useful to the interview process (Arksey & Knight, 2002). Emails 
were subsequently sent to each potential participant with an information sheet attached 
(included as Appendix III). This email was followed up by a telephone call two days later. If 
potential participants deemed themselves to be unsuitable for the study they were asked to 
give notification via email or telephone before 30 September 2012. They were then asked to 
provide contact details of other organisational personnel who may be more appropriate to 
assist during the interview process. All participants were given until 31 January 2013 to 
withdraw from the study. 
Consistent with the underlying characteristics of the semi-structured interview approach, all 
interviews were conducted in an informal and flexible manner. Though the interview process 
was structured with consideration for a set framework of themes, questions were customised 
to reflect the interview context and interviewees were given the opportunity to discuss areas 
that most interested them (Warren, 2002). Customised interview questions were designed to 
fit each organisation’s structure, roles and functions in relation to costing and IDF’s in the 
New Zealand public health sector (for a sample of interview questions asked to MOH 
representatives refer to Appendix I and for a sample of interview questions asked to DHB 
representatives refer to Appendix II). The interview questions were initially formulated based 
on prior literature with the aim of fulfilling the research objective documented at section 3.9 
and answering the research questions posed at section 3.10. During the interview process the 
interview questions were continuously revised to reflect new understandings and insights 
gained from the analysis of prior interviews. This was done using the reflection strategy 
described at section 4.4.2. 
4.5.1.2 Documentation 
As noted at section 4.4.3, this study makes use of data triangulation as a verification strategy. 
Therefore, all documentation is acquired to complement and/or supplement the findings of 
interviews conducted at the case sites. The purpose is to ascertain the validity and reliability 
of interview data, and to improve the overall richness of the study’s findings. The documents 
acquired during data collection are primary and archival documents that relate to DHB 
Costing, National Pricing, Population-Based Funding and IDFs in the New Zealand public 
health sector. All documents are either provided by interviewees during the interview process 
or sourced electronically as per interviewee’s recommendations (specifically the National 
Service Framework Library (NSFL), which is on the MOH website). 
    62 
 4.5.2 Demographics of Data Collected 
4.5.2.1 Interviews 
A total of six case sites were chosen for the purposes of the research, including one main case 
site (DHB A), one supplementary case site (MOH) and four confirmatory case sites (DHB B, 
DHB C, DHB D and DHB E). Five of the case sites chosen were DHBs operating in the New 
Zealand public health sector and a total of six interviews were conducted at these sites with 
Chief Financial Officers (CFO) and Planning and Funding Analysts (PFA). The interviews 
were all conducted in accordance with the interview process described at section 4.5.1.1 and 
interviewees were chosen because of their expertise and knowledge of the organisational 
environment (i.e. costing systems adoption and use and IDF processes at their respective 
DHBs). The remaining case site was the MOH and two interviews were conducted at this site 
with representatives of the costing and pricing groups (MOH Interviewee A and MOH 
Interviewee B). The interviews were conducted in accordance with the interview protocol 
described at section 4.5.1.1 and interviewees were chosen because of their expertise and 
knowledge of DHB costing processes and IDF processes.  
All interviews were conducted between 1 June 2012 and 30 November 2012 and conducted 
on a one-on-one basis. Interviews conducted with representatives of DHB A, DHB B and the 
MOH were face-to-face. Interviews conducted with representatives of DHB C and DHB D 
were phone interviews. The time and location of each interview was agreed with the 
interviewee at their convenience and each interview took approximately one to two hours to 
conduct. The interviews were all recorded (with consent from the interview participant) and 
transcribed at a later date. Notes were also taken by the researcher during and after each 
interview to supplement the interview transcript. 
4.5.2.2 Documentation 
A total of 18 documents were acquired during the process of data collection. As noted above 
(at section 4.5.1.2) the documents were primary and archival in nature. The documents that 
were sourced from interviewees during the interview process include costing system 
guidance documents and IDF technical reports prepared by New Zealand DHBs; and 
discussion documents issued by the NHB related to the MOH costing and pricing groups. 
These documents were acquired to gain an understanding of the organisational environment 
in which DHBs operate, including the costing systems they use, and how the MOH impacts 
on that environment through Population-Based Funding and the calculation of National Price 
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 for IDFs. The documents acquired from electronic sources (specifically the NSFL) 
recommended by interviewees include the Common Chart of Accounts; Common Costing 
Guidelines; Common Costing Standards; Common Counting Standards; Crown Funding 
Agreement; Full-time Equivalent Counting Specification; IDF Forecast Methodology; 
National Costing Collection and Pricing Programme 2013 DHB Provider Arm Data Request; 
National Service Framework Data Dictionary; National Service Framework Service 
Specification; New Zealand Casemix Framework; Operational Policy Framework; Tertiary 
and National Paediatric Adjuster Pool. These documents were acquired to ascertain the 
validity and reliability of interview data, and to improve the overall richness of findings. 
As section 4.5 has discussed, the two primary sources of data collected are interviews (with 
site visits and assisted access to organisational costing and information systems) and primary 
and archival documents (acquired during the interview process and from electronic sources 
recommended by interviewees). The next section discusses how the two sources of data are 
interpreted and analysed using qualitative procedures and techniques. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
The study makes use of qualitative procedures and techniques to interpret and analyse the 
data, which was obtained in accordance with the data collection processes outlined at section 
4.5. Firstly, the data from each interview was transcribed using Express Scribe Transcription 
Software and subsequently analysed to identify key terms and findings. Analysis of the 
transcribed interviews was performed with a coding system (i.e. a list of important words and 
phrases), which was initially devised based on literature reviewed, theory considered and 
background knowledge of the organisational environment being studied (Malina & Selto, 
2001). During the process of analysis new words and phrases were added to the coding 
system based on their relevance and importance to the purposes of the research. The key 
terms and findings were then interpreted to discern the meanings and rationale that underlie 
the opinions, statements and explanations given by interviewees, and through which practical 
and theoretical explanations can be achieved (Silverman, 2006). In instances where more than 
one interview was conducted at a particular case site, patterns and relationships in the data 
were revealed by identifying like terms and similar findings. The patterns and relationships 
revealed in one case site (the main site) were then compared to those in other case sites (the 
supplementary and confirmatory case sites). To corroborate interview findings the 
documentation acquired during data collection was also analysed to identify key terms and 
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 findings, the purpose of which was to reveal patterns and relationships between the two 
sources of data (i.e. interviews and documentation) to enhance confidence in the validity and 
reliability of findings and to improve the overall richness of findings. Subsequent to data 
interpretation and analysis, the findings are to be presented as direct quotations, references to 
points made by interview participants or references to points made in relevant documentation 
(all of which are documented in the results at Chapter 5 to Chapter 8). 
4.7 Chapter Summary 
This study employs a MCS approach to explore adoption and use of sophisticated costing 
systems to disseminate cost information to inform transfer prices for inter-DHB trading in a 
New Zealand public health sector context. The resulting sample of six case sites comprises 
one main case site (DHB A), one supplementary case site (MOH) and several confirmatory 
sites (DHB B, DHB C, DHB D and DHB E). Interviews are conducted with key 
organisational personnel currently working in the New Zealand public health sector. 
Specifically, six interviews are conducted at New Zealand DHBs with CFOs and PFAs. Two 
interviews are also conducted at the MOH with representatives of the costing and pricing 
groups. All interviews are transcribed using Express Scribe Transcription Software and a 
total of 18 documents are collected (primarily from electronic sources) to supplement the 
interview data. To add rigor to the study, demonstrate impartiality of the research process and 
gather findings that maximise validity, reliability and richness verification strategies are used. 
The verification strategies, which include replication, reflection and triangulation, are used 
throughout the processes of sample selection, data collection and data analysis. 
Applying the research approaches and techniques described above, a qualitative MCS is 
conducted, which explores costing systems and IDFs in the New Zealand public health 
sector. Findings of the study are documented below at Chapter 5 to Chapter 8. Chapter 5 
provides an overview of the New Zealand public health sector, including a summary of 
Population-Based Funding, the costing group, the costing standards and the costing 
guidelines. Chapter 6 presents the semi-structured interview evidence of costing systems 
adoption and use in New Zealand DHBs. Chapter 7 discusses the pricing group cost and 
volume data request and presents the data submission requirements for Service-Level and 
Event-Level DHBs. Chapter 8 discusses the calculation of National Price and presents the 
semi-structure interview evidence of how National Price influences IDFs. 
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 Chapter 5 DHB Funding, Purchasing and Costing: An Organisational Overview 
5.1 Introduction 
There are twenty DHBs in the New Zealand public health sector, which have been 
established based on geographic location.12 The specific objectives of each DHB, as outlined 
by the MOH, include improving, promoting and protecting the health of people and 
communities; promoting the integration of health services, especially primary and secondary 
care services; seeking the optimum arrangement for the most effective and efficient delivery 
of health services in order to meet local, regional, and national needs; and promoting 
effective care or support of those in need of personal health services or disability support. 
DHBs are also expected to show a sense of social responsibility, to foster community 
participation in health improvement, and to uphold the ethical and quality standards 
commonly expected of providers of services and public sector organisations. The MOH has 
outlined several more general objectives for DHBs as well. These include promoting 
inclusion and participation in society and the independence of people with disabilities; 
reducing health disparities by improving health outcomes for Māori and other population 
groups; and reducing (with a view toward eliminating) health outcome disparities between 
various population groups (Ministry of Health, 2014). 
To achieve these objectives each DHB, which is also described as the DHB of Domicile, 
must plan to provide or fund the provision of health services in their geographic area. This 
involves making decisions on the most suitable location for the delivery of health services to 
their respective DHB populations (which are based on Statistics New Zealand consensus area 
units) while considering regional and national needs. To make these types of decisions each 
DHB must evaluate their local health needs (based on demographics) and how they can meet 
such needs using funding provided by the MOH. Consequently, the rest of this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses how funding is distributed to each DHB using 
Population-Based Funding; Section 5.3 discusses how DHB’s provide/purchase health 
services to meet the needs of their respective DHB populations; and Section 5.4 discusses the 
Common Costing Group (CCG) and its associated functions. 
 
12 The DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector are Northland DHB, Waitemata DHB, 
Auckland DHB, Counties Manukau DHB, Waikato DHB, Bay of Plenty DHB, Lakes DHB, Tairawhiti DHB, 
Taranaki DHB, Hawke’s Bay DHB, MidCentral DHB, Whanganui DHB, Capital & Coast DHB, Hutt Valley 
DHB, Wairarapa DHB, Nelson Marlborough DHB, West Coast DHB, Canterbury DHB, South Canterbury DHB 
and Southern DHB. 
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 5.2 DHB Funding 
According to sector knowledge provided by the Ministry professionals interviewed, the MOH 
distributes funds to all twenty DHBs that operate in the New Zealand public health sector 
through the Crown Funding Agreement (CFA). The CFA is an output agreement between the 
Crown (aka the MOH) and DHBs, which specifies that the Crown will provide funding to 
DHBs in return for service provision. To receive annual appropriations from the Crown, all 
DHBs are required to prepare accountability and planning documents. The documents, which 
are an Annual Plan that incorporates a Statement of Intent and a Regional Plan, should 
address local, regional and national needs for health services; how health services can be 
properly co-ordinated to meet those needs; and the optimum arrangement for the most 
effective and efficient delivery of health services. 
Crown funding is integral to the New Zealand public health sector as it contributes more than 
two-thirds to total spending on public health (for a breakdown of other sources of Revenue 
and Cost Recoveries refer to Schedule 6 at section 5.4.2.6). Due to the significance of 
Ministry funding, it is distributed to DHB’s methodically using an approach called 
Population-Based Funding that aims to distribute funds fairly according to the relative needs 
of DHB populations and the costs of providing health services to meet those needs. This is 
achieved by distributing funds according to the demographic characteristics of each DHB 
population (Cost Weights) and certain unavoidable costs in providing services to rural and 
non-resident populations (Adjusters). Thus, the population-based funding is effectuated using 
a formula that comprises these two main constituents – (A) Cost Weights and (B) Adjusters. 
(A) Cost Weights 
Cost Weights represent the expected costs per person of a DHB population and are modelled 
using historical expenditure according to four demographic characteristics. These 
characteristics, which are known as the population-based funding formula variables, are the 
key capitation components and include (1) Age; (2) Gender; (3) Ethnicity; and (4) 
Deprivation. (1) Age is based on date of birth and recognised in 5-year increments (i.e. 0-4, 
5-9, 10-14, …85+); (2) Gender is separated between male and female; (3) Ethnicity is self-
identified and prioritised as 1) Māori, 2) Pacific and 3) Other; and (4) Deprivation is derived 
by linking patient address information/domicile code to the corresponding New Zealand 
Deprivation Index 2006 quintile value. To calculate cost weights, patient data is collected for 
each of the aforementioned characteristics. All data related to date of birth, gender and 
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 prioritised ethnicity is obtained from the National Minimum Data Set (NMDS) and cross-
checked against the National Health Index (NHI) database.13 The NHI is also used to acquire 
address information to determine where each patient is situated on the deprivation index. 
The data for each combination of the characteristics described above creates a population 
group, which when aggregated, forms a cost weight matrix. The cost weight matrix outlines 
the expected cost per person within each service area and is created by calculating total 
expenditure in the previous year divided by the total population count for each age, gender 
and deprivation quintile group. To ensure cost weights are accurate the average expected 
expenditure per person for every age-gender-deprivation cell is multiplied by the number of 
people belonging to that cell within each ethnic group. The expected costs for each cell group 
are then added together to determine the overall expected expenditure for each ethnic group. 
Once expected expenditure for each ethnic group is calculated it is compared to actual 
expenditure. Typically, the expected expenditure model underestimates actual expenditure in 
Māori and Pacific groups as these groups tend to need more health services than other groups 
but do not necessary consume these services upfront (Penno et al., 2012). If the model does 
under predict expenditure in one group an adjustment needs to be made to all three ethnic 
groups. This will usually involve cost weights for Māori and Pacific groups being adjusted up 
and cost weights for other groups being adjusted down. 
To provide a hypothetical example, assume that the expected expenditure model predicts that 
Māori expenditure was $10 million. However, actual expenditure may be $12 million. This 
creates an adjustment factor of 20% (being the percentage difference between the expected 
expenditure model and actual expenditure). This adjustment factor is then applied as a single 
adjustment across all cells in that particular ethnicity group (i.e. all age-gender-deprivation 
cost weights in Māori ethnic group are increased by 20%). Because the adjustment uses the 
entire national population as a base an adjustment is made to all three ethnic groups. Where a 
group is adjusted up another group(s) must be adjusted down (i.e. where the model under 
predicts expenditure in one group it must have over predicted expenditure in another) (Penno 
et al., 2012). This means that Pacific groups or other groups (or a combination of both) are 
adjusted down by $2 million. 
13 The NMDS is a national collection of hospital discharge information, including clinical information, for 
inpatients and day patients. The NHI is a unique identifier assigned to each person using health services and 
includes demographic details. 
    68 
                                                          
 After cost weights for each individual service are calculated (and adjusted where necessary) 
they are aggregated within their respective service groups. There are five major service 
groups (MSG), which are (1) Personal Health Primary (primary health, immunisation, 
pharmaceutical and laboratory); (2) Personal Health Other (inpatient, outpatient, maternity 
and other); (3) Health of Older People (aged residential care, home support and inpatient 
assessment, treatment and rehabilitation); (4) Mental Health; and (5) Psychogeriatric 
Services. Aggregated cost weights for each of the five service groups are combined to derive 
total expected annual expenditure for each population group. Total expected annual 
expenditure for each DHB is then multiplied by their respective population projection to 
determine their share of population-based cost-weighted funding for the year. 
(B) Adjusters 
Adjusters are designed to compensate DHBs for unavoidable differences in costs associated 
with the provision/funding of services to their respective populations. The funding adjusters 
include (1) Unmet Needs Adjuster; (2) Rural Adjuster; and (3) Overseas Adjuster: 
(1) The Unmet Needs Adjuster is required to ensure highly deprived populations and specific 
ethnicities (i.e. Māori and Pacific Islander) that underutilise services related to their health 
needs have access to all essential services. 
(2) The Rural Adjuster is required to ensure rural communities have equal access to health 
services, regardless of any additional costs to provide health care in remote areas which may 
result (e.g. Inter-DHB Transfers; Community Services; Small Hospital Facilities; Governance 
Costs; Offshore Islands; Rural General Practitioner Costs; and Travel and Accommodation). 
(3) The Overseas Adjuster is required to cover costs incurred by DHBs of providing health 
services to eligible overseas visitors (i.e. New Zealand citizens visiting temporarily; overseas 
visitors covered by reciprocal agreements with Australia and the United Kingdom; non-
resident citizens from Niue, Tokelau and Cook Islands; visitors covered by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation; and refugees). 
Once the MOH has finalised populated-based funding, the twenty DHBs nationwide will use 
their individual funding packages to plan, purchase and provide health services that they are 
contracted to provide through the CFA. 
 
    69 
 5.3 DHB Purchasing or Service Provision 
The Planning and Funding Unit (PFU) of each DHB will choose to provide health services or 
purchase health services from multiple other providers based on local need and availability of 
resources. The main health service provider for each district is the DHB hospital (aka Public 
Hospital), which is owned and funded by the DHB. Each DHB hospital is called the Provider 
Arm and mainly provides hospital-related services. Examples of Provider Arms in the New 
Zealand public health sector include Hutt Valley Hospital, which is run by Hutt Valley DHB, 
Auckland City Hospital, which is run by Auckland DHB (and is the largest Provider Arm in 
New Zealand), Christchurch Hospital, which is run by Canterbury DHB (and is the largest 
Provider Arm in the South Island) and Dunedin Hospital, which is run by Southern DHB. For 
selected health care activities DHB’s will contract directly with other providers besides the 
main Provider Arms, such as private hospitals, primary care, mental health, disability and 
community services. The Provider Arms themselves can also subcontract to these other 
agencies where necessary.  
In addition, DHBs purchase services from other DHB’s Provider Arms through IDFs. As all 
appropriations provided through the CFA include funding for IDFs, DHBs are required to 
reimburse each other for IDFs from this funding. When a DHB wants to purchase services 
from another DHB the purchaser is the “DHB of Domicile” and the provider is the “DHB of 
Service”. To facilitate IDFs between DHBs the National Cost Collection and Pricing 
Programme (NCCPP) sets National Prices, which become the default prices (refer to Chapter 
7 for full discussion on work performed by the NCCPP and Chapter 8 for full discussion on 
National Price). The main motivation for developing these prices is effective and efficient 
inter-DHB trading within the sector. While DHBs are permitted to negotiate their own prices, 
the hope is that they will trust the efficiency of National Prices and save resources, which can 
otherwise be expended on lengthy price and volume negotiations (refer to Chapter 8 Inter-
District Flows for full discussion on IDFs). 
To assist the NCCPP in setting National Prices for IDFs the MOH has developed a set of 
DHB Costing Standards that serve as common standards for the costing of health services. 
The standards apply to all DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector, in 
particular the DHB’s Provider Arms, and are very important to the efficiency of IDFs as they 
determine the quality of information to be used by the NCCPP for National Pricing work 
(refer to Chapter 7 for full discussion on work performed by the NCCPP and Chapter 8 for 
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 full discussion on National Price). The DHB Costing Standards and the Group responsible for 
developing, reviewing and updating the Standards are discussed in greater detail below. 
5.4 The Common Costing Group 
The Common Costing Group (CCG or “the Group”) is a group of New Zealand public health 
sector experts comprising representatives from DHBs and the MOH. The CCG was set up in 
2005 and is responsible for developing, reviewing and updating the DHB Costing Standards 
and the DHB Costing Guidelines to be used by New Zealand DHBs. 
5.4.1 The Common Costing Standards: An Overview 
The DHB Costing Standards, known as the Common Costing Standards (CCS or “the 
Standards”) hereafter, are rules that establish requirements for recognising, measuring and 
disclosing financial and non-financial information. The CCS also set out specific rules to be 
used in a DHB’s costing system when they have a material impact.14 The CCS are based on 
the principle that when determining the cost of a patient event, it must be fully absorbed (i.e. 
any cost that is caused by the delivery of health care, whether it is direct or indirect in nature, 
should be allocated to activities associated with a patient event in order to have a complete 
cost for the event). To achieve this fundamental directive, the CCG has specified that ABC 
methodologies be applied when costing patient events. In instances where information is not 
available to use ABC methods to allocate overheads the Group has prescribed alternative 
more simplistic methods for cost allocation (refer to section 5.4.2.4 for Schedule 4 of the 
CCS on Overhead Allocation Methodology, section 6.3.1.1 for discussion on the application 
of Schedule 4 and section 7.2 for discussion on the requirements of service-level DHBs and 
the application of prescribed overhead allocation bases). 
The Standards are intended for application to all cost reports and any limitation in their 
application is made clear in the text of each particular Standard. When making disclosures 
and preparing cost reports, the CCG advises that DHBs should maintain a balance between 
benefits and costs. Concordant with Cooper (1988), the CCG stresses that the benefits 
derived from information should meet or exceed the costs of providing the information.15 
Any and all cost reports should be based on accurate information and DHB’s should 
14 According to the CCG (2012, p. 7) “A statement, fact or item is deemed material if it is of such a nature or 
amount that its disclosure is likely to influence the users of the report in making decisions or assessments”. 
Additionally, a statement, fact or item is deemed to have a material impact when it is 2% of the cost of the 
product or product-line being measured. 
15 While a cost/benefit consideration is important, the CCG concedes that such an evaluation is highly subjective 
and cost/benefit margins will differ on a DHB-by-DHB basis. 
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 demonstrate a transparent methodology for the preparation of cost reports. These expectations 
are emphasised to ensure information usefulness, reporting comparability, and to provide the 
Group with the opportunity to assess whether DHBs are complying with the Standards. As an 
additional expectation, where DHBs do not comply with the Standards, full disclosure is 
required to permit comparative assessments of DHB information. 
The main purposes of the Standards, as outlined by the Group, are to: 
1) Ensure consistency in costing and cost allocation within the DHB sector 
2) Improve the quality of cost reporting  
3) Improve operational decision-making within DHBs and hospitals 
4) Provide better data for DHB benchmarking 
5) Provide a sound basis for IDF pricing 
5.4.2 DHB Costing Schedules 1-7 
As noted above, the CCS are based on the principle that when determining the cost of a 
patient event it must be fully absorbed and the CCG has outlined that ABC methodologies 
should be applied to achieve this. Where ABC methods are not possible, the Standards have 
prescribed alternative methods to be used (see Schedules below for preferred and alternative 
costing methods). The Standards comprise seven schedules, each of which is outlined next: 
5.4.2.1 Cost Centre Categories (Schedule 1) 
The purpose of Cost Centre Categories Schedule 1 is to provide guidance for common 
classification of cost centres in DHB costing systems. The CCG has defined cost centres as 
divisions, departments or units that perform functional activities at a DHB Provider Arm and 
it has identified five cost centre categories to be used in DHB costing systems. The cost 
centre categories, which are discussed in greater detail below, are (1) Patient Care and Patient 
Support Cost Centres; (2) Overhead Cost Centres; (3) Non-core Cost Centres; (4) DHB 
Governance Cost Centres; and (5) Planning and Funding Cost Centres. In instances where a 
cost centre comprises costs attributable to more than one category, it is recommended that the 
costs be split and assigned to the appropriate cost centre category. For example, Laundry 
provides services to hospital and private organisations; therefore hospital costs should be 
allocated to Patient Care and Patient Support Cost Centres while private costs should be 
separated out to a Cost Centre.  
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 (1) Patient Care and Patient Support Cost Centres 
Patient Care Cost Centres are defined as cost centres directly involved in the care of patients 
and include (but are not limited to) Allied Health; Palliative Care; and Renal Dialysis. Patient 
Support Cost Centres are defined as cost centres that are indirectly involved in the care of 
patients and include (but are not limited to) Laundry; Patient Administration, such as medical 
typists; and Ward issues, such as pharmaceutical dispensation. As per the CCS, Patient Care 
and Patient Support Cost Centres should associate an identified product with a specific 
patient, either when the patient consumes the product (e.g. lab test) or on an assignment basis 
(e.g. pharmacy cost). While both Patient Care and Patient Support costs typically vary with 
patient volume, only Patient Care costs are individually linked to patient events, meaning 
Patient Support costs are always associated with a specific patient on an assignment basis. 
Furthermore, DHBs with an unsophisticated costing system are required to assign all Patient 
Care and Patient Support costs to Patient Care Cost Centres, which is the lowest level of 
costing for monitoring purposes (unless Patient Support costs relate to a commercial venture 
(e.g. private laundry services), in such case they will not be assigned to a patient event). 
(2) Overhead Cost Centres 
Overhead Cost Centres are defined as cost centres that provide a supporting role to the 
organisation, but cannot be traced to identifiable products consumed by publicly funded 
patients, nor are they readily affected by changes in patient or volume mix. Overhead Cost 
Centres include (but are not limited to) Asset Costs, such as clinical equipment depreciation; 
Chief Executive Office (CEO) Costs, such as public relations; and Medical Records. Full 
details pertaining to the allocation of overhead costs to other cost centres are outlined in 
Overhead Allocation Methodology Schedule 4 (section 5.4.2.4). 
(3) Non-core Cost Centres 
Non-core Cost Centres cover any costs that do not provide products or services directly or 
indirectly (as an infrastructure) to patients, and as such should be excluded from patient costs. 
Non-core costs include research and commercial ventures, such as Laundry services provided 
to private organisations. 
(4) DHB Governance Cost Centres 
DHB Governance Cost Centres are defined as cost centres that relate to any governance 
functions at a DHB. Governance Cost Centres include (but are not limited to) CEO Costs; 
Human Resources; and Risk Management. Governance Cost Centres may receive costs 
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 allocated from Overhead Cost Centres and may allocate costs to the Patient Care and Patient 
Support Cost Centres where appropriate according to usage using the Overhead Allocation 
Methodology described in Schedule 4 (section 5.4.2.4). 
(5) Planning and Funding Cost Centres 
Planning and Funding Cost Centres are defined as cost centres that provide a population 
health planning function or health service funding function. Planning and Funding Cost 
Centres may receive costs allocated from Overhead Cost Centres where appropriate and 
should not be allocated to any Patient Care and Patient Support Cost Centres. 
5.4.2.2. Cost Groups (Schedule 2) 
The purpose of Cost Groups Schedule 2 is to provide guidance for the aggregation of costs in 
the General Ledger (GL) into higher-level cost groups, as categorised by the Common Chart 
of Accounts (CCoA). In accordance with Schedule 2, all costs recorded in the GL need to be 
assigned to cost groups, as the cost groups are tracked when allocating costs and determining 
product and service costs. As per the CCoA there are several mandatory expense categories, 
which include (but are not limited to) Medical Personnel; Non-Clinical Supplies; and 
Outsourced Services. When costs are assigned to specific cost groups a major distinction 
between direct and indirect costs is required. Schedule 2 does not however permit a 
distinction between variable and fixed costs. According to the CCG, the range of possible 
subjective judgements is too great to provide a single set of common guidelines for such a 
distinction. This is supported by the fact that DHBs have historically split costs into variable 
and fixed categories, which tended to result in different categorisations by each DHB. Direct 
costs are costs that are directly attributable to patient activities and fall into the category 
“Cost Groups with Direct Patient Activity”. Direct Cost Groups include (but are not limited 
to) Nursing Labour; Implants; and Patient Support Costs. Indirect costs are costs indirectly 
allocated to patient activities and fall into the category “Cost Groups with no Direct Patient 
Activity” (also identified as “Overheads”). Indirect Cost Groups include (but are not limited 
to) Costs of Capital, which are related to DHB financing; Governance and Administration, 
which are organisation-wide overheads; Building Depreciation; Leases and Rents. 
5.4.2.3 Cost Centre Allocation Order (Schedule 3) 
The purpose of Cost Centre Allocation Order Schedule 3 is to outline the most logical and 
appropriate order for allocating costs from Cost Centres (Schedule 1, section 5.4.2.1) to Cost 
Pools (Schedule 7, section 5.4.2.7). Schedule 3 provides an illustration to show the order in 
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 which Non-clinical Overhead Cost Centres, Patient Support Service Cost Centres and Patient 
Care Cost Centres should be allocated to Product Cost Pools (see Figure 8). Schedule 3 also 
illustrates the flow of certain Non-Clinical Overhead Cost Centres (e.g. vehicle expenses) and 
Patient Support Service Cost Centres (e.g. laundry-related commercial ventures) to Non-core 
Cost Centres, which are not allocated to patient events and are generally dead-ended (i.e. not 
captured as a part of any product in the costing of patient events) in accordance with 
Schedule 5 (section 5.4.2.5).  
Figure 8: Cost Centre Allocation Order 
(Source: Common Costing Group, 2012, p. 28) 
• Overhead Cost Centres are fully allocated to Patient Support Services Cost Centres, 
Patient Care Cost Centres and Other Cost Centres (using cost drivers defined in Schedule 
4, section 5.4.2.4). 
• Patient Support Cost Centres and Overhead Cost Centres allocated thereto are allocated to 
Patient Care Cost Centres, Product Cost Pools and Other Cost Centres. 
• Patient Care Cost Centres are fully allocated to Product Cost Pools. 
• All Cost Centres allocated to Other Cost Centres are non-core or exempted as per 
Schedule 5 (section 5.4.2.5) and as such do not require further allocation. 
The CCG emphasises that the order in which Cost Centres are allocated is vital to ensure 
consistency and comparability across all DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health 
sector. To preserve consistency and comparability, Schedule 3 requires all Cost Centres to be 
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 allocated on the basis of the output activity of the subsequent Cost Centre. Schedule 3 offers 
four separate approaches to fulfil this requirement, which include the Step-Down, Internal 
Recharging, Iterative and Simultaneous approaches.  
In the step-down cost allocation system, backward allocation of costs is not permitted, as this 
practice would result in Cost Centres with unallocated costs. The internal recharging method 
is used when a Cost Centre charges its costs to another Cost Centre within the DHB. In an 
internal recharging cost allocation system, costs should be allocated from Cost Centres to 
Cost Pools after the calculation of each Cost Centres allocated costs and this should be done 
on the basis of resource usage. The value of the allocated costs may be based on full, partial 
or shared use of a particular resource. In the case of partially used or shared resources, costs 
should be allocated in the order as shown in Figure 8. In an iterative cost allocation system 
some backward allocation of costs is permitted, as cost allocations will clear after a number 
of cost allocation iterations (assuming all overhead Cost Centres allocate to other Cost 
Centres). If DHBs use the simultaneous model, they are exempted from applying Schedule 3 
(section 5.4.2.3) as the CCG considers this to be the mathematically preferred approach. 
5.4.2.4 Overhead Allocation Methodology (Schedule 4) 
The purpose of Overhead Allocation Methodology Schedule 4 is to outline the most 
appropriate method for allocating Non-Patient Cost Centre costs (overhead) to Patient Care 
Cost Centres. To elaborate, the Overhead Allocation Methodology identifies an appropriate 
cost driver for the outputs of each Cost Centre. Costs should then be allocated to other 
dependent Cost Centres and Cost Pools on the basis of “unit cost per cost driver”.  
Schedule 4 provides several common bases for cost drivers, which are used to allocate 
overhead. In instances where a cost driver is not measured or a DHB is unable to apply the 
preferred cost drivers, Schedule 4 offers alternate cost drivers (typically Full-Time Equivalent 
(FTE) or Total Cost, as all DHBs should have access to this information) to allocate overhead 
costs. A breakdown of typical functions performed by a Provider Arm with preferred and 
alternate allocation cost drivers is provided below in Table 3 (note this breakdown is not 
exhaustive): 
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 Table 3: Cost Centre Allocation and Recommended Cost Drivers 
Function 
Allocation Cost Driver 
Preferred Alternate 
Asset Costs NBV by Cost Centre Total Costs 
CEO FTE Total Costs 
Cost of Capital Asset Value Total Costs 
Director of Nursing Nursing FTE Total Costs 
Facilities Area occupied in square metres Total Costs 
Finance Department Transactions FTE 
General Support Services FTE Total Costs 
Governance Revenue Total Costs 
Human Resource Costs FTE Total Costs 
Information Systems Number of PC’s FTE 
Insurance - Assets Asset Value Total Costs 
Mgmt. Support - Corp FTE Total Salary Costs 
Mgmt. Support - Service FTE Total Salary Costs 
Medical Support Medical FTE Medical Salary Costs 
Nursing Support Usage  Nurse FTE 
Payroll FTE Total Salary Costs 
Purchasing Usage Total Costs 
Quality/Accreditation FTE/Headcount Total Salary Costs 
Risk Mgmt./Legal FTE/Headcount Total Salary Costs 
 
Where a DHB cannot apply the preferred or alternate cost drivers for costs that are deemed to 
be material (i.e. costs that are at least 2% of total costs) the Group has requested that this be 
disclosed and details of the allocation basis used be provided. The purpose of this disclosure 
is to give the Group an opportunity to consider alternative overhead allocation bases not 
currently provided in the Standards to determine their appropriateness and potential inclusion 
in future versions of the Standards. 
5.4.2.5 Cost Exclusions/Inclusions (Schedule 5) 
Cost Exclusions/Inclusions Schedule 5 provides guidance regarding the items to exclude and 
include when determining the cost of products consumed by patient events. The objective of 
Schedule 5 is commonality of cost information, which is used by the NCCPP to set National 
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 Prices. Commonality of information also allows the MOH to assess DHB performance and 
set achievable benchmarks for DHBs to strive towards. The general guidance set out in 
Schedule 5 states that only costs incurred in every day operations and core business 
restructuring (as a normal part of DHB activity) should be allocated to products. Costs 
incurred as part of organisational wide restructuring, provisions for bad and doubtful debts, 
and all expenses from research and commercial ventures should not be allocated to individual 
products as they do not form part of the infrastructure linked to the delivery of patient care. 
5.4.2.6 Treatment of Revenue (Schedule 6) 
Treatment of Revenue Schedule 6 provides recommendations for the treatment of each 
revenue account from the CCoA. To foster homogenous applications across the Sector, the 
Schedule offers twenty-one recommendations with additional guidance for the treatment of 
revenue items – seventeen of which relate to Cost Recovery and four of which relate to 
Revenue. Revenue that should be treated as “Cost Recovery” includes (but are not limited to) 
Gain on Sale of Fixed Assets; General Rents; and Professional and Consultancy Fees. 
Revenue that should be treated as “Revenue” includes Rental Income from Investment 
Property; Bequests; and Donations. In instances where a DHB cannot apply the guidelines 
provided in Schedule 6 (i.e. when information is not available to permit compliance), the 
CCG has provided additional commentary that all DHBs should disclose any departures from 
the prescribed revenue treatments. The purpose of this disclosure is to provide the Group with 
information to better understand when and why the prescribed treatments are not applied, and 
where alternative treatments are applied instead. This information is subsequently used to 
facilitate continual development of the Standards, as alternative revenue treatments are 
evaluated for appropriateness and potential inclusion in future versions of the Standards. 
5.4.2.7 Intermediate Products (Schedule 7) 
The purpose of Intermediate Products Schedule 7 is to facilitate consistent treatments of cost 
pool and product information in DHB costing systems so accurate unit costs per product can 
be formed. The CCG (2012, p. 47) defines an intermediate product as “a product or service 
provided to a patient that contributes to the final total cost of a patient’s [visit]”. To 
encourage consistent treatments Schedule 7 provides standardised methodologies to be used 
when allocating fully absorbed costs in Patient Care and Patient Support Cost Centres to 
Intermediate Product Cost Pools (see Figure 8). “Greater standardisation of Cost Pools allows 
for the comparison of DHBs at a higher level of detail than possible at the group level” 
    78 
 (CCG, 2012, p. 48). The CCG also contends that the sophistication of costing systems used 
by each DHB determines the level of product specificity. The level to which products are 
specified within a Cost Pool then determines the level of detail at which comparative and 
benchmarking work can be performed. The methodologies outlined in Schedule 7 include the 
Cost Pools to which fully absorbed costs are allocated; levels of detail for products that make 
up those pools; and costs that will be included and excluded from the pools. The Intermediate 
Product Cost Pools offered in the Schedule include (but are not limited to) Anaesthetists; 
Pharmaceutical Cancer Treatment; and Obstetrics. 
5.4.2.8 DHB Costing Schedules 1-7: Sophisticated versus Unsophisticated Application 
Based on the summary of the seven DHB Costing Schedules above (section 5.4.2.1 to section 
5.4.2.7), there are two distinct approaches to costing that are accepted by the CCG. One is 
full use of the CCS by DHBs with sophisticated costing systems, the other, partial use by 
DHBs with unsophisticated costing systems (costing systems adoption and use is discussed at 
Chapter 6). To illustrate how the Schedules interrelate from a sophisticated costing approach 
and an unsophisticated costing approach, a comparison is provided at Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Sophisticated versus Unsophisticated Costing 
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 5.4.3 The Common Costing Guidelines: An Overview 
The DHB Guidelines, known as the Common Costing Guidelines (CCGL or “the 
Guidelines”) hereafter, demonstrate how DHBs apply the Standards to Intermediate Products 
(Schedule 7, section 5.4.2.7). In particular, the Guidelines demonstrate how DHBs allocate 
costs to patient events and the type of costs that are allocated to each product. There are five 
guidelines and they have been developed based on information obtained from members of the 
CCG. Each guideline provides details of the DHBs that have contributed information towards 
its creation and the date this information was obtained. The Guidelines include: 
1) Guideline 1: Critical Care 
2) Guideline 2: Emergency Department (ED) 
3) Guideline 3: Theatre/Procedure Rooms 
4) Guideline 4: Wards 
5) Guideline 5: Oncology and Haematology 
The main purposes of the Guidelines are to (1) Assist DHBs when they are implementing an 
event-level costing system; (2) Enable DHBs to assess their costing methodology in 
comparison to other DHBs; (3) Assist the interpretation of event-level costing data; and (4) 
Improve development of the Common Costing Standards  
5.4.4 Maintaining Common Costing Standards and Common Costing Guidelines 
The CCG assembles every three months (four times a year) to discuss the application of the 
CCS and interpretation of the CCGL. The main motivation for these quarterly meetings is to 
determine whether or not the Standards and the Guidelines are fulfilling their main purposes, 
and to ensure they are appropriate for the wider business group (the DHBs collectively). As 
the CCGL are a support document to the CCS, specifically Schedule 7 (section 5.4.2.7), it is 
essential that the documents function jointly with a high level of efficacy to meet their main 
purposes (predominantly uniform treatments of cost pools and product information so event-
level cost information is comparable for analysis and benchmarking). 
The CCS and the CCGL are considered living documents and are continually developed and 
amended as needs change. Needs may change for any number of reasons, which include (but 
are not limited to) regulatory, legislative, political, economic, social and demographic 
changes. With the intention of sustained overall effectiveness, there are several processes 
used by the CCG to maintain the CCS and the CCGL. These processes include: 
    80 
 • The CCG uses benchmarking to audit each DHB to ensure they are generally following 
the CCS. The CCG also uses other methodologies, such as surveying, to determine 
whether or not the standards are being followed, and if not, the CCG will enquire to (1) 
understand why they are not being followed; (2) ascertain what methods are used instead. 
• To enhance overall functionality of the CCS, they are updated annually based on feedback 
from members of the CCG. Specifically, if any DHB has issues applying the standards to 
their particular costing system and/or finance system, this will be discussed by the CCG 
and the CCS may be amended. The CCG will tend to amend the standards to reduce 
ambiguity and make them more accommodating for all users. While this can be disruptive 
to DHBs when they apply the CCS, wholesale changes are typically only made when the 
CCG and DHBs agree that a change needs to be made to improve costing. 
• As the CCGL are used in conjunction with the CCS, it is vital that the guidelines are 
interpreted clearly and consistently with reference to the standards. To maintain synergy 
between the two documents, the CCG comes together to discuss any discrepancies 
relating to the application of the CCS and/or the interpretation of the CCGL. If there are 
any concerns, the CCG may make amendments to the CCS based on these concerns and 
will redevelop the guidelines according to the amended standards. 
5.4.5 Linking Documents 
The CCG insists that a robust definition base is crucial to the effectiveness of costing systems 
to produce and disseminate quality information for use in areas such as the NCCPP. 
Accordingly, the CCG has developed several companion documents that underpin the CCS. 
These documents include: 
• The Common Chart of Accounts 
The purpose of the CCoA is to provide a nationally consistent GL coding system for the 
recording of transactions by DHBs. Specifically, the CCoA allows common presentation, 
interpretation and use of financial information produced by DHBs. The CCoA also 
supports and provides a stable platform for the CCS and all cost reporting, comparative 
analysis and benchmarking. 
• Full-time Equivalent Counting Specification 
The purpose of the FTE Counting Specification is to set out the framework for measuring 
staff resources. Three separate measures have been developed for the framework, which 
are “Accrued” FTE, “Worked” FTE and “Contracted” FTE. Hours are the basic building 
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 block for all three FTE types and are converted to FTE units on the basis of a 40-hour 
working week for Accrued and Worked FTEs and the number of hours defined as “full-
time” (for example 37.5 hours, 40 hours) for Contracted FTEs. The Accrued FTE measure 
is the core measure for forecasting and reporting. 
• The National Service Framework (NSF) Data Dictionary 
The purpose of the NSF Data Dictionary is to provide a breakdown of all purchase unit 
(PU) costs, their unit of measure, data definitions, GL codes and output classes. 
• The Common Counting Standards 
The purpose of the Common Counting Standards is to outline how health activity should 
be defined, measured and counted to support the planning of health and disability 
services. The main objectives of the Common Counting Standards are to ensure 
consistency in measuring health sector activity; provide consistent data for comparing and 
benchmarking; to ensure that similar health activities can be meaningfully counted and 
compared across the health sector; consolidate the definitions for each set of counting 
rules within each visit type (i.e. inpatient, outpatient and diagnostic); and to identify the 
areas where there is a lack of definitional clarity. 
• NSF Service Specification 
The purpose of the NSF Service Specification is to outline how services should be 
provided to meet health needs. Whenever a DHB enters into a new service agreement, or 
when a DHB is varying or rolling over existing service agreements, the latest service 
specification and their PUs must be used. Each DHB must also comply with the quality 
requirements in the Service Specifications and include non-discretionary quality 
requirements in their agreements with funded service providers. Service Specifications 
tend to include (but are not limited to) a service definition; service objectives; service 
users and access criteria; service component descriptions; quality requirements; PU 
code(s) and reporting requirements. 
• Operational Policy Framework 
The Operational Policy Framework (OPF) is a set of business rules, policy and guideline 
principles that outline the operating functions of DHBs. The OPF comprises several 
sections that detail the requirements DHBs are expected to adhere to. The sections include 
DHB Governance; Planning and Accountability; Service Change; Service Planning and 
Policy; Improving Māori Health; IDFs; Dispute Resolution; Quality; Workforce; 
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 Information Technology; Financial and Capital Operations; and Monitoring and 
Reporting. 
Though the linking documents are important components in the costing process, and assist 
DHB’s in providing information to the NCCPP, these documents will not be discussed further 
as it is beyond the scope of this exploratory study. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
As Chapter 5 has discussed, the MOH distributes funds to all twenty DHBs operating in the 
New Zealand public health sector through the CFA. To distribute funds to the DHBs, the 
MOH uses a mechanism called population-based funding. The Population-Based Funding 
approach aims to distribute funds fairly according to the relative needs of DHB populations 
and the costs of providing health services to meet those needs. This is achieved by 
distributing funds according to the demographic characteristics of each DHB population 
(Cost Weights) and certain unavoidable costs in providing services to rural and non-resident 
populations (Adjusters). Once the MOH has finalised populated-based funding, the twenty 
DHBs nationwide will use their individual funding packages to plan, purchase and provide 
health services that they are contracted to provide through the CFA. The PFU of each DHB 
will choose to provide health services through the DHB hospital (aka main Provider Arm) or 
purchase health services from multiple other providers (such as other DHB Provider Arms 
and Private Hospitals) based on local need and availability of resources. If a DHB decides to 
purchase health services from another DHB, they will do so via IDFs. To facilitate IDFs 
between DHBs, the NCCPP sets National Prices, which become the default prices. The main 
motivation for developing these prices is effective and efficient inter-DHB trading within the 
sector. To assist the NCCPP in setting National Prices for IDFs, the MOH has developed a set 
of DHB Costing Standards that serve as common standards for the costing of health services. 
The standards apply to all DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector, in 
particular the DHB’s Provider Arms, and are very important to the efficiency of IDFs, as they 
determine the quality of information to be used by the NCCPP for National Pricing work. For 
an illustration of the overall process of DHB Funding, Purchasing and Costing in the New 
Zealand public health sector, which has been described in Chapter 5, refer to Figure 10. 
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 Chapter 6 The Common Costing Standards and Costing Systems Adoption 
6.1 Introduction 
As documented by the CCG (2012, p. 8), “DHBs are encouraged to implement and continue 
developing costing systems that adhere to the common costing principles described in [the 
CCS]”.  The CCG also recommends that all cost reports be prepared using the same basic 
building blocks described in the Standards, as this practice benefits the wider good of the 
New Zealand public health sector (specifically DHBs). In particular, reporting information in 
consistent and comparable forms allows users (such as DHB PFAs and the NCCPP) to 
discern and analyse how costs are structured, differ by geographic region, change based on 
demographics and move between DHBs via IDFs.  
Though the CCS have been developed thoroughly with clear purposive aims, their capacity to 
provide information for effective decision-making can be diminished (especially for those 
users aforementioned) by dissimilarities in the way DHBs utilise costing systems and apply 
the Standards. Expanding on the point above, not all DHBs that operate in the New Zealand 
public health sector have recognised or formal costing systems. Furthermore, costing system 
adoptions vary in sophistication. Results of this study indicate that DHBs tend to operate 
costing systems at one of three levels: (1) unsophisticated costing systems that are not 
formally recognised (section 6.2); (2) moderately sophisticated costing systems that are 
formally recognised (section 6.3); and (3) sophisticated costing systems that are formally 
recognised (section 6.4). 
6.2 Unsophisticated Costing Systems Not Formally Recognised 
Based on the findings gathered at the supplementary case site (MOH), there are six secondary 
DHBs and one tertiary DHB that do not currently make use of formally recognised costing 
systems. Furthermore, five of the six secondary DHBs are relatively small in comparison to 
the rest of DHBs operating in the sector. Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that smaller 
secondary health care providers tend not to institutionalise formally recognised costing 
systems. One secondary health care provider (DHB C), which was explored as part of this 
study, currently uses an “in-house cost allocation system, which is adequate for a small 
DHB” but they do not recognise this as a formal costing system. The DHB acknowledges that 
they use simple techniques and practices to provide service-level cost information to the 
NCCPP, but they do not have a sophisticated costing system to facilitate the provision of this 
information at a more detailed event-level. Furthermore, the secondary DHBs explored as 
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 part of this study (DHB C, DHB D, DHB E) note that they currently fulfil two of the four 
characteristics typified by Cooper (1988) as major qualities warranting use of more 
sophisticated costing systems, but they are not currently making use of such systems. The 
characteristics are (1) provision of numerous products and services; and (2) organisational 
operations are multi-faceted and complex. 
The sixth secondary DHB (DHB E) does not make use of a formally recognised costing 
system because “they recently turned their sophisticated costing system off” (DHB E 
interviewee A). DHB E is one of the largest secondary DHBs operating in the New Zealand 
public health sector and acknowledges that they provide numerous products and services, and 
their operations are multi-faceted and complex. However, they do not believe the costs of 
running a sophisticated costing system are justified at their DHB (the costing system 
previously implemented was PowerPerformance Manager (PPM), which is discussed at 
section 6.4). The decision by DHB E to review their current institutions, which led them to 
turn off their sophisticated costing system, was largely motivated by a push from the MOH to 
manage their costs more effectively and reduce their overall deficit. This is reiterated by 
MOH Interviewee A, who stated “there was a lack of funding to support the use of that 
system and pay operational staff”. 
While DHB E “turned a deficit into a surplus after disabling their costing system”, the long-
term impact of their decision to revert to a more cost effective albeit unsophisticated costing 
approach is not yet clear. Specifically, how the decision will impact on the DHB’s ability to 
plan and provide health services to meet the needs of its DHB population. Though DHB E 
“still has the benefit of access to other DHBs cost data through the data cube, they are flying 
blind about how their own costs stack up against other [DHBs]”.16 For a large DHB to turn 
off their sophisticated costing system they need “a good understanding of how the sector 
functions and to trust the efficiency of National Price” (MOH Interviewee A). Trust has to be 
placed in the efficiency of National Price because the DHB is not contributing cost 
information to the NCCPP at an event-level to influence price setting for IDFs. This type of 
decision will always be based on internal analysis and requires considerable trust in a DHB’s 
knowledge of the sector and their own cost structures.  
16 The National Event-level Cost Data Cube (also referred to as the “data cube”) is a data bank managed by the 
MOH that stores event-level DHB’s historical cost and volume data. The data stored in the data cube is 
available to all DHBs to use for various purposes, including cost comparisons and service planning. 
    86 
                                                          
 6.3 Formally Recognised Moderately Sophisticated Costing Systems 
Aside from the six secondary DHBs discussed above, which do not make use of recognised 
or formal costing systems, the findings gathered at the supplementary case site (MOH) 
revealed that the remaining eight secondary DHBs make use of formal costing systems. 
Specifically, these DHBs tend to use an ABC-based costing system called CostPro. As DHB 
A Interviewee A stated, “The CostPro costing system is used by a number of small to 
medium sized DHBs very effectively and provides good value for money. The developers of 
CostPro are active in the health sector so have an in-depth knowledge of DHB systems”. 
While CostPro is not the most sophisticated costing system available, it is financially 
preferred by small DHBs. It only costs around $20,000 per annum for software licensing and 
unlike other more sophisticated costing systems, it is not resource intensive to run (i.e. it does 
not consume numerous operational staff FTEs). Furthermore, “it provides a really wide 
breadth of information that allows [DHBs] to contribute event-level costing data to the 
NCCPP, perform individual product work and understand [their] billing processes in much 
greater detail” (DHB A Interviewee A). 
6.3.1 Main Case Study Results: CostPro Costing System Adoption and Use 
Discussions with DHB A Interviewee A (i.e. the main case site), identified their DHB 
implemented the CostPro Costing System in 2007 (which is still currently in use). “This 
costing system was chosen because [the DHB] already had the CostPro patient activity data 
mart, which holds patient information sourced from the Patient Management System” (DHB 
A Interviewee A). Therefore, the DHB could use both systems in tandem for costing 
purposes. The CostPro Costing Systems brings through all patient volumes from the Patient 
Management System and all unprocessed cost data from the Finance System (also referred to 
as the GL financials), which are used jointly to calculate unit costs at the end of every month. 
Using data from these information systems, CostPro can calculate costs by patient, procedure, 
department and health specialty group. 
According to DHB A Interviewee B, “The system has primarily been used for NCCPP data 
collections, which are run by the NHB every November” (the NCCPP and its related 
functions are discussed in greater detail in section 7). Though this is the main driver behind 
the adoption of CostPro at the DHB, it is not the sole motivation driving ongoing use of the 
costing system. Over time DHB A has broadened its foci for collecting cost information 
beyond the NCCPP national data submission to consider various strategic emphases 
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 associated with planning and funding the provision of health services, both to their own DHB 
population and across regional boundaries. This is due to two main events. Firstly, DHB A 
“has got used to [their] own data” and secondly, they “are starting to gain access to the 
national data set”, which stores all DHBs submitted cost and volume data (DHB A 
Interviewee B). These two events have given the DHB greater opportunities to compare and 
analyse cost information to make decisions associated with planning and funding of health 
services. Specifically, the DHB has started exploring their costs and volumes to make 
decisions associated with product and service mix – the goal of which is to maximise 
utilisation of their constrained capacity. 
To illustrate the types of capacity decisions now being made, DHB A Interviewee A 
discussed a hypothetical situation whereby the DHB was evaluating the potential to take on 
hip replacement volumes for another DHB in the region. In this instance, if the DHB took on 
the volumes and their staffing mix remained constant, they could calculate the marginal cost 
of performing each additional hip replacement. To elaborate, the average price of a hip 
replacement in the sector is approximately $6,500 plus any additional costs associated with 
clinical supplies and infrastructure such as electricity. As the orthopaedic surgeon who will 
be performing the procedures is already employed (and their salary remains constant) the 
only additional costs are the marginal components. The CostPro Costing System, with its 
emphasis on ABC, is able to break down the patient event into specific detailed activities and 
show the disaggregated cost of the DRG event (including the marginal costs of taking on 
each additional volume). This level of detail is vital for the types of decisions described 
above, as it highlights (1) whether or not the DHB can take additional volumes given its spare 
capacity; and (2) whether or not it is cost-effective to actually take on the volumes.17 
DHB A Interviewee A indicates their costing system works by allocating financials through 
Departments to Cost Pools, which are then applied to patient activity volumes to get a cost 
per unit. The next section expands on the process of costing that has been institutionalised at 
DHB A, and an illustration of how costs and volumes flow through the CostPro Costing 
System at the DHB is provided below (see Figure 11). 
17 An interesting element that emerges from this example is the capacity to which the orthopedic surgeon can 
actually work at and if the volumes are taken on whether or not this will require an additional surgeon. 
Moreover, orthopedic surgeons will not all work to the same level of efficiency, therefore it is difficult to 
ascertain to what capacity a surgeon can actually be gauged before another surgeon is required. While this is an 
intriguing research avenue, it is beyond the scope of this study and as such cannot be explored more thoroughly. 
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 Figure 11: DHB Costing Flow Chart 
 
6.3.1.1 Overhead Allocation 
The first step involved in costing patient events at DHB A is allocation of overhead 
department costs. Overhead costs are grouped into overhead departments and allocated to 
Direct Patient Departments, Support/Management Departments and Cost Excluded 
Departments using the allocation bases outlined in the CCS. With reference to the Overhead 
Allocation Methodology (Schedule 4, section 5.4.2.4), the DHB uses a mix of preferred and 
alternate cost drivers to allocate overhead. The DHB applies area occupied in square metres 
for infrastructure (e.g. Maternity ward) and number of PCs for IT systems, which are the 
preferred allocation bases prescribed in the Standards. For all other areas within the DHB, 
including Management, Administration, Governance, and Planning and Funding, the DHB 
applies the alternate cost driver FTEs (which is also labelled as the default). Though the DHB 
acknowledges they do not use a variety of overhead allocation bases, particularly more 
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 sophisticated bases, they note that their current costing system has functionality to distinguish 
overhead departments. Specifically, the costing system can distinguish costs that can be 
included in costing patient events from costs that should be excluded. “There are some 
overhead departments that create overhead costs that are not assigned to patient events and 
are dead-ended” (DHB A Interviewee A), as they do not relate to patient events nor do they 
have any impact on the Provider Arms. Consistent with the overhead methodology prescribed 
by the CCG, “[DHB A’s] current costing system filters overhead costs to Overhead 
Departments, which are then allocated to Direct Patient Departments, Support/Management 
Departments or Cost Excluded Departments” (DHB A Interviewee A) (refer to Figure 11 for 
full illustration of the DHB’s costing processes).  
Though the DHB is costing at an event-level, they recognise that their ability to allocate 
overheads to patient events is inhibited by the limitations of their current costing system. 
Specifically, there is an inability to understand the true drivers of overhead costs. As DHB A 
Interviewee A stated, “You need 80% of your costs to have true drivers for [the costing 
system] to be a pure ABC system. We would probably be under 50%”. This is clearly a 
disadvantage of CostPro, as inaccurate overhead allocations are an impediment to the 
usefulness of costing information for cost comparisons, benchmarking and price setting. 
However, the weaknesses of the current costing system used by DHB A exemplifies both the 
complex nature of public health sector organisations and the level of detail DHBs can go 
down to when allocating overheads to patient events. 
Once overhead costs are allocated to the appropriate departments (Direct Patient, 
Support/Management and Cost Excluded) the next stage of the costing process 
institutionalised at DHB A is to cost Direct Patient Departments, which will form the cost 
basis of patient events. The process of costing Direct Patient Departments is described by the 
DHB as Product Mapping. 
6.3.1.2 Product Mapping 
When costing a direct department (i.e. a department that is not an overhead, but may include 
allocated overhead) the DHB evaluates what products can be captured from the department 
by assessing feeder keys. Feeder keys (which are an institutionalised costing process that is 
specific to DHB A) are the code combinations that are created for all different types of 
activity, such as ED Triage 1 through to ED Triage 5. Activity is captured from the Patient 
Management System by mapping the feeder key to a product created in the costing system 
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 under each specific department. If a product mapping has changed for a feeder key it will 
need to be recast. This can be performed in CostPro simply by accessing the Data Warehouse 
and entering the feeder keys that require changes. When a feeder key is remapped, a fiscal 
year for the change to occur must also be entered in the Data Warehouse. Once this is done 
the final step is to run the stored procedure “Recast Patient Utilisation”, which will extract 
the records with those feeder keys and recast them with their new products. 
A product will have a unit of measure (i.e. Minutes, Bed Days, Visits, Lab Test), which is 
necessary to determine the relativity between each product within a department. Once the 
process of mapping products to departments is complete the next step is cost type mapping. 
6.3.1.3 Cost Type Mapping 
The purpose of cost type mapping is to create and map the cost types required to accurately 
cost products. This is done by classifying costs into cost types based on the GL account they 
come from and then mapping these through to cost type groups, which are disclosed in 
Schedule 7 (section 5.4.2.7). Many account combinations will map to the same department 
and cost type and a few of these will need to be split so that a portion is allocated to multiple 
departments and cost types. The DHB’s CostPro Costing System makes this process very 
easy, as it provides a list of similar account combinations and shows what departments and 
cost types these were mapped to. The DHB’s costing system also simplifies the process of 
setting up defaults, as it will suggest cost types when new account combinations are added at 
each GL update. Once product and cost types have been created, relative value units (RVU) 
are required to cost products correctly. 
6.3.1.4 Relative Value Unit Allocation 
A RVU is a relativity weighting given to show how costs from the Cost Pools should be 
allocated to the products. For example, when applying RVUs to doctors costs across ED 
products, it is assumed triage 1 cases require 100, triage 2 require 90, triage 3 require 40, 
triage 4 require 20 and triage 5 require 10 units of a Senior Doctors time in comparison to 
each other. The RVU assignments are based on the rationale that triage 1 events have the 
highest severity and triage 5 events have the lowest severity, thus triage 1 events require 
more Senior Doctors time than triage 5 events. Total doctors costs pushed down to the ED are 
subsequently allocated to each individual type of triage event based on the RVU assignments 
(i.e. if an RVU of 100 units has a cost of $10.00 then triage 1 events will get a unit cost of 
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 $10.00, triage 2 events will get a unit cost of $9.00, triage 3 events will get a unit cost of 
$4.00, and so on and so forth).  
6.3.1.5 Costing Calculation 
To determine product cost per volume the DHB uses a relatively basic costing calculation. To 
demonstrate the process used by the DHB to cost products a hypothetical costing example 
has been set out below for Doctors costs associated with IT Systems (see Table 4). Firstly, 
the DHB takes the value of the GL account (A in Table 4) and divides it by the total adjusted 
volume for the department/cost type (B in Table 4). To calculate the cost per volume the 
DHB then multiplies the result by the products RVU (C for RVU and D for final cost per 
volume, in Table 4). Therefore, for example, the calculation for Doctors Theatre Minutes 
would be ($25,272/19,678,130) x 10 = $0.0128. 
Table 4: Costing Calculation Example for Doctors Costs Associated with IT Systems 
Cost Types:  IT Systems 
GL Amount: (A) $25,272 
Volumes: Product Codes  
Doctors Inpatient Visits DOC_INP 32,198 
Doctors Outpatient Clinic Mins DOC_OUTP 479,089 
Doctors Theatre Mins DOC_THT 208,566 
RVUs: (C)   
Doctors Inpatient Visits DOC_INP 100 
Doctors Outpatient Clinic Mins DOC_OUTP 30 
Doctors Theatre Mins DOC_THT 10 
RVU x Volumes:   
Doctors Inpatient Visits DOC_INP 3,219,800 
Doctors Outpatient Clinic Mins DOC_OUTP 14,372,670 
Doctors Theatre Mins DOC_THT 2,085,660 
RVU x Volumes Total: (B)  19,678,130 
Cost Per Volume: (D)   
Doctors Inpatient Visits DOC_INP $0.1284 
Doctors Outpatient Clinic Mins DOC_OUTP $0.0385 
Doctors Theatre Mins DOC_THT $0.0128 
 
Once the unit cost (or cost per volume) of each product consumed by a patient event is 
determined, the DHB can then calculate the cost of a single patient event using DRGs and 
Caseweights (these are discussed further in section 7.3). 
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 6.3.1.6 CostPro Costing System Volume Data 
To expand on the example used in section 6.3.1.4, there are several feeder keys for ED 
products. The ED products include ED Attendance Triage 1 Medical; ED Attendance Triage 
1 Surgical; ED Attendance Triage 2 Medical; ED Attendance Triage 2 Surgical; ED 
Attendance Triage 3; ED Attendance Triage 4 and ED Attendance Triage 5. The CostPro 
Costing System gives DHB A’s PFA access to the volumes that come through for each triage 
level every month from the Patient Management System via the Data Warehouse tab. As an 
example, the costing system indicates that the DHB had 316 people admitted as triage 5 in 
July 2012 and 204 in August 2012. This information is very useful as it facilitates decision-
making associated with the planning and funding of services. Specifically, the DHB is able to 
analyse patient volumes year-on-year and forecast future volumes by using volume data from 
prior periods, which is collected by the MOH and stored in a data cube. 
While the CostPro Costing System is able to facilitate decisions associated with product and 
service mix to a certain extent, it will not always provide the most valuable information for 
decision-making. This is largely because CostPro is not the most advanced costing system 
available, and as such it cannot go down to the same level of detail as more sophisticated 
costing systems. As an example, using their current costing system, DHB A has identified 10 
different products in ED, meaning they have identified and manage 10 groups of patients 
with different cost profiles. This is in stark contrast to another secondary health care provider 
that has identified and manages roughly 40 groups of patients with different cost profiles in 
their ED (DHB A Interviewee A). Though the second DHB has more patient volumes, which 
justifies the need for a more sophisticated costing system (such as PPM) to facilitate clearer 
patient differentiation, the DHB also has 3 staff solely devoted to costing and has been 
labelled a costing “flagship” within the sector. The adoption and use of more sophisticated 
costing systems is discussed next. 
6.4 Formally Recognised Sophisticated Costing Systems 
Findings gathered at the supplementary case site (MOH) and DHB B indicate that larger 
tertiary DHBs tend to institutionalise more sophisticated formally recognised costing 
systems. Of the six tertiary DHBs operating in the New Zealand public health sector, five 
currently have and make use of sophisticated costing systems (one tertiary DHB based in the 
South Island uses an unsophisticated costing system to provide service-level data). 
Specifically, tertiary DHBs tend to institutionalise a costing system called PPM. PPM is a 
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 sophisticated costing system developed specifically for use in the health sector that focuses 
on the activity-based environment of health care. The main advantages of PPM include: 
(1) PPM has inbuilt flexibility to allow costing to any level, depending on how much data is 
available from external feeder systems;  
(2) PPM allows the use of weights to create patient level activity data for areas without a 
feeder system, based on any coding classification system;  
(3) Costs can be assigned down to the service and patient level based on duration, standard 
cost or actual charge. In addition, costs can be spread across all services equally, or unequally 
using user-defined/industry-specific RVUs;  
(4) Costing can be performed at the fine-grained activity level (e.g. chest X-ray) and results 
can then be consolidated up to patient, DRG, service, or divisional level;  
(5) Adverse events can be quantified by comparing them to similar DRG encounters without 
adverse events;  
(6) The cost of delivery for each patient encounter can be determined, and gains and losses 
can be measured against National Price;  
(7) The GL can be repurposed for Patient Costing, enabling users to easily move amounts 
between cost centres, create dummy cost centres and account codes, offset revenue against 
expenditure, and define how corporate overheads should be treated; and 
(8) PPM has a built-in reconciliation and audit-reporting tool that allows DHBs to reconcile 
each process performed back to the original GL. The convenience of this tool is in the fact 
that DHBs can present accurate and consistent costing results and volumes in line with 
Schedule 7 of the CCS and the NCCPP national data request. 
One tertiary DHB (DHB B) currently using PPM stated that the costing system is “very 
good” as it enables them to “identify opportunities for cost savings and improved clinical 
resource efficiency”. DHB B identified several main motivations that drive the use of the 
current costing system in their large tertiary DHB setting. Drivers of ‘Highest Motivation’ are 
to identify value-add and non-value add activities to reduce product and service costs; 
provide data to NCCPP (to influence National Price); to make and/or support IDF decisions; 
and to support funding decisions in non-standard services. Drivers of ‘High Motivation’ are 
to measure performance for the purpose of performance appraisal. Drivers of ‘Moderate 
Motivation’ are to evaluate business cases for new/changed services.  
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 To indicate the extent to which their current costing system uses ABC, DHB B stated that 
implementation is complete and ABC information is commonly used by their DHB for cost 
management and decision-making purposes. “ABC is considered a normal part of the 
information system” (DHB B Interviewee A). The DHB also provided additional 
commentary stating, “Clinical costing systems in use in New Zealand are not pure ABC but 
actually cost at a fine, more targeted grain than ABC (i.e. a nurse is a nurse in ABC but in 
clinical costing a theatre nurse is not the same as a ward nurse or a clinic nurse)” (DHB B 
Interviewee A). This comment highlights the complex nature of ABC adoptions in the public 
health sector, and reaffirms the DHB’s own admission that they fulfil two of the four 
characteristics typified by Cooper (1988) as major qualities warranting the adoption of more 
sophisticated costing systems, that make use of ABC. These characteristics are (1) the 
provision of numerous products and services; and (2) organisational operations are multi-
faceted and complex. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
As Chapter 6 has discussed, DHBs are encouraged to adopt and use costing systems that 
adhere to the common costing principles described in the CCS (i.e. sophisticated costing 
systems). However, they tend to operate costing systems at one of three levels: (1) six 
secondary DHBs and one tertiary DHB currently use unsophisticated costing systems that are 
not formally recognised. Furthermore, five of the six secondary DHBs are relatively small in 
comparison to the rest of DHBs operating in the sector. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn 
that smaller secondary health care providers tend not to institutionalise formally recognised 
costing systems; (2) eight secondary DHBs currently use moderately sophisticated costing 
systems that are formally recognised. Specifically, these DHBs have tended to institutionalise 
an ABC-based costing system called CostPro, which is the preferred option for secondary 
DHBs because it is affordable and provides a wide breadth of information that enables them 
to contribute event-level costing data to the NCCPP, perform individual product work and 
understand their billing processes; and (3) five tertiary DHBs currently use sophisticated 
costing systems that are formally recognised (one tertiary DHB based in the South Island 
uses an unsophisticated costing system to provide service-level data). Specifically, tertiary 
DHBs have tended to institutionalise a costing system called PPM, which is described as 
“very good” because it allows DHBs to identify opportunities for cost savings and improved 
clinical resource efficiency, provide data to the NCCPP, make and/or support IDF decisions, 
measure performance for the purpose of performance appraisal, and evaluate business cases. 
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 Chapter 7 National Cost Collection and Pricing Programme Data Submission 
7.1 Introduction 
The NCCPP is a series of work programmes performed conjointly by DHB representatives 
and the MOH NHB on an annual basis. When the NCCPP was originally established its main 
purpose was to work out National Price for IDFs. Since such time its role has expanded 
beyond this main purpose to include: 
• Updating the price book for IDF prices (refer to Chapter 8) 
• Setting the tertiary adjuster pool (refer to Chapter 8) 
• Developing casemix caseweights (refer to section 7.3.1 and Chapter 8) 
• Populating the National Event-level Cost Data Cube 
• Reviewing priority areas in non-casemix pricing 
• Supporting work on pricing mental health and elective services 
• Supporting the Common Costing Standards (refer to section 5.4) 
• Producing key pricing information for DHB comparisons by the NCCPP 
• Contributing to the strategic review of pricing in the MOH 
• Supporting service planning 
• Re-producing data to allow DHBs and other key groups to undertake further analysis     
 (predominantly benchmarking and productivity evaluations) 
To run the work programmes outlined above, the NCCPP has requested that all DHBs 
provide cost, revenue and volume information from their Provider Arms every November.18 
As per the OPF, which is a set of business rules, policies and guiding principles to be used in 
the public health sector, all DHBs are required to provide information in line with the 
NCCPP data request at either service-level or event-level (section 5.4.5). According to MOH 
interviewee A, there are 7 DHBs in the New Zealand public health sector with 
unsophisticated costing systems, and they provide data at the service-level (discussed at 
section 7.2). There are also 13 DHBs in the New Zealand public health sector that have 
adopted and currently maintain sophisticated costing systems, and they provide data at the 
event-level (discussed at section 7.3). 
18 Currently data collection is carried out annually but the NCCPP is considering collecting more frequently to 
facilitate requests made by DHBs to have greater access to event-level costing data throughout the year. 
Collecting data more frequently will require a year-to-date collection rather than a year-end collection (with cost 
data reconciliations with DHB annual accounts continuing to occur at year-end). According to a representative 
of the NCCPP, fulfilling this request will require a significant change to how cost information is collected to 
ensure the process is effective and efficient for DHBs, the CCG and the NCCPP. 
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 7. 2 Costing Systems and the NCCPP Data Request 
As stated above, the NCCPP requires DHBs to provide information on costs incurred, 
revenues received and volumes delivered by their Provider Arms every financial year as at 31 
March. There are seven major files that DHBs may need to submit to the NCCPP annually 
depending on the costing system they use, which are summarised in Table 5: 
Table 5: Summary of File Submission Requirements for Service and Event-Level DHBs 
File Type File Description Relevant DHBs 
Reconciliation 
Template 
Contains a Compliance Statement, High 
Level Summary, Financial Reconciliation, 
Volume Reconciliation MSG Mapping and 
Outlier Events 
All 
Activity File All activity 
(i.e. all event, PU and MSG level activity) 
All 
Event Cost File Event-level costs only Event-level DHBs  
Non-event Cost File 
(Summary File) 
PU and/or MSG costs broken down to CS2 
and CS7 cost codes 
 
 
Mental Health PU level costs broken down to 
CS2 cost codes 
Event-level DHBs 
only for non-mental 
health submission 
 
All DHBs for mental 
health submission 
CS2 Cost File Costs broken down by MSG and CS2 cost 
code 
Service-level DHBs  
CS7 Cost File Costs broken down by MSG and CS7 cost 
code 
Service-level DHBs  
Supplementary 
Casemix File 
Casemix data request for specific costs  
E.g. the 2012 data request was for additional 
information and confirmation of costs for 
patients receiving cardiac defibrillators 
Event-level DHBs  
 
7.2.1 Common File Submission Requirements 
Of the seven major file requests outlined above, there are three that all DHBs need to submit 
irrespective of their costing system. The files are the Reconciliation Template, an Activity 
File and Non-Event (summary level) Mental Health Data:  
1) The Reconciliation Template 
The purpose of the Reconciliation Template is to ensure all DHB’s cost and volume data is 
prepared in accordance with the CCS and that this data is collated accurately at summary 
level. The template is highly detailed and comprises several individual components: 
(1) A Compliance Statement, which should include a disclosure statement and declaration of 
areas of non-compliance with the CCS (particularly Schedule 7, section 5.4.2.7) and the 
NCCPP data request;  
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 (2) High-level summary checks, the purpose of which are to pre-detect and correct errors 
prior to data submission. The summary checks should include a comparison of derived 
revenue to costs, a comparison of current year total costs to the previous year, a comparison 
of reconciled volume to raw file volume and NCCPP volume submissions versus national 
data collection alerts;  
(3) A financial reconciliation of submitted costs to DHBs’ audited annual costs, which 
illustrates cost and revenue items that are not related to provision of Provider Arm health 
services; and  
(4) A volume reconciliation, which is used for quality assurance purposes and does not 
replace the need to provide a full Activity File. The volume reconciliation should include 
summarised activity file data by agency, code, MSG and PU, and it should reconcile to the 
Activity File provided in accordance with the NCCPP data request. 
Along with the common requirements aforementioned, event-level DHBs must provide a file 
for Outlier Events. This file is intended to provide event-level DHBs an opportunity to check 
and identify extreme high/low cost per caseweight events prior to submission. Specifically, 
the file should include the top twenty and bottom twenty Cost per Caseweight Inpatient 
events. As the information provided by event-level DHBs is used to inform National Prices 
for IDFs (refer to Chapter 8 for discussion on National Price and IDFs), this file is of high 
importance as it allows the NCCPP to assess and remove outlier events from the data used for 
pricing work that may potentially reduce the efficiency of National Prices. 
2) Activity Data Files 
All DHBs are required to submit a file for activities provided by or through their respective 
Provider Arms. In addition, the request covers only those services provided by the Provider 
Arm and should not include other services funded by the DHB Funder Arm but not 
undertaken by the DHB’s Provider Arm. Specifically, services provided by non-government 
organisations and other primary providers. The activity file submission should be provided on 
the basis of funder, agency, facility, MSG, PU, patient management system unique identifier 
(PMSUID) and total units. Furthermore it should include all activities that correspond to a 
Cost Groups (Schedule 2, section 5.4.2.2) cost file, an Intermediate Products (Schedule 7, 
section 5.4.2.7) cost file and a non-event cost file for mental health services. 
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 3) Non-Event (summary level) Mental Health Data 
In accordance with the non-event (summary level) cost file specifications, all DHBs are 
required to provide a cost file for all mental health services, broken down by PU. This file 
should be provided on the basis of PU by funder, agency, facility, MSG, PU, cost and Cost 
Groups (Schedule 2, section 5.4.2.2) cost code. 
Whether or not DHB’s need to adhere to the remaining four file submissions (which include 
an Event Cost File, CS2 Cost File, CS7 Cost File and Supplementary Casemix File) is 
contingent on the sophistication of their respective costing systems. “DHB CEO’s 
collectively agreed in October 2008 that all medium and large DHBs should have event-level 
costing systems” (MOH Interviewee B). Though the NCCPP accepts that small DHBs may 
not find it cost-effective to maintain event-level costing systems, the NCCPP believes all 
DHBs should have local or regional costing systems and contribute cost information at an 
event-level. The purpose is “to further improve the accuracy of prices and adjusters, as well 
as the overall value of the National Cost Collection” (refer to Chapter 8 for discussion on 
National Price and adjusters). Notwithstanding this belief, only 13 of the 20 DHBs 
nationwide have adopted and currently maintain sophisticated event-level costing systems. 
As MOH interviewee A stated, “[those] DHBs with unsophisticated costing systems cannot 
justify the costs of running a more sophisticated costing system”. Specifically, the DHBs 
(which are typically small DHBs) believe the operational costs and high level of system 
support required to adopt and use more sophisticated costing systems, such as ABC, are not 
sufficiently offset by potential information benefits of running these systems. 
All DHBs with unsophisticated costing systems are expected to submit files in accordance 
with the requirements of a service-level DHB. Service-Level Costing and NCCPP file 
submissions are explored below. All DHBs with sophisticated costing systems are expected 
to submit files in accordance with the requirements of an event-level DHB. Event-Level 
Costing and NCCPP file submissions are explored at section 7.4. 
7.3 Service-Level Costing and the NCCPP 
As indicated at Chapter 6, DHBs with unsophisticated costing systems have very limited 
means to access information about their costs. In many instances these DHBs can identify 
where their direct costs originate, but they are severely disadvantaged when it comes to 
understanding, monitoring and controlling their indirect costs (section 5.4.2.2). Specifically, 
there is an inability to ascertain what drives the incurrence of indirect costs and where/how 
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 they should be allocated. For DHBs in this situation, Schedule 4 (section 5.4.2.4) offers 
alternate cost drivers (typically FTE or Total Cost, as all DHBs should have access to this 
information) to allocate overhead. Using FTE or Total Cost to allocate overhead makes it 
virtually impossible to cost down to a patient level, as there is not the depth of knowledge to 
accurately trace causal relationships between indirect costs and individual patient events 
(which utilise activities from multiple services both directly and indirectly). With 
consideration for this lack of understanding for how indirect costs are incurred, the CCG and 
the NCCPP requires all DHBs with unsophisticated costing systems to cost at service-level. 
DHBs that make use of unsophisticated costing systems, and thus cost down to service-level, 
are required to allocate all costs of health care (i.e. direct patient care, clinical support and 
overhead) to activity reported in a MSG, with the exception of mental health services, where 
DHBs are required to allocate all costs of health care down to PU level. According to MOH 
interviewee B, MSG’s include “ED, Maternity, Neonatal, Community, Surgical, Disability 
Support, Health of Older People or any other palliative services”. To allocate direct patient 
care and clinical support costs at the MSG is relatively straightforward, as these costs are 
directly associated with the delivery of a specific service. However, to allocate overhead is 
more difficult as these costs generally cannot be directly associated with the provision of a 
specific service. To allocate overhead, service-level DHBs tend to use a single arbitrary 
DHB-wide overhead allocation rate based on FTEs or total cost. Though allocating indirect 
costs using FTEs or total cost is the most suitable approach for DHBs that have 
unsophisticated costing systems, this can impact on the quality of cost information for 
decision-making. Specifically, service planning can be less effective as DHBs with an 
unsophisticated costing system do not have an accurate understanding of the costs associated 
with service provision, and cost comparisons between DHBs with unsophisticated and 
sophisticated costing systems is severely limited as service costs for DHBs with an 
unsophisticated costing system can often be inconsistent, incomparable or incomplete. 
7.3.1 Service-Level File Submissions 
The NCCPP requires all DHBs with unsophisticated costing systems to submit five major 
files for activity and cost data. Three of the file submissions include a Reconciliation 
Template, an Activity File and Non-Event (summary level) Mental Health Data (section 
7.1.1). Service-level DHBs are also required to submit two cost files, the purpose of which is 
to provide the NCCPP with high-level summary data to construct a sector wide view of DHB 
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 Provider Arm costs and volumes. The first file is a Cost Groups (Schedule 2, section 5.4.2.2) 
cost file and the second is an Intermediate Products (Schedule 7, section 5.4.2.7) cost file for 
all non-mental health services. Both these cost file submissions should be provided on the 
basis of MSG by funder, agency, facility, cost and Cost Groups (Schedule 2, section 5.4.2.2) 
cost code. 
7.4 Event-Level Costing and the NCCPP 
Unlike service-level DHBs, in which many of the CCS are offered as a guideline to costing, 
event-level DHBs are expected to follow the Standards and ABC methodologies specified 
therein rigorously. To use the CCS congruously with their respective costing systems, event-
level DHBs should apply the principle of full absorption to determine the cost of a patient 
event. This means that any cost that is caused by the delivery of health care, whether it is 
direct or indirect in nature, should be allocated to activities associated with a patient event in 
order to have a complete cost for the event. As MOH Interviewee B stated, “it is imperative 
that all event-level DHB’s co-operate with the NCCPP’s data requests thoroughly to ensure 
smooth running of the New Zealand public health sector in various crucial functions”. Event-
level costing data contributes substantially to the development of casemix caseweights, 
benchmarking, cost and volume comparisons, pricing work, service planning and funding. 
Thus, significant regulatory and political pressures are placed on DHBs to adopt and use 
sophisticated costing systems, as the information they provide to the NCCPP is essential to 
the functionality of the New Zealand public health sector as an efficient and effective means 
to deliver sustained high quality health services. 
While the CCS are not mandated, and as such, event-level DHBs are not obliged to follow 
them precisely as they are set out, this does not raise concerns over inconsistent applications. 
As MOH Interviewee B stated, “we are comfortable that those DHBs costing at the event-
level are allocating costs in a very consistent manner. This is because all DHBs are actively 
involved in the CCG and as a member of the Group they all strive to reduce discrepancy”. 
That is, there is sufficient cultural-cognitive/political pressure on DHBs to apply the CCS 
appropriately. Furthermore, the Group has been working together for a number of years (the 
CCG was established in 2005) and “members are constantly reviewing information of DHBs 
within the Group to ensure each member’s information is consistent with their own” (MOH 
Interviewee B). If there are inconsistencies between DHBs that have a similar demographic 
or hospital structure, the Group will consult the CCS to ascertain how they were applied and 
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 why there are such inconsistencies. Often the Standards are applied dissimilarly because they 
“were not described well enough to accommodate some scenarios or the description may not 
be clear enough, which creates opportunities for misinterpretation” (MOH Interviewee B). To 
mitigate misinterpretation of the CCS “the CCG and NCCPP constantly offer training 
sessions and forums to provide better visibility for how to cost, how costs are derived and 
how costing information impacts on National Pricing work”. This can be viewed as a direct 
response to normative/social pressures, as the MOH seeks to align perceptions of DHB 
practices and characteristics with social and cultural values (in order to gain or retain 
organisational legitimacy). In addition, significant regulatory pressures are placed on DHBs, 
as the MOH has the authority to withhold funding, to impose a management regime, and in 
extreme cases, replace a Board if it finds a DHB under-performing. In practice, these powers 
are rarely used, as they are seen as drastic measures and are likely to produce unwanted 
effects, such as running a DHB into deficit and reduced public confidence in the New 
Zealand public health sector (which can have the effect of reduced organisational legitimacy). 
7.4.1 Event-Level File Submissions 
The NCCPP requires all DHBs with sophisticated costing systems to submit six major files 
for activity and cost data. Three of the file submissions include a Reconciliation Template, an 
Activity File and Non-Event (summary level) Mental Health Data (section 7.1.1). Event-level 
DHBs are also required to submit two cost files plus one supplementary casemix file. 
The two cost files event-level DHBs submit to the NCCPP provide the costs associated with 
their Provider Arms. The first file is an event-level cost file to capture cost data for any 
activity performed at patient event-level. This cost file should be provided at event-level by 
cost, Cost Groups (Schedule 2, section 5.4.2.2) cost code, Intermediate Products (Schedule 7, 
section 5.4.2.7) cost code and PMSUID. Where activity is not costed at patient event-level, 
DHBs are required to provide cost information by PU. If PU cost information is not available, 
event-level DHBs are required to provide this information by MSG. The second cost file 
event-level DHBs are required to submit is a non-event (summary level) cost file to capture 
costs at the MSG and PU level. This file should be provided on the basis of MSG and PU by 
funder, agency, facility, cost, Cost Groups (Schedule 2, section 5.4.2.2) cost code and 
Intermediate Products (Schedule 7, section 5.4.2.7) cost code. 
In addition to the core data request, event-level DHBs are required to provide casemix-
specific data. This data is requested by “The Casemix Cost Weights Group (CCWG), a work 
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 stream operating under the NCCPP responsible for reviewing the caseweights used for 
casemix funding” (NCCPP, 2012, p. 48).19 Caseweights reflect the costs of treatment for 
individual DRGs and allow comparisons across DRGs as well as a means of aggregating 
volumes. The CCWG use data provided by event-level DHBs to perform work in various 
areas associated with caseweights. Some of these areas include reviewing the level of 
weighted inlier equivalent separation (WIES) weights for DRGs and assessing the adequacy 
of cost weights for DRGs.20 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
As Chapter 7 has discussed, the NCCPP requests cost, revenue and volume information from 
DHBs for their Provider Arms every November. The purpose is to run various work 
programmes, such as updating the price book for IDF prices; setting the tertiary adjuster pool; 
developing casemix caseweights; supporting service planning and populating the National 
Event-level Cost Data Cube. As per the OPF, all DHBs are required to provide information in 
line with the NCCPP data request at either service-level or event-level. There are 7 DHBs in 
the New Zealand public health sector with unsophisticated costing systems, and they provide 
data at service-level. Specifically, they submit five major files for activity and cost data, 
including a Reconciliation Template, an Activity File, Non-Event (summary level) Mental 
Health Data, a Cost Groups cost file and an Intermediate Products cost file for all non-mental 
health services. There are also 13 DHBs in the New Zealand public health sector that have 
adopted and currently maintain sophisticated costing systems, and they provide data at event-
level. Specifically, they submit six major files for activity and cost data, including a 
Reconciliation Template, an Activity File, Non-Event (summary level) Mental Health Data, 
an event-level cost file to capture cost data for any activity performed at patient event-level, a 
non-event (summary level) cost file to capture costs at the MSG and PU level, and casemix-
specific data.  
 
  
19 Casemix focuses on the demographic characteristics of the population served by a health care system. 
Typically the characteristics considered include age, gender, ethnicity, deprivation and health status. 
20 WIES provide a relative measure of resource use for each event within a DRG. A patient’s WIES is 
determined according to their DRG, length of stay, copayments for mechanical ventilation and copayments for 
certain conditions such as scoliosis. Per Penno et al. (2012, p. 43), a DRG “is a system which classifies patients 
into clinically meaningful groups according to the severity of their illnesses and the intensity of resources 
required to treat them”. 
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 Chapter 8 Inter-District Flows and the NCCPP 
8.1 Introduction 
When a DHB wants to purchase services from another DHB’s Provider Arm to treat patients 
in their own geographic region they do so through IDFs. To facilitate IDFs between DHBs 
operating in the New Zealand public health sector, the NCCPP sets National Prices for 
services, which become the default prices. The main motivation for developing these prices is 
efficient and effective inter-DHB trading (purchasing and service provision) between DHBs 
in the sector. While DHBs are permitted to negotiate their own prices, the hope is that they 
will trust the efficiency of National Prices and save resources, which can otherwise be 
expended on lengthy price and volume negotiations. The calculation of National Price is 
discussed next. 
8.2 National Price 
To foster a health system in which efficient and effective inter-DHB trading occurs, the 
NCCPP should provide National Prices that are well-informed and equitable. That is, 
National Prices should be formed in such a way that the DHB of Domicile is not overcharged 
and the DHB of Service is sufficiently reimbursed for costs associated with the provision of 
services to other DHBs. In an attempt to provide National Prices grounded in the qualities 
described above, the NCCPP collects cost and volume data from all DHBs operating in the 
sector and uses this information as the basis for National Prices (as discussed in Chapter 7). 
“The calculation of National Prices is predicated on the expectation that all DHBs will 
comply with the NCCPP’s data request” (MOH Interviewee B). However, as Chapter 6 
reveals, DHBs operate costing systems with varying levels of sophistication, and as Chapter 7 
reveals, this impacts on the quality of cost and volume data submitted to the NCCPP (i.e. 
costing system sophistication dictates whether a DHB provides service-level or event-level 
cost information).  
Though the NCCPP’s annual data collection is a very resource-intensive process for DHBs, it 
should be noted that the number of DHBs that submit cost and volume data at event-level 
determines how well informed and equitable National Prices are for IDFs. Therefore, the 
onus is on DHB’s to adopt and make use of sophisticated costing systems to ensure they 
contribute to the NCCPP’s National Pricing work. The process used by the NCCPP to 
calculate National Prices, including how service-level and event-level data is used to inform 
these prices, is described below. 
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 As per discussions with MOH Interviewee A and B, who are both directly involved in the 
NCCPP National Pricing work, all cost and volume data for service-level and event-level 
DHBs is collected, stored and processed in the IDF Price Book. The IDF Price Book is an 
Excel workbook that comprises two large spreadsheets – one of which is a Summary File of 
all cost and volume data that is used to calculate (1) Relativities and Scaled Prices, and the 
other is where all macro driven processes are performed to calculate (2) Adjusters. Once 
scaled price relativities and adjusters are calculated, the NCCPP can provide the IDF Price 
Book. The basic equation that is used as the basis for pricing in the IDF price book is: 
Efficient Cost = Scaled Price x Volumes + Adjusters 
(1) Relativities and Scaled Prices 
The NCCPP generates a set of Price Relativities for all non-casemix PUs (i.e. the price of 
individual products) and casemix cost weights (i.e. the price of typical DRG events) using 
event-level cost and volume data submitted in accordance with the NCCPP’s data request. 
The Price Relativities for non-casemix PUs and casemix cost weights are calculated using the 
normal distribution within a specific inlier bound standard weight (previously referred to as 
WIES in section 7.3.1). Fundamentally, this means that all event-level cost and volume data 
is combined for individual PUs and casemix cost weights and appropriate price benchmarks 
are determined based on that data. The benchmarks then become the basis for National Price 
for each non-casemix PU and standard casemix cost weight. 
Subsequent to the calculation of Price Relativities for all non-casemix PUs and casemix cost 
weights the NCCPP then scales them. The first step involved in scaling is to revise Price 
Relativities by excluding all outlier events. The logic behind this step is to remove any 
incentive for event-level DHBs retaining patients for longer than necessary, thus promoting 
efficient resource use. Once outlier events are removed, the NCCPP brings together all cost 
and volume data (being service-level and event-level cost data combined) to scale Price 
Relativities in accordance with total costs for the sector. This is done to ensure (1) the 
average price-weights multiplied by volumes do not exceed the total costs submitted by all 
DHBs; and (2) the relativities are based on total costs. 
(2) Adjusters 
Casemix funding assumes that a Provider Arm will (on average) receive the right amount of 
funding for each class of discharge, as defined by the DRGs. However, there are instances 
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 where casemix funding does not sufficiently recognise the costs incurred by a DHB for 
providing services. Similarly, there are instances where casemix funding does not take into 
consideration the efficiencies/inefficiencies of particular DHBs. Consequently, the NCCPP 
calculates adjusters in an attempt to alleviate the shortcomings of casemix funding and 
improve equitability of IDFs between DHBs. The IDF Price Book adjusters include (1) The 
Tertiary Compensator; (2) National Paediatric Adjuster; (3) Efficiency Adjuster; and (4) 
Inflationary Adjuster. 
(1) The Tertiary Compensator is required because casemix prices do not reflect the actual 
costs to tertiary facilities of providing services. Even though the tertiary service casemix unit 
price is calculated through the price book a facility-related increment is calculated (using 
actual cost evidence) and is added to base funding for tertiary DHBs to cover their additional 
costs of service.21  
(2) The National Paediatric Adjuster is an adjustment for national paediatric services. This 
payment is made to DHBs of Service to recognise the additional cost margin paediatrics has 
over comparable adult services. 
(3) The Efficiency Adjuster is based on the principle that the DHB of Domicile should not be 
required to pay for the inefficiencies of the DHB of Service. To calculate the efficiency 
adjuster, which is usually around 2%, the NCCPP compares costs (inputs) and volumes 
(outputs) of each DHB against others in the sector to estimate relative levels of efficiency. 
(4) The Inflationary Adjuster is required because the NCCPP works with retrospective data to 
calculate National Prices for the following year. Thus, an adjustment to all price work is 
required to account for inflationary changes. In a similar vein, there is also a predicted 
demographic growth adjustment to account for changes in the DHB population. 
8.2.1 National Price Domination 
Discussions with MOH and DHB representatives indicate there is widespread agreement that 
National Price is dominated by tertiary DHBs. This point of view is substantiated by several 
pieces of evidence. As MOH Interviewee A stated, “all tertiary DHBs, with the exception of 
[one in the South Island], operate sophisticated costing systems and provide event-level data 
21 There are a number of reasons why casemix prices may predict costs for tertiary facilities inadequately. Two 
prominent examples include (1) technological advancements to service provision, with tertiary facilities tending 
to implement such changes first; and (2) the fact that tertiary services are more likely to maintain 24-hour 
accessibility, with a consequential increase in capacity costs. 
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 to the NCCPP”. The five tertiary DHBs that contribute cost information in accordance with 
the NCCPP data submission account for approximately 90% of all tertiary costs incurred and 
70% of all event-level costing data submitted. This gives a good representation from the 
larger tertiary facilities, but there are concerns that secondary DHBs are underrepresented in 
the submission. 
Concerns that secondary DHBs are underrepresented in the NCCPP submission have 
emerged largely because six secondary DHBs do not have sophisticated costing systems, thus 
are not able to submit event-level cost data to the NCCPP to influence National Price. The 
eight secondary DHBs that do contribute cost information in accordance with the NCCPP 
data submission account for approximately 65% of all secondary costs incurred and 30% of 
all event-level costing data submitted. There are also concerns that National Price is too 
North Island centric. As MOH Interviewee A noted, “there is only one tertiary DHB in the 
South Island with a sophisticated costing system. Consequently, no event-level data is 
provided from secondary DHBs operating in the South Island to inform National Price”. 
The major issue that arises from tertiary DHBs dominating National Price is that resources 
are not transferred between DHBs via IDFs as efficiently as possible. Specifically, there are 
concerns that National Price is too high, as tertiary costs tend to be higher than secondary 
costs, and there is not enough data from secondary DHBs at event-level to influence prices 
down. As DHB B Interviewee A stated, “National Price would be more efficient if there was 
a wider representation of secondary Provider Arms contributing. The small base means a 
volatile price and this leads to volatile prices and tertiary national adjusters”. Furthermore, 
secondary DHBs have expressed concerns that the true and fair cost of each IDF is not 
National Price (representing the full cost with fixed and variable components), but a cost 
somewhere between marginal and full cost. 
In spite of potential inefficiencies created by the calculation of National Price, this does not 
inhibit service accessibility via IDFs. As DHB A Interviewee B stated, “it can hurt the 
bottom-line of a DHB if there is a cost implication, but patient welfare comes first and cost 
efficiency comes second”. To elaborate, all DHBs receive Crown funding in December and a 
predetermined amount is taken off for the following year’s IDFs. The amount is 
predetermined because IDFs are agreed between the DHB of Domicile and the DHB of 
Service prior to the year starting. Therefore, it is factored into each DHBs budget that there 
will be a fixed cost (the IDF) for service provision to meet some patient’s needs. “To ensure 
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 resources leave the district appropriately, DHBs perform a health needs assessment every 3-5 
years, the purpose of which is to evaluate health needs across the community and determine 
what services are likely to be required to meet those needs” (DHB A Interviewee B). Each 
DHB will then decide whether it is more cost effective to provide particular services through 
their Provider Arm or to outsource to other Provider Arms (through IDFs) or other agencies, 
such as private hospitals, primary care, and mental health, disability and community services. 
There are several tertiary services that are only provided by tertiary DHBs, and as a result 
secondary DHBs will always refer these services out to tertiary DHBs. In this case, secondary 
DHBs often feel “powerless to prevent inefficient resource flows when patients are referred 
out” (DHB A Interviewee B). Nevertheless, there are still opportunities for secondary DHBs 
to retain patients if they believe it will be more cost effective to provide care at their own 
Provider Arm, as opposed to referring patients out to another DHB. In actual fact a number of 
DHBs have tried actively to repatriate a lot of their IDFs in the last few years and that has 
been relatively successful. One example involves general surgery, whereby DHB A has had 
an increase in their general surgery output because of an increase in surgeon availability. 
While this has involved an increase in fixed costs for surgical and nursing labour, the DHB 
notes that they have actually saved money overall by performing surgical procedures in-
house. The main reason for this is that the cost of performing each surgical procedure is not 
the full cost represented by National Price, but the marginal cost for clinical supplies 
associated with each surgery. 
Though the MOH and DHB’s acknowledge that use of sophisticated costing systems with 
ABC methodologies is crucial to the calculation of National Price, there is also a realisation 
that not all DHBs are prepared to implement such systems. As a result, it is not plausible to 
expect concerns over the efficiency of National Price to be remedied through universal 
adoption of sophisticated costing systems. After discussions with several MOH and DHB 
experts, it is also unlikely that a revised methodology to calculate National Price is going to 
be implemented in the near future, as suggestions of a price between marginal and full cost 
have had little traction. As DHB A interviewee B stated, “one DHB has done quite a bit of 
work on an alternative transfer pricing methodology that they see as a true and fair marginal 
cost, rather than the full cost represented by National Price”. The DHB started performing 
this work because they have been hit really hard with IDFs in recent years and there is a 
realisation at the DHB that National Prices for IDFs are more costly than using private 
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 providers. “While [the DHB] would prefer to use the resources and capacity available to them 
in the public system, if prices continue to deteriorate their bottom-line they will be forced to 
use private providers, which have been proven to cost less than IDFs at National Price” 
(DHB A interviewee A). 
Based on the discussion above, it is evident that National Price is not a perfect mechanism. 
While some DHBs have repatriated patients to mitigate the issues with National Price, other 
DHBs have expressed interest in an alternative pricing mechanism. However, the most 
effective approach used by DHBs to combat the inefficiencies of National Price to meet the 
needs of DHB populations has been a move to increase collaboration between DHBs. 
8.3 DHB Collaboration 
Several DHBs have expressed the opinion that collaboration between DHBs to forecast 
patient needs and discuss their treatment across districts and regions is highly important. As 
DHB A Interviewee B stated, “DHBs at regional level are already using various collaborative 
initiatives to manage available funding in different ways to maximise equity of access to 
health services across regions”, specifically, to plan services at regional level. DHBs have 
also heightened emphasis on negotiating prices away from the National Price and outside of 
the IDF network, the aim of which is to charge DHBs of Domicile a price that reflects the 
actual costs incurred by DHBs of Service to treat patients. Another major example of the 
types of regional collaboration occurring in the New Zealand public health sector is the 
3DHB Programme. This collaborative partnership is discussed in greater detail below: 
8.3.1 The 3DHB Programme 
The 3DHB Programme is a partnership between three DHBs operating in the same region 
and it was formed by the Sub-Regional Clinical Leadership Group (CLG) because they 
realised integration of services between the DHBs was inadequate. The CLG is a group led 
by clinicians from the three DHBs whose purpose is to develop services across the region 
with a focus towards quality, efficiency and equitable access. Specifically, the CLG 
recognised a need to better integrate primary and secondary care across the region to improve 
availability of specialised services to patients and reduce duplication of service (particularly 
when a patient is transferred between DHBs). Accordingly, the partnership has designed the 
new structure to fit the constantly changing environment of health care (i.e. the patient 
population) and support clinical integration of services with the aim of providing quality, 
accessible and efficient services that will be sustainable across the region. 
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 8.3.2 Structure of the 3DHB Programme 
Through the 3DHB Programme there were a number of structural changes to the health 
system in the region. The changes were deemed necessary to facilitate clinically led 
improvements, with management and organisational design in support. 
As part of the 3DHB Programme, the CLG has established an initiative focussed on ‘single 
service, several sites’, whereby services such as Ear, Nose and Throat, Gastroenterology, 
Child health, Ophthalmology, Orthopaedics, non-melanoma skin lesions, Palliative Care, and 
Radiology are shared within the region. The PFUs have also combined to form a single unit 
called the Service Integration and Development Unit (SIDU). Previously service planning 
and funding was performed by each DHB for their own population and PFAs would come 
together to discuss the provision of health care as a region. Under SIDU there is one director 
and all planning and funding decisions are made with respect to the whole region and a 
shared financial bottom-line. “The main benefit of SIDU is that capacity can be used more 
effectively and efficiently to arrange the best mix of local services, equitable access to quality 
services and high performing centres of excellence to meet health needs of the shared 
population” (DHB A interviewee B). 
To facilitate the aims of the 3DHB Programme, the partnership has meant an increase in 
mobility of human resources, meaning specialists can move between Provider Arms to treat 
patients as needed. Mobility of human resources between the collaborating DHBs has 
significant benefits to staff through shared education and new opportunities to gain 
experience. Furthermore, the partnership aligned the three IT teams to make both patient 
journeys and working between DHBs a more seamless experience. Specifically, the 
partnership introduced an IT system whereby all three districts operate using the same log in, 
email and phone network. The partnership also introduced an IT initiative called e-Tree, 
which houses all electronic files for the region, so clinicians can view patient’s electronic 
medical records from any site, regardless of where they are being treated. These 
developments vastly improve ease of access, as DHB personnel are able to work both locally 
and remotely from a single portal. 
One of the major changes to management structure is the two secondary DHBs amalgamated 
their senior management teams and share a CEO (with a view towards gradual integration 
across all three DHBs as opportunities arise). This initiative alone meant that more than 40 
positions at the DHBs were disestablished to make way for one management team. Though 
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 the DHBs have been combined for administrative and management purposes, all three DHBs 
operating under the 3DHB programme will continue to have their own elected Boards. It is 
crucial to the success of the partnership that each partner DHB maintains their own Board. 
“This is because each DHB must be accountable to their respective DHB populations and 
demonstrate transparency over health targets, health initiatives and financial performance” 
(DHB A interviewee B). Additionally, each DHB population needs local representation so as 
to ensure equitable decision making, as most decisions will have an impact on all three 
districts and there is likely to be occasions where tension is created between the needs of a 
sub-regional population and the needs of the region as a whole. 
8.3.3 Centres of Excellence and the Clinical Expert Domain 
As a result of the 3DHB Programme, centres of excellence can be established, whereby the 
delivery of health care is arranged in such a way that “the Provider Arm which is most 
effective and efficient at providing a specific specialised service becomes the main provider 
to the entire region” (DHB A interviewee B). This not only reduces duplication, as Provider 
Arms do not assume the default position that they must provide all services, but it also 
improves the quality and efficiency of patient care. Though it is important to consider where 
centres of excellence are, the partnership also needs to be mindful of where patient needs are. 
Moreover, the partnership needs to make sure every decision is made prospectively so as to 
anticipate where future needs will be. “[These considerations] are crucial to the partnership if 
it is going to be both successful and sustainable, as they can create travel, inconvenience and 
social costs if ignored” (DHB A interviewee B). For that reason, a clinical expert domain has 
been established, whereby the delivery of health care is arranged so specialists and centres of 
excellence are in the district where services are most needed (assuming the Provider Arm has 
the requisite infrastructural capabilities to provide the service and it is cost effective to do so). 
8.3.4 Cost Savings 
Though cost savings was not the primary purpose for forming the partnership, it is noted that 
the overall intention of the 3DHB programme is to improve the quality, accessibility and 
efficiency of patient care by getting the best value for health system resources and making 
them sustainable into the future. To this end, it is evident that the 3DHB programme will 
create cost savings in a number of areas. These savings will be observed predominantly 
through fewer personnel costs and reduced duplication of managerial, administrative, 
planning and funding functions (discussed in section 8.2.2). Savings will also be experienced 
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 through reduced duplication of service, better co-ordination of services between the Provider 
Arms and improved quality and efficiency of services.  
Notwithstanding the financial benefits of the 3DHB programme, there are a number of 
unintended non-financial costs that may eventuate as a result of the collaboration. These costs 
include internal conflicts and tensions between the participating DHBs during the transition 
phase. Specifically, there may be resistance to change if DHBs do not understand the benefits 
of the collaboration or they do not agree with the collective processes being implemented to 
purchase, fund and cost health services. This could have the effect of undermining the 
programme and reducing its overall effectiveness. Additionally, there are may be potential 
implications to the organisational legitimacy of the DHBs involved in the collaboration, 
particularly if members of the public do not understand the purpose of the programme or its 
intended benefits to them as users of the New Zealand public health sector. That is, 
confidence in the health sector may be reduced if the general public believes the overall 
impact of the collaboration is a reduction in the range and availability of services to them (i.e. 
DHBs are reneging on their social contract to provide sustained high quality health services). 
8.3.5 Impact on Inter-District Flows 
The two secondary DHBs operating under the 3DHB programme have a large volume of 
IDFs, as they cannot sustain a complete range of services to meet patient needs, and this has 
an equally high dollar value attached to it. Furthermore, “the share of resources committed to 
IDFs has been unfavourable compared to budget in the past couple of years and continues to 
increase, but not as a direct result of an increase in volumes” (DHB A Interviewee B). The 
increase is due in part to a steady rise in National Price, but more importantly, it is because 
tertiary DHBs are constantly improving their processes to code and count the services they 
provided through IDFs.  
Acknowledging the inefficiencies of National Price (discussed in section 8.1.1), the 3DHB 
programme alleviates most of the concerns associated with IDFs. Though each district still 
receives their own share of population-based funding (discussed in section 5.2), all resources 
are used collectively to plan and provide health services to the entire region. In addition, the 
MOH has stated that the DHBs must now break-even as a region, as opposed to three 
separate organisations. Having one bottom-line not only reduces the negative impact National 
Prices may have had on the DHBs during the process of inter-district trading, but it also 
removes the disincentive to partake in IDFs between the DHBs in collaboration. This means 
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 the DHBs are united by a common objective to provide quality, accessible and efficient 
health services without incurring a deficit. While the collaboration mitigates most concerns 
associated with the inefficiency of National Price to the extent that IDFs occur within the 
regional (i.e. between partners of the 3DHB programme), as history indicates there may be 
instances where services still need to be sought away from the 3DHB Programme, 
particularly for unforeseen patient events. The 3DHB Programme will need to decide as a 
group if it is more cost effective to seek these services from other Provider Arms via IDFs, or 
consider other alternatives. The alternatives will include private providers or using collective 
resources on capital expenditure to provide such services within the region (as capital 
expenditure budgets are aligned through the partnership). 
8.3.6 Success of the 3DHB Programme 
The collaboration means new and in some cases radically different ways of thinking and 
working. “There will be a certain period of transition, which is inevitable, and there will be a 
number of features that will play a significant role in the success of the 3DHB programme” 
(DHB A Interviewee B). Two key features will be leadership and communication. Leadership 
is an important feature because staff needs to see what the vision is and be convinced that the 
partnership knows what it wants to achieve and how it is going to achieve it. As DHB A 
Interviewee B pointed out, these areas have been considered – “the CLG owns the project 
and they have a clear aim, equitable access to quality and efficient health services through 
greater DHB collaboration”. Communication is also important because the vision and 
proposed benefits thereof need to be conveyed clearly and convincingly. “This will have the 
dual effect of creating buy-in and it will ensure everyone works together towards one 
common goal with a shared vision and values” (DHB A Interviewee B). This will also have 
the effect of reassuring the local community that the collaboration is for the greater good and 
will actually yield benefits to them as users of the New Zealand public health care system. 
Strong communication channels will be important over the duration of the programme too, as 
people will be working together from several different sites. As a result there will be reliance 
on communication technology such as email, phone and video-conferencing (which have 
been aligned). 
Relationships are a key feature, as people need to gain familiarity with each other and learn to 
work together. Forming strong relationships will create a work dynamic where trust is 
developed and everyone is open and honest in their discussions. Considering political 
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 relationships, it is important that each local community has a voice and there is accountability 
to these communities. Irrespective of size, each Board represents their DHB population, and 
it is important that they all have strong operational input and are acknowledged, respected 
and shown due consideration whenever a decision is made. 
Another key feature is acceptance to change. Along with the reorganisation of health care in 
the region, there will also be constant change processes. As DHB A Interviewee B stated, 
“We have to build headroom in our budgets to cope with changes in demand and 
opportunities for innovation. This means change will become the norm as we will be 
constantly shifting resources to where they are most needed”. Awareness and acceptance that 
change processes will occur is vastly important to the success of the partnership because (1) 
the DHBs need to work together to make patient events less complicated; (2) the ageing 
population brings new levels of complexity to health care; and (3) the DHBs have limited 
resources to provide health services. This is not easy, but it is essential to ensure health 
services thrive and can adapt to the needs of the region’s population as they change. 
8.4 Chapter Summary 
As Chapter 8 has discussed, the NCCPP calculates National Prices to facilities IDFs between 
DHBs to meet patient needs. Though National Prices are calculated with the intention of 
facilitating efficient and effective IDFs, there is a realisation that the calculation of these 
prices is dominated by tertiary DHBs with sophisticated costing systems. In spite of potential 
inefficiencies created by the calculation of National Prices, this does not inhibit service 
accessibility via IDFs. It can hurt the bottom-line of a DHB if there is a cost implication, but 
patient welfare comes first and cost efficiency comes second. Acknowledging the potential 
inefficiencies of National Prices, some DHBs have expressed interest in a revised 
methodology between marginal and full cost, but these suggestions have had little traction. 
As a result, several DHBs have tried actively to repatriate a lot of their IDFs in the last few 
years, which has been relatively successful. Another mechanism that has been used to 
mitigate the potential inefficiencies of  National Prices to meet the needs of DHB populations 
has been a move to increase collaboration between DHBs. Specifically, DHBs have started 
using various collaborative initiatives to manage available funding in different ways to 
maximise equity of access to health services across regions, including service planning at 
regional level, negotiating IDF prices away from the National Price and outside of the IDF, 
and finally, establishing the 3DHB Programme.  
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 Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
Changes in the New Zealand public health sector in recent years, such as heightened social, 
political and economic pressures to manage and reduce costs while improving the quality of 
care in conjunction with stringent health care guidelines, have forced DHB’s nationwide to 
reassess their approach to health care provision. This study has assessed the influence of the 
NHB and the twenty DHBs it monitors, using a twofold consideration. The first consideration 
related to adoption and use of costing systems by DHBs operating in the New Zealand public 
health sector. The second consideration was how service planning and provision is 
effectuated by inter-district co-ordination and IDFs, and the impact costing systems adoption 
and use have on these processes. 
In recognition of the potential benefits of sophisticated costing systems, and the fact that the 
New Zealand public health sector is severely underrepresented in current cost accounting and 
transfer pricing literature, the objective of this study was to: 
To examine the costing systems used by DHBs to plan and provide health services, and to 
evaluate how the use of such costing systems influence service planning and provision (at the 
district, regional and national level) in accordance with the outcomes outlined by the MOH. 
To achieve this overall research objective six research questions were posed: 
RQ 1: What determines and guides the costing systems used in New Zealand DHBs? 
RQ 2: How are costs calculated in DHB costing systems? 
RQ 3: How is cost information produced by cost systems used to plan and provide services? 
RQ 4: How and for what other purposes is cost information used in the public health sector? 
RQ 5: How are the transfer prices to be charged for inter-DHB trading determined? 
RQ 6: How and for what purposes do DHBs collaborate with each other? 
The next six sections will discuss and answer the research questions and consider the 
literature and theory where applicable. 
9.2 Costing Systems Adoption and Use in New Zealand DHBs 
The New Zealand public health sector has undergone significant reforms in recent years, 
including the NHB being established, decentralisation of decision-making to DHBs for local 
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 service planning and provision, and heightened emphasis on expected outcomes of the public 
health sector (as outlined by the MOH). The outcomes include New Zealanders living longer, 
healthier and more independent lives; a health system that is cost-effective and supports a 
productive economy; health services that are delivered better, sooner and more conveniently; 
and finally, assurance of the future sustainability of the health system. The recent reforms to 
the New Zealand public health sector (which are essentially due to resourcing and 
sustainability concerns) and the MOH’s focus on achieving the outcomes aforementioned, 
have led to significant regulatory, social and political pressures on DHBs. Specifically, DHBs 
have been pressured to evaluate current practices or institutions; revise health care systems, 
including locality of treatment; and assess established accounting systems and mechanisms 
(or lack thereof) to understand the source of costs and resource consumption. 
While the overall aim of the reforms are clear, DHBs have faced a unique challenge in 
balancing institutional pressures imposed on them by various constituents (with varying 
results). Acknowledging the prospective benefits of sophisticated costing systems compared 
to traditional costing systems (section 2.2), it was expected that DHBs would adopt 
sophisticated costing systems to plan and provide health services, adhere to those institutional 
pressures that are most influential and strive to maintain organisational legitimacy. However, 
“an additional complicating factor in hospitals is that one set of institutional pressures may 
conflict with other sets of pressures” (Krishnan & Yetman, 2011, p. 1006). Specifically, one 
set of institutional pressures can require hospitals to reduce costs by being economically and 
programmatically efficient (Dranove, 1998; Covaleski et al., 2003; Eldenburg & Krishnan, 
2003). Conversely, an alternative set of institutional pressures can constrain managers from 
pursuing opportunities to reduce costs and increase economic value, particularly if such 
opportunities diminish the range and/or quality of health services to sections of society 
(Krishnan & Yetman, 2011). Consistent with theory, results of the current study indicate that 
DHBs adopt and use costing systems on different levels and with differing views about which 
institutional pressures are the most influential (which are discussed next). 
DHBs are exposed to significant regulatory pressures to adopt and use sophisticated costing 
system that adhere to the CCS and enable them to contribute event-level cost information to 
the NCCPP for the various work programmes they run (i.e. benchmarking, productivity 
evaluations, national pricing, regional and national service planning). While DHBs face these 
pressures, the CCG also advises that the costs of providing such information should not 
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 outweigh the benefits of generating it (Cooper, 1988). As a result, smaller secondary DHBs 
have a tendency to refrain from adopting and using sophisticated costing systems, as the 
significant cost of establishing and operating such systems cannot be justified. 
DHBs are also exposed to significant cultural-cognitive/political pressures to adopt and use 
sophisticated costing systems, which are placed on them by other DHBs and the MOH. These 
pressures are placed on DHBs because the MOH expects DHBs to plan and provide services 
to meet their directives and outcomes. If a DHB does not make use of a sophisticated costing 
system, their ability to provide information to the National Event-level Cost Data Cube is 
nonexistent. Consequently, those DHBs without sophisticated costing systems are not be able 
to (1) compare their cost structures and cost information with other DHB’s; (2) determine if 
there are opportunities to create process improvements or reduce waste based on that 
information; and (3) efficiently and effectively plan services with other DHBs in the region to 
maximise use of their limited capacity. 
DHBs are also exposed to significant social/normative pressures, which are placed on them 
by the general public. However, the impact of these pressures on adoption and use of 
sophisticated costing systems is changeable based on (1) the public’s expectations about how 
the organisation should conduct its operations (Ruef & Scott, 1998); and (2) the DHB’s 
perceptions about which institutional pressures are the most influential and how they should 
respond to them to ensure organisational survival (Scott, 2001; Kostova et al. 2008). Some 
DHBs have institutionalised sophisticated costing systems that enable them to better 
understand their cost structures, provide cost and volume information to the NCCPP (to 
inform National Price for IDFs) and plan and provide health services to achieve the MOH’s 
directives and desired outcomes. These DHBs tend to believe that adopting and using 
sophisticated costing systems for the purposes aforementioned will provide the best 
opportunity for the DHB to meet the health needs of the general public and thus, enable them 
to maintain organisational legitimacy. Conversely, other DHBs have reverted to 
unsophisticated costing systems, as they do not believe the information benefits of more 
sophisticated costing systems outweigh the costs of operating them. These DHBs tend to 
believe that reducing spending in administrative areas, instead opting to use their limited 
capacity in other areas such as service provision, will provide the best opportunity for the 
DHB to meet the health needs of the general public and thus, enable them to maintain 
organisational legitimacy. The differences in adoption and use of costing systems highlights 
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 how different DHBs view institutional pressures and that these views will change based on 
their own internal organisational environment (i.e. a small secondary DHB is less likely to 
use a sophisticated costing system compared a large tertiary DHB). 
9.3 Costing Systems and Costing Information 
Concordant with Cooper (1988), the CCG stresses that the benefits derived from information 
should meet or exceed the costs of providing the information. Therefore, DHBs operate 
costing systems on three levels based on the perceived costs and benefits of generating cost 
information (with consideration for their individual organisational structure). The three levels 
that DHBs operate costing systems on include (1) unsophisticated costing systems that are 
not formally recognised; (2) moderately sophisticated costing systems (such as CostPro) that 
are formally recognised; and (3) sophisticated costing systems (such as PPM) that are 
formally recognised. Using their respective costing systems in conjunction with the CCS and 
the CCGL, DHBs calculate costing information to be used for various purposes.  
Those DHBs with unsophisticated costing systems cost at the MSG level (i.e. at Cost Pool 
level). To allocate direct patient care and clinical support costs to cost pools is relatively 
straightforward, as these costs are directly associated with the delivery of a specific service. 
However, to allocate overhead is more difficult, as these costs generally cannot be directly 
associated with the provision of a specific service. To allocate overhead, service-level DHBs 
tend to use a single arbitrary DHB-wide overhead allocation rate based on FTEs or total cost, 
which is consistent with Al-Omiri & Drury’s (2007) sophistication continuum for simplistic 
traditional systems. Using FTE or Total Cost to allocate overhead makes it virtually 
impossible to cost down to a patient level, as there is not the depth of knowledge to 
accurately trace causal relationships between indirect costs and individual patient events 
(which utilise activities from multiple services both directly and indirectly).  
Though allocating indirect costs using FTEs or total cost is the most suitable approach for 
DHBs that have unsophisticated costing systems (because there is an inability to ascertain 
what drives the incurrence of these costs and where/how they should be allocated), this can 
impact on the quality of cost information for decision-making (Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994; 
Geri & Ronen, 2005). Specifically, service planning can be less effective, as DHBs with an 
unsophisticated costing system do not have an accurate understanding of the costs associated 
with service provision or how to control them (Cooper & Kaplan, 1992; Hussain & 
Gunasekaran, 2001). Cost comparisons between DHBs with unsophisticated and 
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 sophisticated costing systems is severely limited too, as service costs for DHBs with 
unsophisticated costing systems can often be inconsistent, incomparable or incomplete 
(OAG, 2013). 
Those DHBs with more sophisticated costing systems cost at the patient event-level. Unlike 
service-level DHBs, in which many of the CCS are offered as a guide to costing, event-level 
DHBs are expected to follow the Standards and ABC methodologies specified therein 
rigorously. To use the CCS congruously with their respective costing systems, event-level 
DHBs should apply the principle of full absorption to determine the cost of a patient event. 
This means that any cost that is caused by the delivery of health care, whether it is direct or 
indirect in nature, should be allocated to activities associated with a patient event in order to 
have a complete cost for the event (Brown et al., 2003; Al-Omiri & Drury, 2007). To allocate 
overheads to patient events, event-level DHBs with moderately sophisticated costing systems 
will tend to use a combination of duration cost drivers and transaction cost drivers (for first 
stage and second stage allocation), which is consistent with Al-Omiri & Drury’s (2007) 
sophistication continuum for sophisticated ABC systems. To allocate overheads to patient 
events, event-level DHBs with sophisticated costing systems will tend to use duration cost 
drivers rather than transaction drivers (for first stage and second stage allocation), which is 
consistent with Al-Omiri & Drury’s (2007) sophistication continuum for highly sophisticated 
ABC systems. This allocation process requires event-level DHBs to develop thorough 
understandings of how overhead costs are incurred, which can often lead to in-depth analysis 
to successfully identify activities or processes and the first stage and second stage cost drivers 
associated with each activity or process (Baker, 1994; Al-Omiri & Drury, 2007). 
While the CCS are not mandated, and as such, event-level DHBs are not obliged to follow 
them precisely as they are set out, this does not raise concerns over inconsistent applications. 
This is because all DHBs are actively involved in the CCG and as a member of the Group 
they all strive to reduce discrepancy. That is, there is sufficient cultural-cognitive/political 
pressure on DHBs to apply the CCS appropriately. If there are inconsistencies between DHBs 
that have a similar demographic or hospital structure, the Group will consult the CCS to 
ascertain how they were applied and why there are such inconsistencies. Often the Standards 
are applied dissimilarly because they were not described well enough to accommodate some 
scenarios or the description may not be clear enough, which creates opportunities for 
misinterpretation. To mitigate misinterpretation of CCS, the CCG and NCCPP constantly 
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 offer training sessions and forums to provide better visibility for how to cost, how costs are 
derived and how costing information impacts on National Pricing work. This can be viewed 
as a direct response to normative/social pressures, as the MOH seeks to align perceptions of 
DHB practices and characteristics with social and cultural values (in order to gain or retain 
organisational legitimacy) (Deegan, 2006). In addition, significant regulatory pressures are 
placed on DHBs, as the MOH has the authority to withhold funding, to impose a management 
regime, and in extreme cases, replace a Board if it finds a DHB under-performing. In 
practice, these powers are rarely used, as they are seen as drastic measures and are likely to 
produce unwanted effects, such as running a DHB into deficit and reduced public confidence 
in the New Zealand public health sector (which can have the effect of reduced organisational 
legitimacy). 
9.4 Service Planning and Provision 
The PFU of each DHB will choose to provide health services or purchase health services 
from multiple other providers based on local need and availability of resources. The main 
health service provider for each district is the DHB hospital, which is owned and funded by 
the DHB. Each DHB hospital is called the Provider Arm and mainly provides hospital-related 
services. For selected health care activities, DHB’s will contract directly with other providers 
besides the main Provider Arms, such as private hospitals, primary care, and mental health, 
disability and community services. The Provider Arms themselves can also subcontract to 
these other agencies where necessary. In addition, DHBs purchase services from other 
DHB’s Provider Arms through IDFs. As all appropriations include funding for IDFs, DHBs 
are required to reimburse each other for IDFs from this funding. 
As noted in the previous section, DHBs with unsophisticated costing systems do not have an 
accurate understanding of the costs associated with service provision. In many instances these 
DHBs can identify where their direct costs originate, but they are severely disadvantaged 
when it comes to understanding, monitoring and controlling their indirect costs. Though 
DHBs in this situation can make use of other DHBs cost data through the National Event-
level Cost Data Cube, there is an inability to determine the accuracy of their own costs for 
service provision and how these costs compare to other DHBs with a more in-depth 
understandings of their cost structures. This is largely because an unsophisticated costing 
system, which makes use of a single arbitrary DHB-wide overhead allocation rate based on 
FTEs or total cost, is likely to report distorted product and service costs (Cooper & Kaplan, 
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 1992). As a result, DHBs that operate unsophisticated costing systems cannot accurately 
calculate the costs required to treat individual patient events, which can severely impact the 
process of service planning and provision. 
For DHBs with more sophisticated costing systems, there is greater opportunity to 
understand, monitor and control costs associated with the provision of health services. In 
addition, these DHBs have greater means to make decisions associated with service planning 
and provision. This is consistent with literature, which states that the information costing 
systems generate plays a major role in the decision-making process and has a crucial 
influence on organisational performance. Specifically, the information sophisticated costing 
systems generate can be used more effectively to determine product and/or service mix 
(Brown et al., 2003; Geri & Ronen, 2005). The ability to make effective product and/or 
service mix decisions is attributed to the fact that they are familiar with their cost structures 
and have access to data stored in the National Event-level Cost Data Cube. These two events 
have given such DHBs greater opportunities to compare and analyse cost information to 
make decisions associated with planning and provision of health services (including whether 
or not to provide services internally or outsource to other providers). 
Beyond service planning at the district level, the costing information provided by these DHBs 
with more sophisticated costing systems can be used at the regional and national level. As the 
results of the current study demonstrate, one DHB uses the costing information generated by 
their sophisticated costing system to consider various strategic emphases associated with 
planning and funding the provision of health services, both to their own DHB population and 
across regional boundaries. Specifically, the DHB has started exploring their costs and 
volumes to make decisions associated with product and service mix – the goal of which is to 
maximise utilisation of their constrained capacity to achieve the directives and outcomes 
outlined by the MOH. The DHB’s costing system, with its emphasis on ABC, is able to break 
down the patient event into specific detailed activities and show the disaggregated cost of the 
DRG event (including the marginal costs of taking on each additional volume), which is 
consistent with Canby’s (1995) findings. This level of detail is vital for the types of decisions 
described above, as it highlights (1) whether or not the DHB can take on additional volumes 
given its spare capacity; and (2) whether or not it is cost-effective to actually take on the 
volumes. 
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 9.5 Costing Information: Other Uses 
Aside from service planning and provision, the cost information generated by DHBs costing 
systems is used for a variety of other purposes. From an internal organisational perspective, 
DHBs will use their own and other DHBs cost information to evaluate performance year-on-
year and determine if there are opportunities to gain operational control and eliminate waste 
(Chan, 1993; Ramsey, 1994; Canby, 1995; Ross, 2004; Lawson, 2005; Yereli, 2009; Shander 
et al., 2010). Consistent with the literature (which states that ABC systems can be used to 
control costs and make strategic decisions), DHBs will use such systems to (1) identify key 
activities involved in health services; (2) where process improvements can be made; and (3) 
where non-value added activities can be eliminated, while ensuring proper functionality of 
each service. DHBs tend to use cost information for these purposes because they face 
significant institutional pressures from the MOH to ensure they provide low cost high quality 
health services that are sustainable into the future. Moreover, because DHBs have limited 
capacity it is crucial to their organisational legitimacy that they consider opportunities to gain 
operational control and eliminate waste. This is largely due to the fact that they face 
significant social/normative pressures to provide a range of high quality health services to 
meet the needs of the general public. If a DHB is unable to provide a full range of services to 
meet the demands placed on them by users of the New Zealand public health sector their 
existence and organisational legitimacy will be brought into question. This is because an 
inability to provide sustained high quality health services to the general public will lead to 
reduced public confidence and a belief that DHBs are reneging on the obligations (expressed 
or implied) of their social contract (Shocker & Sethi, 1974; Suchman, 1995; Ruef & Scott, 
1998; Deegan, 2006). 
From an organisational-field perspective, the cost information generated by DHBs’ costing 
systems is used for a variety of other purposes. Firstly, the cost information is used by the 
CCG to maintain the CCS and the CCGL. Specifically, the CCG assembles quarterly to 
discuss the application of the CCS and interpretation of the CCGL. The main motivation for 
these quarterly meetings is to determine whether or not the Standards and the Guidelines are 
fulfilling their main purposes, and to ensure they are appropriate for the wider business group 
(the DHBs collectively). Thus, significant regulatory and political pressures are placed on 
DHBs to adopt and use sophisticated costing systems, as the information they provide to the 
MOH is essential to the work they perform to maintain the Standards and the Guidelines.  
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 Also, from an organisational-field perspective, the cost information generated by DHBs’ 
costing systems is used by the NCCPP for a variety of other purposes. These purposes 
include updating the price book for IDF prices; setting the tertiary adjuster pool; developing 
casemix caseweights; populating the National Event-level Cost Data Cube; reviewing priority 
areas in non-casemix pricing; supporting work on pricing mental health and elective services; 
producing key pricing information for DHB comparisons by the NCCPP; contributing to the 
strategic review of pricing in the MOH; re-producing data to allow DHBs and other key 
groups to undertake further analysis. To run these work programmes, the NCCPP requests 
that DHBs provide information from their Provider Arms annually. Thus, significant 
regulatory and political pressures are placed on DHBs to adopt and use sophisticated costing 
systems, as the information they provide to the NCCPP is essential to their work and the 
functionality of the health sector as a means to deliver sustained high quality health services. 
9.6 Approaches to Transfer Pricing for Inter-DHB Trading 
There are two main approaches used to calculate transfer prices for inter-DHB trading. The 
first approach (i.e. the main approach) is National Price, which is a form of cost-based 
transfer pricing that is calculated by the NCCPP. The main motivation for developing 
National Prices is to facilitate efficient and effective inter-DHB trading within the sector. To 
assist the NCCPP in setting National Prices for IDFs, the MOH has developed a set of CCS 
(based on ABC principles) that serve as common but not mandatory standards for costing 
health services. To calculate National Prices, the NCCPP has requested that all DHBs provide 
cost, revenue and volume information from their Provider Arms every November using these 
standards. As per the OPF, all DHBs are required to provide information in line with the 
NCCPP data request at either service-level or event-level. The 7 DHBs with unsophisticated 
costing systems provide data at the service-level, while the 13 DHBs that have adopted and 
currently maintain sophisticated costing systems provide data at the event-level. This process 
of standardised costing and rigorous cost collection to set transfer prices is consistent with the 
literature. To elaborate, Colbert & Spicer (1998); Desheh et al. (1997) and Stevenson & 
Cabell (2002) recognise the importance that high-quality information has on transfer pricing. 
Moreover, they all state that ABC can be used to provide such information. 
The literature states that a full cost-based transfer price is based on the total cost of the 
provider’s product, and is equivalent to the variable costs plus fixed costs per transfer unit 
(Colbert & Spicer, 1998). National Price is effectively a full-cost based transfer price, in that 
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 it is based on the full cost of a patient event. Though cost-based transfer pricing is a credible 
substitute to market-based pricing, there is an inherent expectation that organisations 
applying this approach can calculate accurate product and/or service costs (Atkinson et al., 
2007). This is equally important in the calculation of National Prices. Thus, the MOH and 
NCCPP place regulatory pressures on all DHBs to institutionalise sophisticated costing 
systems so they can submit cost and volume information to inform National Price (and 
contribute to a more efficient price representative of all DHBs costs to serve). Though the 
MOH and DHB’s acknowledge that use of sophisticated costing systems with ABC 
methodologies is crucial to the calculation of National Price, there is also a realisation that 
not all DHBs are prepared to implement such systems. 
An additional concern created by setting National Prices at full cost is the fact that it 
demotivates the buying DHB from purchasing services in the inter-organisational 
environment. Kaplan (1982, p. 483) views this as “the essence of the transfer pricing 
conundrum”. The findings of the current study reaffirm the presence of the transfer pricing 
conundrum. Specifically, findings reveal that one DHB, which has been hit really hard with 
IDFs in recent years, has been forced to consider alternative approaches to service provision 
beyond IDFs. This consideration stems from the realisation that National Prices for IDFs are 
more costly than using private providers in the external market or providing the same 
services through their own Provider Arm at marginal cost (if there is spare capacity to do so). 
While the DHB has stated that they would prefer to use the resources and capacity available 
to them in the public system, if prices continue to deteriorate their bottom-line they will be 
compelled to use such alternatives as those aforementioned. 
The second approach to transfer pricing applied in the New Zealand public health sector is 
negotiated transfer pricing. While DHBs are permitted to negotiate their own prices, typically 
they will trust the efficiency of National Prices and save resources, which can otherwise be 
expended on lengthy price and volume negotiations. This is consistent with the transfer 
pricing literature, which states that the main weaknesses of the negotiated transfer pricing 
approach are that it can be a very time-consuming process, lead to inter-divisional conflict, 
and lead to sub-optimal output levels if the negotiated price is too high (Kaplan & Atkinson, 
1989). Notwithstanding the weaknesses of negotiated transfer pricing, some DHBs have 
performed work on an alternative transfer pricing methodology that they see as a “true and 
fair” marginal cost, rather than the full cost represented by National Price, the aim of which is 
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 to charge DHBs of Domicile a price that reflects the actual costs incurred by DHBs of 
Service to treat patients. Though results of the current study do not confirm whether or not 
negotiated transfer pricing is being applied, it is likely that in instances where DHBs are 
using this approach they will agree on a price somewhere between marginal and full cost. 
9.7 DHB Collaboration 
Acknowledging concerns with the current approach to calculating National Prices for IDFs, 
DHBs have increased collaboration to meet the needs of their DHB populations. In addition 
to negotiating transfer prices away from National Price and outside the IDF network, which 
has been discussed in the previous section, DHBs have started collaborating for the purposes 
of service planning at regional level. Some DHBs have also moved to more drastic means of 
collaboration to meet the needs of their DHB populations. One example explored as part of 
the current study is the 3DHB Programme. The increased collaboration between DHBs 
through the 3DHB Programme has largely been in response to concerns that planning at 
district level was insufficiently aligned with national objectives, and inter-district co-
ordination too weak, leading to inefficiencies, duplication of services and concerns about 
future sustainability (Ettelt et al., 2012). 
The CLG designed the 3DHB Programme to fit the constantly changing environment of 
health care (i.e. the patient population) and support clinical integration of services with the 
aim of providing quality, accessible and efficient services that will be sustainable across the 
region. The collaboration means new and in some cases radically different ways of thinking 
and working. The collaboration also drives a process of organisational change, in which 
current institutions at the participating DHBs are revised or replaced to ensure organisational 
survival (Scott, 2001; Kostova et al. 2008). As a primary example, the PFUs have combined 
to form a single unit called SIDU. Under SIDU there is one director and all planning and 
funding decisions are made with respect to the whole region and a shared financial bottom-
line. The main benefit of SIDU is that capacity can be used more effectively and efficiently to 
arrange the best mix of local services, equitable access to quality services and high 
performing centres of excellence to meet health needs of the shared population. 
Though the 3DHB Programme has been developed with a clear vision in mind, it has created 
a significant change to the organisational environment in which the participating DHBs 
operate. As a result, the collaboration may create internal conflicts and tensions between the 
participating DHBs, particularly during the transition phase. Specifically, there may be 
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 resistance to change if DHB staff does not understand the benefits of the collaboration or they 
do not agree with the collective processes being implemented to purchase, fund and cost 
health services. This could have the effect of undermining the programme and reducing its 
overall effectiveness. As Scott (2001, p. 189) states, institutions can often be in conflict 
during the process of institutionalisation and will compete with each other by prescribing 
“varying forms and activities for participants, with the winners and losers to be sorted out 
over time”. This process can potentially be problematic as it may undermine the legitimacy of 
the organisations operating under the 3DHB Programme. As the participating DHBs are to be 
united by a common objective to provide quality, accessible and efficient health services 
without incurring a deficit, there is regulatory pressure and cultural-cognitive/political 
pressure on them to work in harmony. To alleviate concerns created by internal tensions and 
conflicts, the CLG needs to ensure it (1) takes leadership of the Programme; (2) clearly 
conveys the vision to participating DHBs; and (3) convinces the DHBs that the partnership 
knows what it wants to achieve and how it is going to achieve it. This will hopefully have the 
dual effect of creating buy-in and ensuring everyone works together towards one common 
goal with a shared vision and values. 
Additionally, there are may be potential implications to the organisational legitimacy of the 
DHBs involved in the collaboration, particularly if members of the public do not understand 
the purpose of the programme or its intended benefits to them as users of the New Zealand 
public health sector. That is, confidence in the health sector may be reduced if the general 
public believes the overall impact of the collaboration is a reduction in the range and 
availability of services to them (i.e. DHBs are reneging on their social contract to provide 
sustained high quality health services). This potential negative outcome is reaffirmed by Ruef 
& Scott (1998), who state that society (which comprises patients, donors and other 
community members) will tend to hold a set of expectations about how a health care 
organisation should conduct its operations. The best way to alleviate the potential for reduced 
organisational legitimacy is to ensure continued public confidence. To achieve this, clear 
communication channels between the 3DHB Programme and the general public need to be 
established, so the vision and proposed benefits thereof can be conveyed clearly and 
convincingly to the general public. 
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 9.8 Contributions 
This study’s results contribute to the academic literature and have implications for practice, 
which are discussed next. Firstly, the results of the current study contribute to cost accounting 
literature. Specifically, the results of the current study reveal that DHBs adopt and use 
costing systems with varying levels of sophistication, including unsophisticated costing 
systems that are not formally recognised, moderately sophisticated costing systems based on 
ABC principles (such as CostPro) that are formally recognised and sophisticated costing 
systems based on ABC principles (such as PPM) that are formally recognised. Additionally, 
the results demonstrate that DHBs tend to adopt and use sophisticated costing systems to plan 
and provide health services. However, the factors outlined by Cooper (1988) do not always 
lead to adoption and use of more sophisticated costing systems, despite DHBs identifying 
that such factors are present in their organisation (i.e. provision of numerous products and 
services; and organisational operations are multi-faceted and complex). Rather, the results 
indicate that DHBs will consider a range of political, economic and social factors when 
evaluating the usefulness of more sophisticated costing systems to assist in the planning and 
provision of health services. 
The results also contribute to cost accounting literature in that they suggest adoption and use 
of sophisticated costing systems provides higher quality cost information, and that this leads 
to more informed and effective decision-making. To elaborate, DHBs with sophisticated 
costing systems understand their costs and cost structures for effective service planning and 
provision. To provide an example, DHBs with sophisticated costing systems will evaluate 
their cost information to determine whether or not it is cost effective to retain patients and 
provide care at their own Provider Arm, as opposed to referring patients out to another DHB. 
DHBs will also evaluate their cost and volume information to make decisions associated with 
product and service mix – the goal of which is to maximise utilisation of their constrained 
capacity (including taking on volumes for other DHBs). 
The results also contribute to transfer pricing literature. Specifically, the results reveal that 
the main transfer pricing approach applied by DHBs for the purpose of IDFs is National Price 
(which is a variation of full cost-based transfer pricing that is specific to the New Zealand 
public health sector). The results also contribute to transfer pricing literature by (1) 
reaffirming the presence of the transfer pricing conundrum through the full cost-based 
transfer pricing approach; and (2) that DHBs will tend to negotiate prices away from National 
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 Price if they do not believe it is efficient. These results support suggestions made by Ashton 
et al. (2008) that the mechanisms used to inform prices unfairly affect smaller secondary 
DHBs due to the excessive influence tertiary DHB’s supposedly have over the National Price 
setting process. Finally, the results contribute to literature on the nexus between costing 
systems and transfer pricing (IDFs). Specifically, the results of the current study indicate that 
adoption and use of sophisticated costing systems (based on ABC), contributes markedly to 
IDFs. In particular, the event-level cost information provided by DHB’s with sophisticated 
costing systems is used directly to calculate National Prices for inter-DHB trading.  
9.9 Limitations and Future Research 
Despite this study’s contributions to academic literature and practice, it has a number of 
limitations (notwithstanding the limitations of MCS research outlined at Chapter 4) that 
correspond to opportunities for future research. Firstly, this study focused on the views and 
opinions of CFOs, PFAs and MOH representatives. Though the choice of interview 
participants was deliberate (by selecting participants that had a detailed knowledge of their 
organisational environment, the costing systems used by DHBs and IDF processes), so to 
guarantee the validity of findings and ensure appropriate conclusions were made, this study’s 
findings were limited by a lack of consideration of the views and opinions of other personnel, 
such as medical personnel. As Ross (2004) notes, there is a clear division between medical 
and accounting personnel, which negatively affects each, as well as patients, the health 
delivery system, and society. Specifically, medical personnel often have a negative ill-
informed view of costing systems (and the perceived benefits thereof). This can create a 
culture of resistance to change, which may severely impede the successfulness of strategy 
and constrain opportunities to improve efficiency within an organisation (Drury & Tayles, 
1995). While this is stated in the cost accounting literature, the current study is unable to 
contribute to this literature because it does not explore the views and opinions of medical 
personnel. As a result, future research could be conducted, by interviewing medical 
personnel, to gain insights into their views and opinions on the functionality of costing 
systems and IDF processes in a New Zealand public health sector context. 
Secondly, the current study highlights an opportunity to conduct future research into the 
calculation of transfer prices for IDFs in the New Zealand public health sector. As the 
findings indicate, one DHB has done work on an alternative transfer pricing methodology 
that they see as a “true and fair” marginal cost, rather than the full cost represented by 
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 National Price. To better understanding the intricacies of this work, and assess its 
applicability to IDFs, an in-depth case study could be conducted at the DHB site. 
Furthermore, the current study focused on transfer pricing at an inter-organisational level (i.e. 
between DHBs). Thus, there is a further opportunity to contribute to the literature by 
considering the process of transfer pricing from an intra-organisational level (i.e. between 
divisions of a single DHB). As a majority of the literature cited and reviewed considers 
transfer pricing at an intra-organisational level, conducting an in-depth case study at a DHB 
or a MCS at several DHBs, would be a valuable contribution to the literature. 
9.10 Chapter Summary 
This study has examined the costing systems used by DHBs to plan and provide health 
services and it has evaluated how the use of such costing systems influences service planning 
and provision in accordance with the directives and outcomes outlined by the MOH. In 
particular, this study has revealed that costing systems are being used on three levels, 
including unsophisticated costing systems that are not formally recognised; moderately 
sophisticated costing systems (such as CostPro) that are formally recognised; and 
sophisticated costing systems (such as PPM) that are formally recognised. This study has also 
explored how more sophisticated costing techniques, such as ABC, are used by DHBs to (1) 
enhance the utilisation of limited resources; and (2) adhere to social expectations to provide 
sustained high quality health services. This study has also contributed to transfer pricing 
literature from a New Zealand public health sector context by exploring the processes that 
underpin IDFs, including (1) how National Prices for IDFs are calculated; and (2) to what 
extent the cost information produced by DHB’s costing systems influences this calculation. 
With consideration to the research framework that was developed for the purposes of this 
study, it is evident (based on the findings of the study) that DHBs have multiple institutions 
and will adopt and adapt these institutions at varying levels based on their differing views 
about which institutional pressures are the most influential. Specifically, DHBs will 
institutionalise costing practices, costing systems, costing rules and procedures, processes for 
the provision of cost and volume information, pricing mechanisms, and product/service mix 
based on their own underlying perceptions of regulatory, social and political pressures. While 
DHBs have tended to adopt and adapt institutions at different levels, they have all done so 
with one overarching goal in mind, to maintain organisational legitimacy and ensure 
organisational survival in the New Zealand public health sector. 
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 II Appendices 
Appendix I Interview Questions for MOH Research Exploration 
Interviewee Name:  
Common Costing Group: 
1) What is the Common Costing Group? 
2) For what purpose was the Common Costing Group formed? 
3) How does the Common Costing Group interact with DHBs (describe relationship)? 
4) Who is involved with the Common Costing Group? 
• Membership 
• Relationships 
• Other influences 
 
5) What does the Common Costing Group provide standards for? 
• Choices 
• Restrictions 
• Flexibility 
• DHB feedback 
 
6) How does the Common Costing Group influence overhead allocation? 
• Choices 
• Restrictions 
• Flexibility 
• DHB feedback 
 
7) What are the advantages and disadvantages of offering these standards as guidelines? 
8) Could mandating these standards be a potential method to alleviate any disadvantages – why?  
National Cost Collection and Pricing Programme (NCCPP) and National Price: 
9) What is the NCCPP? 
10) How many DHBs nationwide provide costing information to this submission? 
11) How does this submission influence national price? 
12) What processes are involved in the calculation of national price? 
13) Are there any difficulties associated with the determination of national price?  
14) Are national prices dominated by costing information from tertiary DHBs? 
15) If possible, how do you think IDF efficiency could be improved? 
16) Should a minimum costing system requirement be imposed on national DHBs to ensure a more complete 
submission to the NCCPP? 
Operational Policy Framework: 
17) What is the OPF? 
18) How is the OPF utilised in the public health sector? 
19) How does the OPF support IDFs between DHBs? 
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 Appendix II Interview Questions for DHB Research Exploration 
Interviewee Name:  
Job Title:  
Department:  
Interview Time:  
Interview Day:  
 
1) What drives use of the current costing system at the DHB? 
 
2) Overhead allocation: 
 -   How does the DHB allocate overheads? 
 -  How does the Common Costing Group influence overhead allocation? 
• Choices 
• Restrictions 
• Flexibility 
• DHB feedback 
 
3) Can you explain how the current costing system at the DHB utilises ABC? 
 
4) Overall, is the current costing system successful? 
 
5) Could you explain any limitations/weaknesses of the current costing system? 
 
6) How do front line/operational staff view the costing system? 
• Ease of use 
• Applicability to organisational structure and goals  
• Relevance of costing information 
• Resistance/reservations 
• What costs does this costing system create and are they justified (overall cost 
versus benefit) 
 
7) Which transfer pricing approach does the DHB use? 
 -   Market-based transfer prices 
 -  Cost-based transfer prices 
• Variable-cost transfer prices 
• Full-cost transfer prices 
 -   Negotiated transfer prices 
 -  Other (please explain) 
 
8) How does the DHB decide which transfer pricing method to use? 
 
9) Could you describe how the DHB uses transfer pricing information for decision-making? 
 -   On an internal basis  
 -  On an external basis 
 
10) How does the current costing system support transfer pricing decisions? 
 -  Internally at the DHB 
 -  Externally to the NCCPP 
 
Acknowledging recent concerns regarding Inter District Flows: 
 
11) Could you explain what these concerns are? 
 
12) How have these concerns been mitigated? 
 
13) Have recent attempts to improve IDF between DHBs your region been successful? 
 
14) Could you explain any additional limitations/weaknesses of the current transfer pricing approach? 
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 Appendix III 
 
31 August 2012 
Dear [Insert Name], 
I am Master of Commerce student at Victoria University of Wellington undertaking a study to explore 
activity-based costing (ABC) and inter-district flows (IDF) in the New Zealand public health sector. 
The key objectives of the research are to provide information on the use of ABC in DHBs and to 
comprehend the efficiency of IDFs between New Zealand public health sector organisations. 
You have been selected as one of the potential participants of my research project because of your 
knowledge and expertise regarding costing systems use and the movement of IDFs (in your DHB/at 
DHBs in the New Zealand public health sector). 
To enable me to complete the study, I would appreciate your co-operation in participating in an 
interview, which will take approximately 45 minutes of your time to complete. If you are interested in 
participating in this research please give me notification via email or telephone. Equally, if you are 
not familiar with the costing system used (in your DHB/at DHBs) or the movement of IDFs to and 
from (your DHB/DHBs in the New Zealand public health sector), please give me notification via 
email or telephone by 30 September 2012. 
The Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee has granted ethics approval for this 
study. The responses provided will be used as support to the main findings of my research project and 
for academic publication. The responses of the survey will be used by me and shared with my 
supervisor. The results of the survey will be reported in a summary format, so your identity will be 
anonymous. All data will be stored securely at Victoria University of Wellington and will be 
destroyed 3 years after the completion of this study. 
If you would like to receive a summary of the transcribed results, please provide your email address to 
either myself or my supervisor, Dr Carolyn Fowler, via email or phone. 
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the research project, 
please contact me at Victoria University of Wellington via: 
Email: matt.vankesteren@vuw.ac.nz  Phone: (027) 630 7750 
Alternatively, you may contact my academic supervisor, Dr Carolyn Fowler, via: 
Email: carolyn.fowler@vuw.ac.nz  Phone: (04) 463 6506 
 
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance in our research efforts. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Matt van Kesteren                                  Dr Carolyn Fowler 
Master of Commerce Student                                                   Senior Lecturer 
Victoria Business School                                                                                   Victoria Business School 
Victoria University of Wellington                     Victoria University of Wellington 
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